From Israel News, 27 September 2010, by Yitzhak Benhorin:
WASHINGTON – Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman met Monday in New York with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon a short time after the latter expressed his disappointment that the West Bank settlement construction moratorium was not being extended beyond its 10-month period.
... Lieberman contended that the freeze "is just an excuse" for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to quit budding peace talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. "For nine months the Palestinians claimed that the freeze is a ploy, and now they have turned it into a lynchpin," said the foreign minister to the UN chief.
After Abbas announced he is awaiting the upcoming meeting of the Arab League at the beginning of October, Lieberman asserted, "If the Arab League is seeking challenges to deal with, there are many in the Arab world. Hundreds of people are killed each week in terrorist attacks, and poverty and despair cry out to the heavens.
"Instead of solving these problems, the leaders of the Arab League prefer to run away from them, and blame Israel for all their internal problems. Instead of dialogue, they prefer to incite the masses against the Jews," added Lieberman.
Lieberman said that Israel is interested in a fair peace agreement. "We are willing to collaborate with the international community and be cooperative, but without compromising on security and Israel's vital interests," he said....
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Sunday, September 26, 2010
The Nakba Obsession
From City Journal, Summer 2010, Vol. 20, No. 3, by Sol Stern*:
The Palestinian national narrative is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East.
... The Nakba is the heart of the Palestinians’ backward-looking national narrative, which depicts the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 as the original sin that dispossessed the land’s native people. Every year, on the anniversary of Israel’s independence, more and more Palestinians (including Arab citizens of Israel) commemorate the Nakba with pageants that express longing for a lost paradise. Every year, the legend grows of the crimes committed against the Palestinians in 1948, crimes now routinely equated with the Holocaust. Echoing the Nakba narrative is an international coalition of leftists that celebrates the Palestinians as the quintessential Other, the last victims of Western racism and colonialism.
There is only one just compensation for the long history of suffering, say the Palestinians and their allies: turning the clock back to 1948. ...[the "right of return"]... All Palestinian refugees—not just those still alive of the hundreds of thousands who fled in 1948, but their millions of descendants as well—would be allowed to return to Jaffa, Haifa, the Galilee, and all the villages that Palestinian Arabs once occupied.
Such a step would mean suicide for Israel as a Jewish state, which is why Israel would never countenance it. At the very least, then, the Nakba narrative precludes Middle East peace. But it’s also, as it happens, a myth—a radical distortion of history.
...During the 1948 war and for many years afterward, the Western world—including the international Left—expressed hardly any moral outrage about the Palestinian refugees. This had nothing to do with Western racism or colonialism and much to do with recent history. The fighting in Palestine had broken out only two years after the end of the costliest military conflict ever, in which the victors exacted a terrible price on the losers. By that, I don’t mean the Nazi officials and their “willing executioners,” who received less punishment than they deserved, but the 11 million ethnic Germans living in Central and Eastern Europe—civilians all—who were expelled from their homes and force-marched to Germany by the Red Army, with help from the Czech and Polish governments and with the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill. Historians estimate that 2 million died on the way. Around the same time, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two new countries, India and Pakistan; millions of Hindus and Muslims moved from one to the other, and hundreds of thousands died in related violence. Against this background, the West was not likely to be troubled by the exodus of a little more than half a million Palestinians after a war launched by their own leaders.
...The Palestinians were also compromised by the fact that their leader in 1948, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, had been a Nazi collaborator during the war.
In fact, I. F. Stone, the most revered left-wing journalist of the day, was one of the most influential American advocates for the Zionist cause. I have in my possession a book by Stone called This Is Israel, distributed by Boni and Gaer, a major commercial publisher at the time. The book, based on Stone’s reporting during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, has become a collector’s item by virtue of the fact that Stone’s fans want to forget that it ever existed. Of the four adoring biographies of the great muckraker published in the last decade, only one even mentions that Stone wrote This Is Israel—and then shrugs off its significance in a few paragraphs.
It’s obvious why the book would be embarrassing to today’s leftist critics of Israel and Zionism. It opens with a foreword by Bartley Crum, the prominent American lawyer, businessman, and publisher of PM, the most widely read progressive newspaper of the 1940s. Crum evokes “the miracles [that the Israelis] have performed in peace and war. . . . They have built beautiful modern cities, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa on the edge of the wilderness. . . . They have set up a government which is a model of democracy.” His friend and star correspondent, Izzy Stone, has “set down what he knows and what he has seen, simply, truthfully and eloquently.” We Americans, Crum concludes, “can, through this book, warm ourselves in the glory of a free people who made a two thousand year dream come true in their own free land.”
Accompanied by famed war photographer Robert Capa’s iconic images of male and female Israeli soldiers, Stone’s text reads like a heroic epic. He writes of newborn Israel as a “tiny bridgehead” of 650,000 up against 30 million Arabs and 300 million Muslims and argues that Israel’s “precarious borders,” created by the United Nations’ November 1947 partition resolution, are almost indefensible. “Arab leaders made no secret of their intentions,” Stone writes, and then quotes the head of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzam: “This war will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades.”
Palestinian leaders reminded Stone of the fascists he had fought with his pen since the Spanish Civil War. He ticks off the names of several Nazi collaborators prominent among the Arab military units that poured into Palestine after passage of the UN’s resolution. In addition to the grand mufti, they included the head of the Arab Liberation Army, Fawzi el-Kaukji, who took part in the fascist revolt against the British in Iraq in 1940 and then escaped to Berlin, where he recruited Balkan Muslims for the Wehrmacht. Another Palestinian military commander, Sheik Hassan Bey Salameh, was a “former staff officer under Rommel,” Stone writes. “Salameh had last appeared in Palestine in 1944 when he was dropped as a Reichswehr major for sabotage duties.” For good measure, Stone adds, “German Nazis, Polish reactionaries, Yugoslav Chetniks, and Bosnian Moslems flocked [into Palestine] for the war against the Jews.”
And how does Stone explain the war’s surprising outcome and the sudden exodus of the Palestinian Arabs? “Ill-armed, outnumbered, however desperate their circumstances, the Jews stood fast.” The Palestinians, by contrast, began to run away almost as soon as the fighting began. “First the wealthiest families went,” Stone recounts. “While the Arab guerrillas were moving in, the Arab civilian population was moving out.” Stone blames the grand mufti for giving explicit orders to the Palestinians to abandon Haifa, which had the largest Arab community of any city assigned to the Jewish state under the UN’s partition plan.
What is most revealing about the book is the issue that Stone does not write about: the fate of the refugees after their exodus. Stone undoubtedly shared the conventional wisdom at the time: that wars inevitably produced refugees and that the problem was best handled by resettlement in the countries to which those refugees moved. Stone surely expected that the Arab countries to which the Palestinian refugees had moved would eventually absorb them as full citizens. That outcome wouldn’t be perfect justice, but it would limit Palestinian suffering and open the doors to a reasonable and permanent settlement of the conflict. Stone also knew that Israel was in the process of absorbing an almost equal number of impoverished Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, most of whom had been forced out of their homes and lost all their property in places where they had lived for hundreds of years.
Stone could never have foreseen that for the next 62 years, the Palestinians would remain in those terrible refugee camps—not just in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but in Lebanon, Syria, and present-day Jordan as well. Nor could Stone have imagined that not one Arab country would move to absorb the refugees and offer them citizenship, or that the Palestinians’ leaders would insist on keeping the refugees locked up in the camps for the purpose of dramatizing their Nakba narrative.
...Earlier this year, another pathbreaking work of historical scholarship appeared that, if facts mattered at all in this debate, would put the final nail in the coffin of the Nakba myth. The book is Palestine Betrayed, by Efraim Karsh, head of the Middle East program at King’s College London. Karsh has delved deeper into the British and Israeli archives—and some Arab ones—than any previous historian of the period. He deftly uses this new material to seal the case that the Nakba was, to a large extent, brought on by the Palestinians’ own leaders.
For example, using detailed notes kept by key players in Haifa, Karsh provides a poignant description of an April 1948 meeting attended by Haifa’s Arab officials, officers of the nascent Israeli military, Mayor Shabtai Levy, and Major General Hugh Stockwell, the British military commander of Haifa. Levy, in tears, begged the Arab notables, some of whom were his personal friends, to tell their people to stay in their homes and promised that no harm would befall them. The Zionists desperately wanted the Arabs of Haifa to stay put in order to show that their new state would treat its minorities well. However, exactly as Stone reported in This Is Israel, the Arab leaders told Levy that they had been ordered out and even threatened by the Arab Higher Committee, chaired by the grand mufti from his exile in Cairo...
In describing the battle for Jaffa, the Arab city adjoining Tel Aviv, Karsh uses British military archives to show that the Israelis again promised the Arabs that they could stay if they laid down their arms. But the mufti’s orders again forbade it. In retrospect, it is clear that the mufti wanted the Arabs of Haifa and Jaffa to leave because he feared not that they would be in danger but that their remaining would provide greater legitimacy to the fledgling Jewish state.
Unfortunately, no amount of documentation and evidence about what really happened in 1948 will puncture the Nakba narrative. The tale of dispossession has been institutionalized now, an essential part of the Palestinians’ armament for what they see as the long struggle ahead. It has become the moral basis for their insistence on the refugees’ right to return to Israel, which in turn leads them to reject one reasonable two-state peace plan after another. In the meantime, the more radical Palestinians continue to insist that the only balm for the Nakba is the complete undoing of the historical crime of Zionism—either eliminating Israel or submerging it into a secular democratic state called Palestine. (The proposal is hard to take seriously from adherents of a religion and a culture that abjure secularism and allow little democracy.)
Nor will the facts about 1948 impress the European and American leftists who are part of the international Nakba coalition. The Nakba narrative of Zionism as a movement of white colonial oppressors victimizing innocent Palestinians is strengthened by radical modes of thought now dominant in the Western academy.
Postmodernists and postcolonialists have adapted Henry Ford’s adage that “history is bunk” to their own political purposes. According to the radical professors, there is no factual or empirical history that we can trust—only competing “narratives.” For example, there is the dominant establishment narrative of American history, and then there is the counter-narrative, written by professors like the late Howard Zinn, which speaks for neglected and forgotten Americans.
Just so, the Palestinian counter-narrative of the Nakba can now replace the old, discredited Zionist narrative, regardless of actual historical facts. And thanks to what the French writer Pascal Bruckner has called the Western intelligentsia’s new “tyranny of guilt”—a self-effacement that forbids critical inquiry into the historical narratives of those national movements granted the sanctified status of “oppressed”—the Nakba narrative cannot even be challenged.
This makes for a significant subculture in the West devoted to the delegitimization of Israel and the Zionist idea. To leftists, for whom Israel is now permanently on trial, Stone’s 1948 love song to Zionism has conveniently been disappeared, just as Trotsky was once disappeared by the Soviet Union and its Western supporters (of whom, let us not forget, Stone was one). Thus Tony Judt can write in The New York Review of Books—the same prestigious journal in which Stone began publishing his reconsiderations of Zionism—that Israel is, after all, just an “anachronism” and a historical blunder.
Several years ago, I briefly visited the largest refugee camp in the West Bank: Balata, inside the city of Nablus. Many of the camp’s approximately 20,000 residents are the children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren of the Arab citizens of Jaffa who fled their homes in early 1948.
For half a century, the United Nations has administered Balata as a quasi-apartheid welfare ghetto. The Palestinian Authority does not consider the residents of Balata citizens of Palestine; they do not vote on municipal issues, and they receive no PA funding for roads or sanitation. The refugee children—though after 60 years, calling young children “refugees” is absurd—go to separate schools run by UNRWA, the UN’s refugee-relief agency. The “refugees” are crammed into an area of approximately one square kilometer, and municipal officials prohibit them from building outside the camp’s official boundaries, making living conditions ever more cramped as the camp’s population grows. In a building called the Jaffa Cultural Center—financed by the UN, which means our tax dollars—Balata’s young people are undoubtedly nurtured on the myth that someday soon they will return in triumph to their ancestors’ homes by the Mediterranean Sea.
In Balata, history has come full circle. During the 1948 war, Palestinian leaders like Haj Amin al-Husseini insisted that the Arab citizens of Haifa and Jaffa had to leave, lest they help legitimize the Jewish state. Now, the descendants of those citizens are locked up in places like Balata and prohibited from resettling in the Palestinian-administered West Bank—again, lest they help legitimize the Jewish state, this time by removing the Palestinians’ chief complaint. Yet there is a certain perverse logic at work here.
For if Israel and the Palestinians ever managed to hammer out the draft of a peace treaty, Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, would have to go to Balata and explain to its residents that their leaders have been lying to them for 60 years and that they are not going back to Jaffa.
Which, to state the obvious again, is one of the main reasons that there has been no peace treaty.
*Sol Stern is a contributing editor of City Journal, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and the author of Breaking Free: Public School Lessons and the Imperative of School Choice.
The Palestinian national narrative is the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East.
Bettmann/Corbis
Palestinian refugees flee the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.
... The Nakba is the heart of the Palestinians’ backward-looking national narrative, which depicts the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 as the original sin that dispossessed the land’s native people. Every year, on the anniversary of Israel’s independence, more and more Palestinians (including Arab citizens of Israel) commemorate the Nakba with pageants that express longing for a lost paradise. Every year, the legend grows of the crimes committed against the Palestinians in 1948, crimes now routinely equated with the Holocaust. Echoing the Nakba narrative is an international coalition of leftists that celebrates the Palestinians as the quintessential Other, the last victims of Western racism and colonialism.
There is only one just compensation for the long history of suffering, say the Palestinians and their allies: turning the clock back to 1948. ...[the "right of return"]... All Palestinian refugees—not just those still alive of the hundreds of thousands who fled in 1948, but their millions of descendants as well—would be allowed to return to Jaffa, Haifa, the Galilee, and all the villages that Palestinian Arabs once occupied.
Such a step would mean suicide for Israel as a Jewish state, which is why Israel would never countenance it. At the very least, then, the Nakba narrative precludes Middle East peace. But it’s also, as it happens, a myth—a radical distortion of history.
...During the 1948 war and for many years afterward, the Western world—including the international Left—expressed hardly any moral outrage about the Palestinian refugees. This had nothing to do with Western racism or colonialism and much to do with recent history. The fighting in Palestine had broken out only two years after the end of the costliest military conflict ever, in which the victors exacted a terrible price on the losers. By that, I don’t mean the Nazi officials and their “willing executioners,” who received less punishment than they deserved, but the 11 million ethnic Germans living in Central and Eastern Europe—civilians all—who were expelled from their homes and force-marched to Germany by the Red Army, with help from the Czech and Polish governments and with the approval of Roosevelt and Churchill. Historians estimate that 2 million died on the way. Around the same time, the Indian subcontinent was divided into two new countries, India and Pakistan; millions of Hindus and Muslims moved from one to the other, and hundreds of thousands died in related violence. Against this background, the West was not likely to be troubled by the exodus of a little more than half a million Palestinians after a war launched by their own leaders.
...The Palestinians were also compromised by the fact that their leader in 1948, Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, had been a Nazi collaborator during the war.
In fact, I. F. Stone, the most revered left-wing journalist of the day, was one of the most influential American advocates for the Zionist cause. I have in my possession a book by Stone called This Is Israel, distributed by Boni and Gaer, a major commercial publisher at the time. The book, based on Stone’s reporting during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, has become a collector’s item by virtue of the fact that Stone’s fans want to forget that it ever existed. Of the four adoring biographies of the great muckraker published in the last decade, only one even mentions that Stone wrote This Is Israel—and then shrugs off its significance in a few paragraphs.
It’s obvious why the book would be embarrassing to today’s leftist critics of Israel and Zionism. It opens with a foreword by Bartley Crum, the prominent American lawyer, businessman, and publisher of PM, the most widely read progressive newspaper of the 1940s. Crum evokes “the miracles [that the Israelis] have performed in peace and war. . . . They have built beautiful modern cities, such as Tel Aviv and Haifa on the edge of the wilderness. . . . They have set up a government which is a model of democracy.” His friend and star correspondent, Izzy Stone, has “set down what he knows and what he has seen, simply, truthfully and eloquently.” We Americans, Crum concludes, “can, through this book, warm ourselves in the glory of a free people who made a two thousand year dream come true in their own free land.”
Accompanied by famed war photographer Robert Capa’s iconic images of male and female Israeli soldiers, Stone’s text reads like a heroic epic. He writes of newborn Israel as a “tiny bridgehead” of 650,000 up against 30 million Arabs and 300 million Muslims and argues that Israel’s “precarious borders,” created by the United Nations’ November 1947 partition resolution, are almost indefensible. “Arab leaders made no secret of their intentions,” Stone writes, and then quotes the head of the Arab League, Abdul Rahman Azzam: “This war will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongol massacres and the Crusades.”
Palestinian leaders reminded Stone of the fascists he had fought with his pen since the Spanish Civil War. He ticks off the names of several Nazi collaborators prominent among the Arab military units that poured into Palestine after passage of the UN’s resolution. In addition to the grand mufti, they included the head of the Arab Liberation Army, Fawzi el-Kaukji, who took part in the fascist revolt against the British in Iraq in 1940 and then escaped to Berlin, where he recruited Balkan Muslims for the Wehrmacht. Another Palestinian military commander, Sheik Hassan Bey Salameh, was a “former staff officer under Rommel,” Stone writes. “Salameh had last appeared in Palestine in 1944 when he was dropped as a Reichswehr major for sabotage duties.” For good measure, Stone adds, “German Nazis, Polish reactionaries, Yugoslav Chetniks, and Bosnian Moslems flocked [into Palestine] for the war against the Jews.”
And how does Stone explain the war’s surprising outcome and the sudden exodus of the Palestinian Arabs? “Ill-armed, outnumbered, however desperate their circumstances, the Jews stood fast.” The Palestinians, by contrast, began to run away almost as soon as the fighting began. “First the wealthiest families went,” Stone recounts. “While the Arab guerrillas were moving in, the Arab civilian population was moving out.” Stone blames the grand mufti for giving explicit orders to the Palestinians to abandon Haifa, which had the largest Arab community of any city assigned to the Jewish state under the UN’s partition plan.
What is most revealing about the book is the issue that Stone does not write about: the fate of the refugees after their exodus. Stone undoubtedly shared the conventional wisdom at the time: that wars inevitably produced refugees and that the problem was best handled by resettlement in the countries to which those refugees moved. Stone surely expected that the Arab countries to which the Palestinian refugees had moved would eventually absorb them as full citizens. That outcome wouldn’t be perfect justice, but it would limit Palestinian suffering and open the doors to a reasonable and permanent settlement of the conflict. Stone also knew that Israel was in the process of absorbing an almost equal number of impoverished Jewish refugees from the Arab countries, most of whom had been forced out of their homes and lost all their property in places where they had lived for hundreds of years.
Stone could never have foreseen that for the next 62 years, the Palestinians would remain in those terrible refugee camps—not just in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but in Lebanon, Syria, and present-day Jordan as well. Nor could Stone have imagined that not one Arab country would move to absorb the refugees and offer them citizenship, or that the Palestinians’ leaders would insist on keeping the refugees locked up in the camps for the purpose of dramatizing their Nakba narrative.
...Earlier this year, another pathbreaking work of historical scholarship appeared that, if facts mattered at all in this debate, would put the final nail in the coffin of the Nakba myth. The book is Palestine Betrayed, by Efraim Karsh, head of the Middle East program at King’s College London. Karsh has delved deeper into the British and Israeli archives—and some Arab ones—than any previous historian of the period. He deftly uses this new material to seal the case that the Nakba was, to a large extent, brought on by the Palestinians’ own leaders.
For example, using detailed notes kept by key players in Haifa, Karsh provides a poignant description of an April 1948 meeting attended by Haifa’s Arab officials, officers of the nascent Israeli military, Mayor Shabtai Levy, and Major General Hugh Stockwell, the British military commander of Haifa. Levy, in tears, begged the Arab notables, some of whom were his personal friends, to tell their people to stay in their homes and promised that no harm would befall them. The Zionists desperately wanted the Arabs of Haifa to stay put in order to show that their new state would treat its minorities well. However, exactly as Stone reported in This Is Israel, the Arab leaders told Levy that they had been ordered out and even threatened by the Arab Higher Committee, chaired by the grand mufti from his exile in Cairo...
In describing the battle for Jaffa, the Arab city adjoining Tel Aviv, Karsh uses British military archives to show that the Israelis again promised the Arabs that they could stay if they laid down their arms. But the mufti’s orders again forbade it. In retrospect, it is clear that the mufti wanted the Arabs of Haifa and Jaffa to leave because he feared not that they would be in danger but that their remaining would provide greater legitimacy to the fledgling Jewish state.
Unfortunately, no amount of documentation and evidence about what really happened in 1948 will puncture the Nakba narrative. The tale of dispossession has been institutionalized now, an essential part of the Palestinians’ armament for what they see as the long struggle ahead. It has become the moral basis for their insistence on the refugees’ right to return to Israel, which in turn leads them to reject one reasonable two-state peace plan after another. In the meantime, the more radical Palestinians continue to insist that the only balm for the Nakba is the complete undoing of the historical crime of Zionism—either eliminating Israel or submerging it into a secular democratic state called Palestine. (The proposal is hard to take seriously from adherents of a religion and a culture that abjure secularism and allow little democracy.)
Nor will the facts about 1948 impress the European and American leftists who are part of the international Nakba coalition. The Nakba narrative of Zionism as a movement of white colonial oppressors victimizing innocent Palestinians is strengthened by radical modes of thought now dominant in the Western academy.
Postmodernists and postcolonialists have adapted Henry Ford’s adage that “history is bunk” to their own political purposes. According to the radical professors, there is no factual or empirical history that we can trust—only competing “narratives.” For example, there is the dominant establishment narrative of American history, and then there is the counter-narrative, written by professors like the late Howard Zinn, which speaks for neglected and forgotten Americans.
Just so, the Palestinian counter-narrative of the Nakba can now replace the old, discredited Zionist narrative, regardless of actual historical facts. And thanks to what the French writer Pascal Bruckner has called the Western intelligentsia’s new “tyranny of guilt”—a self-effacement that forbids critical inquiry into the historical narratives of those national movements granted the sanctified status of “oppressed”—the Nakba narrative cannot even be challenged.
This makes for a significant subculture in the West devoted to the delegitimization of Israel and the Zionist idea. To leftists, for whom Israel is now permanently on trial, Stone’s 1948 love song to Zionism has conveniently been disappeared, just as Trotsky was once disappeared by the Soviet Union and its Western supporters (of whom, let us not forget, Stone was one). Thus Tony Judt can write in The New York Review of Books—the same prestigious journal in which Stone began publishing his reconsiderations of Zionism—that Israel is, after all, just an “anachronism” and a historical blunder.
Several years ago, I briefly visited the largest refugee camp in the West Bank: Balata, inside the city of Nablus. Many of the camp’s approximately 20,000 residents are the children, grandchildren, and even great-grandchildren of the Arab citizens of Jaffa who fled their homes in early 1948.
For half a century, the United Nations has administered Balata as a quasi-apartheid welfare ghetto. The Palestinian Authority does not consider the residents of Balata citizens of Palestine; they do not vote on municipal issues, and they receive no PA funding for roads or sanitation. The refugee children—though after 60 years, calling young children “refugees” is absurd—go to separate schools run by UNRWA, the UN’s refugee-relief agency. The “refugees” are crammed into an area of approximately one square kilometer, and municipal officials prohibit them from building outside the camp’s official boundaries, making living conditions ever more cramped as the camp’s population grows. In a building called the Jaffa Cultural Center—financed by the UN, which means our tax dollars—Balata’s young people are undoubtedly nurtured on the myth that someday soon they will return in triumph to their ancestors’ homes by the Mediterranean Sea.
In Balata, history has come full circle. During the 1948 war, Palestinian leaders like Haj Amin al-Husseini insisted that the Arab citizens of Haifa and Jaffa had to leave, lest they help legitimize the Jewish state. Now, the descendants of those citizens are locked up in places like Balata and prohibited from resettling in the Palestinian-administered West Bank—again, lest they help legitimize the Jewish state, this time by removing the Palestinians’ chief complaint. Yet there is a certain perverse logic at work here.
For if Israel and the Palestinians ever managed to hammer out the draft of a peace treaty, Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, would have to go to Balata and explain to its residents that their leaders have been lying to them for 60 years and that they are not going back to Jaffa.
Which, to state the obvious again, is one of the main reasons that there has been no peace treaty.
*Sol Stern is a contributing editor of City Journal, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, and the author of Breaking Free: Public School Lessons and the Imperative of School Choice.
Friday, September 24, 2010
Dividing sovereignty of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan
Or International Analyst Network, 22 Sep 2010, David Singer suggests an alternative to the Two-State Solution:
...There is however another far more practical and readily achievable alternative solution....That solution involves the division of sovereignty of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan.
Separation of Arabs and Jews in Palestine - as far as is possible - has been the policy that has guided international diplomacy in the region since 1920. It has been sponsored by the League of Nations, the United Nations and several Commissions of Inquiry. It remains the policy currently favoured and supported by America, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations.
This policy - with one notable exception - has failed for one reason - Arab refusal to accept anything less than sovereignty in 100% of the territory available for allocation between Jews and Arabs.
That one exception was Arab acceptance of the League of Nations decision on 23 September 1922 denying the Jews any entitlement to reconstitute the Jewish National Home in 77% of Palestine - laying the groundwork for the creation of an exclusively Arab State there in 1946 that is today called Jordan.
It was not until 1948 that the Jews were able to create their own State in 17% of Palestine.
Sovereignty in the remaining 6% of Palestine - the West Bank and Gaza - is still up for grabs.
Although Jordan and Israel have fought several wars following the War of Independence in 1948 they have enjoyed a signed and sealed peace treaty between their respective states since 1994 - which has withstood many political and diplomatic pressures that could have heralded its demise.
Jordan indeed fits the Clinton mould of Israel “living peacefully with a neighbor who has the same aspirations for normal life.”
Presently stuck between their two respective States is the West Bank with a population of 2 million Arabs and 500000 Jews - whose territorial sovereignty remains undetermined.
Division of that sovereignty between Israel and Jordan resonates as a just and fair solution for the following reasons:
•It will restore Jordanian governance to the major part of the West Bank as existed from 1950 up to its loss to Israel in the Six Day War in 1967.
•It will bring the overwhelming majority of its 2 million West Bank Arabs under Jordanian protection, free them from Israeli control and restore the freedom of movement and citizenship rights enjoyed by them between 1948 - 1967
•Not one Jew or Arab will have to leave his present home or business in the West Bank
•Issues presently seen as contentious such as water, refugees and Jerusalem have already been identified and proposed solutions flagged in the 1994 Treaty.
•Drawing the new international boundary between Israel and Jordan to end sovereignty claims by Jews and Arabs in the West Bank should be capable of being achieved within three months.
•There will be a dramatic and immediate change in the current status quo which most agree is dangerous and untenable
•Jordan is the only Arab partner that can honour and enforce any agreement on the West Bank that Israel is prepared to sign.
•It will finalize the allocation of sovereignty of former Palestine between the two successor States to the Mandate for Palestine.
Jordan cannot be allowed to simply reject such an alternative out of hand and seek to walk away from the looming conflict that must inevitably fill the void after the collapse of the two-state solution.
Jordan has been part of the problem surrounding the issue of sovereignty in the West Bank since 1920. It now is time for Jordan to step up to the plate and take responsibility for being part of the solution in 2010.
...There is however another far more practical and readily achievable alternative solution....That solution involves the division of sovereignty of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan.
Separation of Arabs and Jews in Palestine - as far as is possible - has been the policy that has guided international diplomacy in the region since 1920. It has been sponsored by the League of Nations, the United Nations and several Commissions of Inquiry. It remains the policy currently favoured and supported by America, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations.
This policy - with one notable exception - has failed for one reason - Arab refusal to accept anything less than sovereignty in 100% of the territory available for allocation between Jews and Arabs.
That one exception was Arab acceptance of the League of Nations decision on 23 September 1922 denying the Jews any entitlement to reconstitute the Jewish National Home in 77% of Palestine - laying the groundwork for the creation of an exclusively Arab State there in 1946 that is today called Jordan.
It was not until 1948 that the Jews were able to create their own State in 17% of Palestine.
Sovereignty in the remaining 6% of Palestine - the West Bank and Gaza - is still up for grabs.
Although Jordan and Israel have fought several wars following the War of Independence in 1948 they have enjoyed a signed and sealed peace treaty between their respective states since 1994 - which has withstood many political and diplomatic pressures that could have heralded its demise.
Jordan indeed fits the Clinton mould of Israel “living peacefully with a neighbor who has the same aspirations for normal life.”
Presently stuck between their two respective States is the West Bank with a population of 2 million Arabs and 500000 Jews - whose territorial sovereignty remains undetermined.
Division of that sovereignty between Israel and Jordan resonates as a just and fair solution for the following reasons:
•It will restore Jordanian governance to the major part of the West Bank as existed from 1950 up to its loss to Israel in the Six Day War in 1967.
•It will bring the overwhelming majority of its 2 million West Bank Arabs under Jordanian protection, free them from Israeli control and restore the freedom of movement and citizenship rights enjoyed by them between 1948 - 1967
•Not one Jew or Arab will have to leave his present home or business in the West Bank
•Issues presently seen as contentious such as water, refugees and Jerusalem have already been identified and proposed solutions flagged in the 1994 Treaty.
•Drawing the new international boundary between Israel and Jordan to end sovereignty claims by Jews and Arabs in the West Bank should be capable of being achieved within three months.
•There will be a dramatic and immediate change in the current status quo which most agree is dangerous and untenable
•Jordan is the only Arab partner that can honour and enforce any agreement on the West Bank that Israel is prepared to sign.
•It will finalize the allocation of sovereignty of former Palestine between the two successor States to the Mandate for Palestine.
Jordan cannot be allowed to simply reject such an alternative out of hand and seek to walk away from the looming conflict that must inevitably fill the void after the collapse of the two-state solution.
Jordan has been part of the problem surrounding the issue of sovereignty in the West Bank since 1920. It now is time for Jordan to step up to the plate and take responsibility for being part of the solution in 2010.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
Do you want a radical Islamist state between Iraq and suburban Israel?
From Ynet News, 21 Sept 2010, by Martin Sherman:
...why letting Hamas take over Judea and Samaria is extremely unwise
...when [journalist Guy] Bechor claims that if the Hamas took over Judea and Samaria "The international pressure exerted on Israel would be eased and even disappear, as nobody wishes to grant a state to terrorists,” one can only wonder whether he has succumbed to terminal amnesia ...
Indeed, in the case of the Palestinians, the pejorative designation of "terrorist" is alarmingly transitory. After all, the entire Oslo process was launched with "terrorists." The PLO was formally designated as a terror organization until the early ‘90s, and only permitted to open a Mission Office in Washington in 1994 after the signature of Declaration of Principles on the White House Lawn - despite the fact that it had merely outsourced its murderous activities to its violent affiliates.
This clearly indicates that widespread international reticence in dealing with "terrorists" is not something that can be taken for granted - certainly not for any length of time. Indeed, the PLO was "sanitized" largely due to efforts by prominent Israelis. Bechor would do well to keep this in mind, for familiar-sounding voices are being raised today by a growing chorus of influential figures in the US, in the EU…and in Israel, calling for "engagement" with the Hamas.
The trouble with Gaza
Moreover, given the severe worldwide censure that Israel has been subjected to over its policy toward Hamas-governed Gaza, one can only wonder on what Bechor bases his astonishing claim that if Hamas was to govern Judea and Samaria "international pressure exerted on Israel would be eased and even disappear."
No less astounding is Bechor's rhetorical question: "What’s so bad about the new situation created in the Gaza Strip...?"
But even if Israel decided to shrug off international condemnation and risk global censure and sanction, there are huge differences - in terms of geographical extent, topographical structure and strategic significance - between the ramifications of a Hamas takeover of Judea and Samaria, and those of a Hamas-ruled Gaza:
• The length of Israel's frontier with the Gaza Strip is a little over 50 kilometers; that of the "West Bank is about 300 kilometers long (and longer if it is to include the large settlement blocs as Bechor envisages.)
• The Gaza border abuts a relatively remote and sparsely-populated portion of the country. The "West Bank" frontier would run barely a mile from the national parliament, along the very fringes of Israel's most populous areas in the coastal metropolis, adjacent to the perimeter of Ben Gurion Airport and to large sections of the Trans-Israel highway.
• While the Gaza strip is generally low-lying flatlands and contains no water resources that impact on Israeli supply, the "West Bank" is an elevated mountain ridge that commands much of Israel's vital infrastructures (both civilian and military), crucial water resources, major urban population centers and commercial hubs.
Radical Islamic state
Hamas would not have to rain down hundreds of rockets on Israel to paralyze the nation's social and economic routine. A few sporadic firings every now and then would be sufficient for that. In fact, the mere threat of bombardment (even if inaccurate) would bring about a disastrous disruption of air traffic to Israel and catastrophic cessation of tourism.
However, this would hardly constitute an internationally credible "smoking gun" to justify massive Israel retaliation along a front several hundred kilometers long in difficult terrain - especially if the Hamas regime could claim plausible deniability by placing the blame on radical renegades.
This clearly indicates that widespread international reticence in dealing with "terrorists" is not something that can be taken for granted - certainly not for any length of time. Indeed, the PLO was "sanitized" largely due to efforts by prominent Israelis. Bechor would do well to keep this in mind, for familiar-sounding voices are being raised today by a growing chorus of influential figures in the US, in the EU…and in Israel, calling for "engagement" with the Hamas.
The trouble with Gaza
Moreover, given the severe worldwide censure that Israel has been subjected to over its policy toward Hamas-governed Gaza, one can only wonder on what Bechor bases his astonishing claim that if Hamas was to govern Judea and Samaria "international pressure exerted on Israel would be eased and even disappear."
No less astounding is Bechor's rhetorical question: "What’s so bad about the new situation created in the Gaza Strip...?"
- ...lasting damage to the moral fiber of the nation ..
- ...the senseless and futile uprooting any vestige of Jewish presence
- ...Thousands of rockets and mortar shells that have rained down on civilian population centers for years!? Indeed only poor aim on the part of the Palestinians and the sparse target-density in the arid expanses bordering the Gaza Strip have prevented these bombardments from being catastrophic.
But even if Israel decided to shrug off international condemnation and risk global censure and sanction, there are huge differences - in terms of geographical extent, topographical structure and strategic significance - between the ramifications of a Hamas takeover of Judea and Samaria, and those of a Hamas-ruled Gaza:
• The length of Israel's frontier with the Gaza Strip is a little over 50 kilometers; that of the "West Bank is about 300 kilometers long (and longer if it is to include the large settlement blocs as Bechor envisages.)
Hamas would not have to rain down hundreds of rockets on Israel to paralyze the nation's social and economic routine. A few sporadic firings every now and then would be sufficient for that. In fact, the mere threat of bombardment (even if inaccurate) would bring about a disastrous disruption of air traffic to Israel and catastrophic cessation of tourism.
According to Bechor, ensconcing the Hamas in will ensure "there is a master of the house there that can be presented with demands." Well, we saw how splendidly that worked in Gaza - especially with Gilad Shalit.
But perhaps the most worrying aspect of Bechor's analysis is the illusion that his suggested scenario would somehow exempt Israel from the burden of securing the nation. He proposes that "Israel would…allow free passage between the Hamas principality and Jordan. This would provide the Islamic principality with an outlet to the world, via Jordan, which would have to assume the burden just as Egypt did in Gaza."
So Bechor finds the situation in Gaza - which has been flooded by weapons since the disengagement - a model to emulate? It should be remembered that unlike Egypt, Jordan has a Palestinian majority. Thus, being perceived as the "Zionist's warder" of a "Palestinian prison" may destabilize the current regime, either forcing it into far-reaching concessions to the Islamist elements or even surrendering power completely.
So ...what we may get is a radical Islamist state stretching from the Iraqi border in the east to suburban Israel in the west.
So ...what we may get is a radical Islamist state stretching from the Iraqi border in the east to suburban Israel in the west.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
An Imminent Coup by Hezbollah in Lebanon
From the International Analyst Network, 18 Sep 2010, by Elias Youssef Bejjani:
A Saudi advice has delayed the return of Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.
Meanwhile, 3500 Hezbollah militiamen are secretly deployed in the Eastern Christian region according to a report that was published yesterday by the "Beirut Observer" web site. Hezbollah has reached its final logistic preparations to execute an armed coup to take over all of Lebanon by force.
The web site attributed its information to well-informed sources in the Saudi media.
Below is a summary of the report with other related information:
Well-informed Saudi sources have confirmed to the "Beirut Observer" that the delay of Lebanon's PM return to Beirut came in response to advice by Saudi officials. The Saudis are extremely concerned in regards to information became available to them indicating that an imminent Hezbollah coup is in on the horizon. The Saudis are fearful that Hezbollah’s threats are not mere political rhetoric this time. The Iranian-armed militia has set all the needed logistic preparations for the coup and is only waiting for the zero hour.
According to the report, Hezbollah's planned coup will take a camouflaged cover of civilian protection this time. But the reality on the ground is that it will not be different from Hezbollah's bloody and cruel invasion of Western Sunni Beirut and Druze Mount Lebanon in May 2008. The coup will be initiated by putting government officials under house arrest. This will include Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, General prosecutor Said Mirza, Internal Security Forces General Director General Ashraf Rifi as well as many other officials and politicians. Sources said that Information Branch President Colonel Wesam Hassan will be spared from house arrest in the early hours of the coup.
The report went on to conclude that at the present time the centre of attention is a scheduled visit by a Saudi envoy to Damascus today and on the results of his talks with Syrian officials. The Saudi mission to Syria will focus on the current volatile situation in Lebanon, the avoidance of bloodshed, strife and and the repetition of what happened on May 2008. The Saudis fear that the impact of any military coup executed by Hezbollah in Lebanon will spread chaos over the entire region.
Private sources from Beirut unveiled that Hezbollah has deployed 3500 of its armed militia men along the Mediterranean coast in the Christian region from Beirut northwards through the cities of Junieh, Tabarja and Batroun. These bearded Hezbollah men are residing in chalets and apartments located in Christian areas and on standby alert status in case of any political development or security emergency that may require their armed intervention.
According to the report, a decision was taken by Hezbollah's leadership to invade Christian regions loyal to the March 14 Coalition, and subdue them by military force. Hezbollah's Leadership aim from such an invasion is to deliver a bloody intimidation message to all Lebanese who oppose its hegemony over the country. They want to prove on the ground that they have the upper hand, the sole power and the authority all over the country...
Follow this link to the Arabic report published yesterday by the Beirut Observer web site.
A Saudi advice has delayed the return of Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.
Meanwhile, 3500 Hezbollah militiamen are secretly deployed in the Eastern Christian region according to a report that was published yesterday by the "Beirut Observer" web site. Hezbollah has reached its final logistic preparations to execute an armed coup to take over all of Lebanon by force.
The web site attributed its information to well-informed sources in the Saudi media.
Below is a summary of the report with other related information:
Well-informed Saudi sources have confirmed to the "Beirut Observer" that the delay of Lebanon's PM return to Beirut came in response to advice by Saudi officials. The Saudis are extremely concerned in regards to information became available to them indicating that an imminent Hezbollah coup is in on the horizon. The Saudis are fearful that Hezbollah’s threats are not mere political rhetoric this time. The Iranian-armed militia has set all the needed logistic preparations for the coup and is only waiting for the zero hour.
According to the report, Hezbollah's planned coup will take a camouflaged cover of civilian protection this time. But the reality on the ground is that it will not be different from Hezbollah's bloody and cruel invasion of Western Sunni Beirut and Druze Mount Lebanon in May 2008. The coup will be initiated by putting government officials under house arrest. This will include Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, General prosecutor Said Mirza, Internal Security Forces General Director General Ashraf Rifi as well as many other officials and politicians. Sources said that Information Branch President Colonel Wesam Hassan will be spared from house arrest in the early hours of the coup.
The report went on to conclude that at the present time the centre of attention is a scheduled visit by a Saudi envoy to Damascus today and on the results of his talks with Syrian officials. The Saudi mission to Syria will focus on the current volatile situation in Lebanon, the avoidance of bloodshed, strife and and the repetition of what happened on May 2008. The Saudis fear that the impact of any military coup executed by Hezbollah in Lebanon will spread chaos over the entire region.
Private sources from Beirut unveiled that Hezbollah has deployed 3500 of its armed militia men along the Mediterranean coast in the Christian region from Beirut northwards through the cities of Junieh, Tabarja and Batroun. These bearded Hezbollah men are residing in chalets and apartments located in Christian areas and on standby alert status in case of any political development or security emergency that may require their armed intervention.
According to the report, a decision was taken by Hezbollah's leadership to invade Christian regions loyal to the March 14 Coalition, and subdue them by military force. Hezbollah's Leadership aim from such an invasion is to deliver a bloody intimidation message to all Lebanese who oppose its hegemony over the country. They want to prove on the ground that they have the upper hand, the sole power and the authority all over the country...
Follow this link to the Arabic report published yesterday by the Beirut Observer web site.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Russia supplies advance weapons to Syria
From Ynet News, 19 September 2010, by Itamar Eichner:
Jerusalem angered at sale of Russian [cruise] missiles to Syria...
Israeli officials are threatening to sell weapons to "areas of strategic importance" to Russia after Moscow announced over the weekend that it would go through with the sale of P800 [cruise] missiles to Syria...
Russia's announcement came after both Israel and the US implored that it abandon the sale. The cruise missiles discussed, dubbed Yakhont, have a range of 300 km, which puts Israeli ships off of Lebanon's coast at risk of being hit by missiles fired from Syria's southern port.
...last month Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Russian President Vladimir Putin and requested that he call it off, for fear the missiles will be handed to Hezbollah.
More recently Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Moscow on a similar mission. Barak spoke with both Putin and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. ...
Despite the extensive efforts, the deal was announced Friday to be proceeding as planned. "They've gone one step too far," one Jerusalem official said. "This is not in keeping with our cooperation with them."
The official said Israel had so far refrained from selling "strategic, tie-breaking weapons" to third-world countries, and that it expected Russia to do the same.
"The supply of advanced weapons to Syria, one of Hezbollah's two main supporters, especially on the eve of the fateful peace talks with the Palestinians, is not a move encouraging the moderate forces of the Middle East – but rather a prize for extremist states," the source said.
...The P800 is considered one of the world's most advanced cruising missiles due to its speed and low flight. Israel fears it will fall into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would put its ships in the Mediterranean at risk, especially in light of terror organizations' desire to derail peace talks with the Palestinians...
Jerusalem angered at sale of Russian [cruise] missiles to Syria...
Israeli officials are threatening to sell weapons to "areas of strategic importance" to Russia after Moscow announced over the weekend that it would go through with the sale of P800 [cruise] missiles to Syria...
Russia's announcement came after both Israel and the US implored that it abandon the sale. The cruise missiles discussed, dubbed Yakhont, have a range of 300 km, which puts Israeli ships off of Lebanon's coast at risk of being hit by missiles fired from Syria's southern port.
...last month Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Russian President Vladimir Putin and requested that he call it off, for fear the missiles will be handed to Hezbollah.
More recently Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Moscow on a similar mission. Barak spoke with both Putin and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. ...
Despite the extensive efforts, the deal was announced Friday to be proceeding as planned. "They've gone one step too far," one Jerusalem official said. "This is not in keeping with our cooperation with them."
The official said Israel had so far refrained from selling "strategic, tie-breaking weapons" to third-world countries, and that it expected Russia to do the same.
"The supply of advanced weapons to Syria, one of Hezbollah's two main supporters, especially on the eve of the fateful peace talks with the Palestinians, is not a move encouraging the moderate forces of the Middle East – but rather a prize for extremist states," the source said.
...The P800 is considered one of the world's most advanced cruising missiles due to its speed and low flight. Israel fears it will fall into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would put its ships in the Mediterranean at risk, especially in light of terror organizations' desire to derail peace talks with the Palestinians...
The Next Israel-Hizballah War
In a new Washington Institute Policy Focus #106, published September 2010, Jeffrey White offers an estimation of what renewed hostilities between Israel and Hizballah might look like.
In a meticulously calculated forecast of the future battlefield -- supplemented by original maps and graphics -- White outlines the capabilities and operational objectives of the two sides, the potentially game-changing roles played by Syria and Iran, and the possible impact on the region's postconflict military and political environments.
White concludes that
…If war does in fact come to Israel’s northern border, it would bear little resemblance to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. Instead, it would in all likelihood be a transformational, even fateful, event for the region...
…In all probability, it would be a major conflict, one fought over extensive areas of Lebanon, Israel, and probably Syria, featuring large military forces executing complex operations and resulting in substantial casualties (military and civilian) as well as major infrastructure damage in all of the countries involved. …the fighting would be intense and would likely escalate and expand. Israel and Hizballah would feel great pressure to win such a war, and that need would drive the hostilities to a new level, likely pulling in Syria and pushing Iran to become involved as well. The conflict would be a severe test for decisionmakers and warfighters on both sides, and a challenge for key external actors, especially the United States.
… Although the challenge of a war with Hizballah and its allies should not be underestimated, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are much better prepared today than they were in 2006. …Israel would aim to fundamentally alter the military equation, with great consequences for the political situation.
… it would likely be decisive in the military operational sense. Israeli military strategy would center on the use of large-scale joint air, ground, and naval operations to rapidly eliminate Hizballah’s rocket and missile forces, destroy its ground forces in southern Lebanon, severely damage its command and control systems, and destroy its infrastructure throughout Lebanon.
Israel would probably attempt to prevent the conflict from escalating into general war with Syria …
… Hizballah’s military efforts would center on the following strategies:
■■ Offensively, to launch massive rocket/missile attacks on military and civilian targets with the intention of inflicting significant casualties and damage
■■ Defensively, to oppose Israeli air, ground, and naval operations inside Lebanon with aggressive action, slowing any advances while inflicting as many casualties as possible ...
For their part, Syria and Iran would at minimum provide communications, command, control, intelligence, and resupply assistance in an effort to keep Hizballah in the fight. Syrian air defense elements would oppose “penetrations” of Syrian airspace and perhaps engage Israeli aircraft over Lebanon, given the small operational area involved and the proximity of Damascus to the combat zone. Beyond basic support (e.g., advice, arms, intelligence), Iran’s potential role is unclear. But in a large-scale conflict, Tehran could decide to participate more directly by providing light infantry or special forces in Lebanon, and perhaps missile and air defense forces within Syria. And both Damascus and Tehran would likely feel pressure to increase their roles as the war escalated, due in part to their connections with and commitments to Hizballah.
If Syria became directly involved in a conflict with Israel during a war in Lebanon, its goals would include:
■■ Preserving the regime and its key assets (security, military, economic)
■■ Preserving Hizballah’s position in Lebanon and its ability to threaten Israel
■■ Reestablishing a Syrian military presence in Lebanon
■■Inflicting a defeat on Israel sufficient to create the conditions for regaining the Golan Heights
In Iran, the regime could decide to take one or more of several steps, on an escalating scale of involvement:
■■ Providing more arms to Hizballah and Syria
■■ Providing advisors, technicians, or light combat forces
■■ Carrying out asymmetric attacks on Israeli interests (e.g., terrorist-type actions)
■■ Engaging in regional troublemaking (e.g., raising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz)
■■ Conducting missile strikes on Israel
In the Palestinian arena, Hamas leaders would likely limit the group’s participation to token actions accompanied by supporting rhetoric. At the same time, no one should be surprised if a new war in the north included a “Gaza excursion.” Hamas could decide to enter the conflict in serious fashion, employing heavy rocket fire and long-range weapons. Alternatively, Israel could decide to finish the job begun with Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009.
Escalation and Uncertainty
The war outlined here would present a dangerous situation— various pressures and dynamics would push it toward escalation. The course of the fighting, the combatants’ offensive strategies and doctrinal approaches, the depth of their preparations for war, their expectation that the other side will use massive force, and the perceived advantages of preemption would all foster a broader and more serious conflict. …
Decisionmakers on all sides would be under great pressure to act quickly in order to achieve their goals and protect their assets and populations…
… it would be a large-scale, intense conflict waged between Israel and some combination of Hizballah and its allies, fought in and over Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, and lasting weeks. In the end …The IDF would be occupying some, perhaps substantial, parts of Lebanon and potentially all of Gaza…
…It would certainly be Israel’s most serious war since 1973, and one that the IDF would have to win. …if Israel acted decisively, were willing to pay the costs in casualties and damage, and enjoyed military success, then a new war could substantially weaken its opponents in the following ways:
■■ Hizballah would be broken as a military factor in Lebanon and weakened politically.
■■ The Syrian regime would be weakened by military defeat and the loss of important military and security assets.
■■ Iran’s activities in the region would be circumscribed by the defeat of its allies; and if Tehran failed to aid them during the conflict, it would lose influence as well.
■■ Hamas (assuming it became involved directly) would lose its military power in Gaza and at least some of its political power.
The U.S. Role
… the United States should not necessarily take immediate steps toward ending it quickly.
Several important objectives would be at stake in such a scenario: breaking Hizballah’s military capabilities and reducing its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent Hizballah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal. Only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals.
Accordingly, the United States should consider giving the IDF both the time and the political space it needs to carry out those objectives.
Washington should also be prepared for associated Iranian troublemaking in the Persian Gulf. The United States must demonstrate that it will use force if necessary, thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advantage of the situation created by a Lebanon war.
Conclusion
Whether hostilities will erupt soon or ever is uncertain; both sides have good reason to avoid it. But if war does come once again to Israel’s northern border, a renewed confrontation between Israel and Hizballah will not resemble their inconclusive 2006 encounter.
The new war will likely be wider in geographic scope and more destructive, with high-intensity operations from the beginning. The dynamics of the fighting will produce rapid escalation, possibly pulling in Syria and even Iran.
Where the war goes badly for either side, significant military and civilian casualties, disruption of economic activity, and damage to infrastructure are probable. Although Israel will most likely prevail in this scenario, victory for either side will carry substantial costs. And for the losing side, the consequences may well be fateful. As the war deterrent appears to weaken, both Israel and Hizballah are preparing for a serious confrontation that neither can afford to lose.
Download the full, 60-page report (a 1.4MB pdf)
Downloadable Maps:
Notional Israeli Air Force Operations against Hizballah
Notional Israeli Offensive Operations in Southern Lebanon
Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon
Notional Hizballah Offensive Operations in Northern Israel
Notional Hizballah Defense Concept
*Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Iran. A thirty-four-year veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), he participated in DIA operational and policy planning and wrote extensively for senior defense officials, including the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In a meticulously calculated forecast of the future battlefield -- supplemented by original maps and graphics -- White outlines the capabilities and operational objectives of the two sides, the potentially game-changing roles played by Syria and Iran, and the possible impact on the region's postconflict military and political environments.
White concludes that
- this is the war the IDF must win -- the consequences may be fateful, and
- Washington should be developing its own concrete plans and preparatory steps now.
…If war does in fact come to Israel’s northern border, it would bear little resemblance to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. Instead, it would in all likelihood be a transformational, even fateful, event for the region...
…In all probability, it would be a major conflict, one fought over extensive areas of Lebanon, Israel, and probably Syria, featuring large military forces executing complex operations and resulting in substantial casualties (military and civilian) as well as major infrastructure damage in all of the countries involved. …the fighting would be intense and would likely escalate and expand. Israel and Hizballah would feel great pressure to win such a war, and that need would drive the hostilities to a new level, likely pulling in Syria and pushing Iran to become involved as well. The conflict would be a severe test for decisionmakers and warfighters on both sides, and a challenge for key external actors, especially the United States.
… Although the challenge of a war with Hizballah and its allies should not be underestimated, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are much better prepared today than they were in 2006. …Israel would aim to fundamentally alter the military equation, with great consequences for the political situation.
… it would likely be decisive in the military operational sense. Israeli military strategy would center on the use of large-scale joint air, ground, and naval operations to rapidly eliminate Hizballah’s rocket and missile forces, destroy its ground forces in southern Lebanon, severely damage its command and control systems, and destroy its infrastructure throughout Lebanon.
Israel would probably attempt to prevent the conflict from escalating into general war with Syria …
… Hizballah’s military efforts would center on the following strategies:
■■ Offensively, to launch massive rocket/missile attacks on military and civilian targets with the intention of inflicting significant casualties and damage
■■ Defensively, to oppose Israeli air, ground, and naval operations inside Lebanon with aggressive action, slowing any advances while inflicting as many casualties as possible ...
For their part, Syria and Iran would at minimum provide communications, command, control, intelligence, and resupply assistance in an effort to keep Hizballah in the fight. Syrian air defense elements would oppose “penetrations” of Syrian airspace and perhaps engage Israeli aircraft over Lebanon, given the small operational area involved and the proximity of Damascus to the combat zone. Beyond basic support (e.g., advice, arms, intelligence), Iran’s potential role is unclear. But in a large-scale conflict, Tehran could decide to participate more directly by providing light infantry or special forces in Lebanon, and perhaps missile and air defense forces within Syria. And both Damascus and Tehran would likely feel pressure to increase their roles as the war escalated, due in part to their connections with and commitments to Hizballah.
If Syria became directly involved in a conflict with Israel during a war in Lebanon, its goals would include:
■■ Preserving the regime and its key assets (security, military, economic)
■■ Preserving Hizballah’s position in Lebanon and its ability to threaten Israel
■■ Reestablishing a Syrian military presence in Lebanon
■■Inflicting a defeat on Israel sufficient to create the conditions for regaining the Golan Heights
In Iran, the regime could decide to take one or more of several steps, on an escalating scale of involvement:
■■ Providing more arms to Hizballah and Syria
■■ Providing advisors, technicians, or light combat forces
■■ Carrying out asymmetric attacks on Israeli interests (e.g., terrorist-type actions)
■■ Engaging in regional troublemaking (e.g., raising tensions in the Strait of Hormuz)
■■ Conducting missile strikes on Israel
In the Palestinian arena, Hamas leaders would likely limit the group’s participation to token actions accompanied by supporting rhetoric. At the same time, no one should be surprised if a new war in the north included a “Gaza excursion.” Hamas could decide to enter the conflict in serious fashion, employing heavy rocket fire and long-range weapons. Alternatively, Israel could decide to finish the job begun with Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009.
Escalation and Uncertainty
The war outlined here would present a dangerous situation— various pressures and dynamics would push it toward escalation. The course of the fighting, the combatants’ offensive strategies and doctrinal approaches, the depth of their preparations for war, their expectation that the other side will use massive force, and the perceived advantages of preemption would all foster a broader and more serious conflict. …
Decisionmakers on all sides would be under great pressure to act quickly in order to achieve their goals and protect their assets and populations…
… it would be a large-scale, intense conflict waged between Israel and some combination of Hizballah and its allies, fought in and over Israel, Lebanon, and Syria, and lasting weeks. In the end …The IDF would be occupying some, perhaps substantial, parts of Lebanon and potentially all of Gaza…
…It would certainly be Israel’s most serious war since 1973, and one that the IDF would have to win. …if Israel acted decisively, were willing to pay the costs in casualties and damage, and enjoyed military success, then a new war could substantially weaken its opponents in the following ways:
■■ Hizballah would be broken as a military factor in Lebanon and weakened politically.
■■ The Syrian regime would be weakened by military defeat and the loss of important military and security assets.
■■ Iran’s activities in the region would be circumscribed by the defeat of its allies; and if Tehran failed to aid them during the conflict, it would lose influence as well.
■■ Hamas (assuming it became involved directly) would lose its military power in Gaza and at least some of its political power.
The U.S. Role
… the United States should not necessarily take immediate steps toward ending it quickly.
Several important objectives would be at stake in such a scenario: breaking Hizballah’s military capabilities and reducing its political power; disabusing Syria of the notion that it can act in Lebanon to further its own interests without significant cost; and removing the potent Hizballah proxy from Iran’s foreign policy arsenal. Only successful IDF operations can achieve those goals.
Accordingly, the United States should consider giving the IDF both the time and the political space it needs to carry out those objectives.
Washington should also be prepared for associated Iranian troublemaking in the Persian Gulf. The United States must demonstrate that it will use force if necessary, thwarting any attempt by Tehran to take advantage of the situation created by a Lebanon war.
Conclusion
Whether hostilities will erupt soon or ever is uncertain; both sides have good reason to avoid it. But if war does come once again to Israel’s northern border, a renewed confrontation between Israel and Hizballah will not resemble their inconclusive 2006 encounter.
The new war will likely be wider in geographic scope and more destructive, with high-intensity operations from the beginning. The dynamics of the fighting will produce rapid escalation, possibly pulling in Syria and even Iran.
Where the war goes badly for either side, significant military and civilian casualties, disruption of economic activity, and damage to infrastructure are probable. Although Israel will most likely prevail in this scenario, victory for either side will carry substantial costs. And for the losing side, the consequences may well be fateful. As the war deterrent appears to weaken, both Israel and Hizballah are preparing for a serious confrontation that neither can afford to lose.
Download the full, 60-page report (a 1.4MB pdf)
Downloadable Maps:
Notional Israeli Air Force Operations against Hizballah
Notional Israeli Offensive Operations in Southern Lebanon
Selected Rocket and Missile Coverage of Israel from Potential Launch Areas in Lebanon
Notional Hizballah Offensive Operations in Northern Israel
Notional Hizballah Defense Concept
*Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at The Washington Institute, specializing in the military and security affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Iran. A thirty-four-year veteran of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), he participated in DIA operational and policy planning and wrote extensively for senior defense officials, including the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Don't Panic - Israel is not so isolated
From BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 114, September 14, 2010, by Prof. Efraim Inbar, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Israel is not nearly as diplomatically isolated as its critics from within and without would have us believe; thus, Israeli diplomacy and security policies should not be dictated by panic over such “isolation.”
By ascribing exaggerated importance to the Palestinian issue, and by inflating assessments of Israel’s isolation, the Israeli (and Diaspora Jewish) left advocate an urgent deal with the Palestinians, at a heavy Israeli price.
A calmer, more realistic assessment of Israel’s situation – attempted below – calms unwarranted fears and can help lead to sober positions on issues of war and peace.
Introduction
Many Israelis feel that Israel is once more alone and that the Jewish state is increasingly isolated in the international community. An August 2010 poll shows that on the question of Israel's current status in the international arena, a majority of the Jewish public thinks Israel is moderately or completely isolated (54%), compared to 46% who say it is not isolated. A similar poll among Diaspora Jews would likely reveal an even more acute feeling of isolation, because as a minority Diaspora Jews are more exposed to anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli attitudes. Taking into consideration the many examples of the negative media coverage of Israel, such feelings in Israel and in the Diaspora are understandable. Indeed, the infamous Goldstone Report and the “Gaza flotilla” incident, among other events, provide ample evidence of a hostile international climate regarding Israel.
Moreover, the Israeli left argues vocally that the continuation of the conflict with the Palestinians exacts a heavy price from Israel; that Israel is becoming an isolated and less legitimate political entity. Yet, this claim reflects a distorted view of reality. The hard left is influenced primarily by its reference groups – the Western left and its radical offshoots. Ascribing exaggerated importance to the Palestinian issue, and to Israel’s isolation, they advocate an urgent deal with the Palestinians at a heavy Israeli price.
The partisans on the left are wrong. A closer look at Israel’s interactions with many states in the world in which real power resides, and with international organizations (not nearly as powerful), explains why. A calm and careful review of the situation provides a more nuanced and much less pessimistic picture.
Wider Israeli diplomatic presence
Take the number of states that have diplomatic relations with Israel. This measure clearly shows an improvement in Israel’s international status, particularly since 1973. Then, with the energy crisis, the power of the Arab world was at its zenith. Subsequently, Israel experienced an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations. This has drastically changed, particularly after 1991, when an increasing number of states decided to establish and/or upgrade diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. For example, all states within the Soviet orbit, in former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as most African and Asian states opted for diplomatic relations. Significantly, rising powers such as China and India, and pivotal states such as Russia, Turkey, and Nigeria decided to have full diplomatic relations with Israel, which have been maintained ever since.
Generally, states facing the challenges of terrorism and/or radical Islam, mostly a post-1991 phenomenon, seek cooperation with Israel. The Jewish state has much to offer in the area of intelligence and tactical and doctrinal counter-terrorism. Because of the growing Islamist threat, the number of states seeking security relations with the Jewish state is on the rise. There are many countries that fall into this category, and the Israeli-Palestinian intractable conflict hardly deters them from useful interactions with Israel.
Improved relations with Muslim states
Significantly, relations with the Muslim world have improved. Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Israel has oscillating informal dealings with several Arab states in the Gulf and in the Maghreb. Most of the Arab world adheres to the Arab League Peace Initiative. While this peace plan is not reasonable from an Israeli perspective (it is a take it or leave it proposal), the Arabs are talking peace, not war, and imply a de facto recognition of Israel – a historic change in their position. The Arab economic boycott has largely evaporated. It is the Iranian nuclear threat that puts any differences with Israel over the Palestinian issue on a side burner.
Israel also has cordial and fruitful relations with Muslim states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Israeli presence is well felt in states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Muslim identity of these populations and their elites does not hinder relations with Jerusalem in areas important to their national interests. Their sensitivity to the imagined or real misfortunes of the Palestinians is very low.
The US and rising powers
Similarly, diplomatic ties with the most important country in the world, the US, have greatly improved since 1973 and the strategic relationship is still very strong, despite the misguided Middle Eastern policies of the Barack Obama administration. For the past four decades, the level of American public support for Israel has remained remarkably stable (about 65%). This translates, of course, into congressional support. Israel is still popular in the US primarily because of how it is perceived and not because of the Jewish lobby. We have recently seen President Obama bow to this popular sentiment and adopt a friendlier posture toward the Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu.
A high level of friendship toward Israel and the Jewish people characterizes the two most populous and dynamic states on the world scene – India and China – rising powers in every sense of the word. Both are old civilizations that have not been burdened by anti-Semitic baggage, like Europe. They treat the Jewish State with reverence as they see in it a similar old civilization that has had remarkable achievements. Most Asian countries, even if they vote against Israel in international forums, have a similar attitude. Likewise, countries on the Pacific Rim, an area that has gained international significance, are usually pro-Israel. South Korea and Australia are prime examples. Sub-Saharan African countries also contain very pro-Israel circles for a variety of reasons.
European attitudes
Old Europe" is indeed a different planet on this matter. Its naïve strategic culture, where there is no threat perception and the use of force is seen as anachronistic, makes Israel a difficult case to swallow. This is reinforced by latent traditional anti-Semitism that singles out the Jews as responsible for the problems of the world. Belgium, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden, in particular, display anti-Israeli positions bordering on anti-Semitism. Fortunately, none are core European states. Some European universities have become unpleasant places for Israelis, and a large portion of the European intelligentsia is intuitively anti-Israel, even denying Israel’s right to exist. It is also true that much of the elite European media is hysterically biased against Israel.
At the same time France, Germany, and Italy (the power centers of the European Union) are ruled nowadays by leaders that have a soft spot for Israel. Influential pockets of strong pro-Israeli sentiment are still present in all Western European states. Some even view Israel’s struggle as a vanguard of their own beleaguered Western civilization, threatened by moral relativism and Islamic fanaticism. The growing fears of Muslim immigration in the Old Continent provide an important corrective on the prism of Israel.
Then there’s the expansion of the European Union that has worked in Israel’s favor. "New Europe," the Eastern European states, is very different from the Western part of Europe. Its strategic culture is dominated by a historic threat perception from Russia; as a result, it is more understanding of the dilemmas associated with the necessary use of force by Israel. So is small Finland.
Little evidence of growing Israeli isolation
Generally, most states are not ready to have their relations with Jerusalem held hostage by the vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We can also detect the beginning of weariness with the Arab-Israeli conflict and an attitude reminiscent of “a plague on both your houses.” Some have even begun to realize that the Palestinians have a stake in not ending the conflict and in propagating the victim image to continue to get financial support from gullible Western donors.
Most international forums remain rabidly anti-Israel and Israel continues to be singled out as the culprit of a variety of “sins.” But as no real change has taken place in the anti-Israel arena in past decades, it is difficult to conclude that Israel’s position has worsened in such international organizations. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the UN rescinded the 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution terming Zionism – the Jewish national movement – racist. This year Israel was also accepted into the exclusive club of the OECD, which is a significant diplomatic feat. The OECD brings together the 33 most developed countries in the world that are committed to democracy and the market economy.
A growing and real problem for Israel is the phenomenon of “lawfare,” whereby anti-Israel groups exploit the legal system of Western states to criminalize Israel and Israeli government officials in these states and in international forums. Several states have been sensitized to this issue and have taken legislative actions to remedy the situation. This is particularly true of states operating military forces beyond their borders, such as the US, UK, or France, which could one day face similar challenges. Another growing challenge to Israel's legitimacy comes from NGOs that single out Israel for alleged human rights abuses. The real impact this has on Israel's international status is not yet clear.
Isolation in the international community, the literature shows, is more often than not connected to the international power configuration. Obviously, normative considerations have little impact on the decision making of the authoritarian states that deplore the human rights “abuses” of Israel. Indeed, the growing weakness of the US, particularly since the advent of President Obama, has exposed its small ally, Israel to somewhat harder times.
Nevertheless, taking into account that Israel cannot benefit from an association with a big international bloc, such as the developing countries or the Muslim bloc, or with regional blocs such as Latin America, Europe, or Asia, Israel is doing quite well on the international scene. Moreover, the world has shown that it can live with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for many years.
Conclusion
Jews are historically conditioned to sense isolation and de-legitimization. Already in the Bible, the prophet Balaam called the Jewish nation “a people that dwells alone.” Today, according to a recent poll, 56% of the Israeli Jewish public believes that "the whole world is against us." Yet, a larger majority (77%) thinks it makes no difference what Israel does and how far it may go on the Palestinian issue; the world will continue to be very critical of it. While the Jewish prism on international relations could amplify this sense of isolation, the realistic outlook on international relations can prevent unwarranted fears and lead to a balanced Israeli position on issues of war and peace.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Israel is not nearly as diplomatically isolated as its critics from within and without would have us believe; thus, Israeli diplomacy and security policies should not be dictated by panic over such “isolation.”
By ascribing exaggerated importance to the Palestinian issue, and by inflating assessments of Israel’s isolation, the Israeli (and Diaspora Jewish) left advocate an urgent deal with the Palestinians, at a heavy Israeli price.
A calmer, more realistic assessment of Israel’s situation – attempted below – calms unwarranted fears and can help lead to sober positions on issues of war and peace.
Introduction
Many Israelis feel that Israel is once more alone and that the Jewish state is increasingly isolated in the international community. An August 2010 poll shows that on the question of Israel's current status in the international arena, a majority of the Jewish public thinks Israel is moderately or completely isolated (54%), compared to 46% who say it is not isolated. A similar poll among Diaspora Jews would likely reveal an even more acute feeling of isolation, because as a minority Diaspora Jews are more exposed to anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli attitudes. Taking into consideration the many examples of the negative media coverage of Israel, such feelings in Israel and in the Diaspora are understandable. Indeed, the infamous Goldstone Report and the “Gaza flotilla” incident, among other events, provide ample evidence of a hostile international climate regarding Israel.
Moreover, the Israeli left argues vocally that the continuation of the conflict with the Palestinians exacts a heavy price from Israel; that Israel is becoming an isolated and less legitimate political entity. Yet, this claim reflects a distorted view of reality. The hard left is influenced primarily by its reference groups – the Western left and its radical offshoots. Ascribing exaggerated importance to the Palestinian issue, and to Israel’s isolation, they advocate an urgent deal with the Palestinians at a heavy Israeli price.
The partisans on the left are wrong. A closer look at Israel’s interactions with many states in the world in which real power resides, and with international organizations (not nearly as powerful), explains why. A calm and careful review of the situation provides a more nuanced and much less pessimistic picture.
Wider Israeli diplomatic presence
Take the number of states that have diplomatic relations with Israel. This measure clearly shows an improvement in Israel’s international status, particularly since 1973. Then, with the energy crisis, the power of the Arab world was at its zenith. Subsequently, Israel experienced an avalanche of severed diplomatic relations. This has drastically changed, particularly after 1991, when an increasing number of states decided to establish and/or upgrade diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. For example, all states within the Soviet orbit, in former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, as well as most African and Asian states opted for diplomatic relations. Significantly, rising powers such as China and India, and pivotal states such as Russia, Turkey, and Nigeria decided to have full diplomatic relations with Israel, which have been maintained ever since.
Generally, states facing the challenges of terrorism and/or radical Islam, mostly a post-1991 phenomenon, seek cooperation with Israel. The Jewish state has much to offer in the area of intelligence and tactical and doctrinal counter-terrorism. Because of the growing Islamist threat, the number of states seeking security relations with the Jewish state is on the rise. There are many countries that fall into this category, and the Israeli-Palestinian intractable conflict hardly deters them from useful interactions with Israel.
Improved relations with Muslim states
Significantly, relations with the Muslim world have improved. Israel has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan. Israel has oscillating informal dealings with several Arab states in the Gulf and in the Maghreb. Most of the Arab world adheres to the Arab League Peace Initiative. While this peace plan is not reasonable from an Israeli perspective (it is a take it or leave it proposal), the Arabs are talking peace, not war, and imply a de facto recognition of Israel – a historic change in their position. The Arab economic boycott has largely evaporated. It is the Iranian nuclear threat that puts any differences with Israel over the Palestinian issue on a side burner.
Israel also has cordial and fruitful relations with Muslim states that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Israeli presence is well felt in states such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Muslim identity of these populations and their elites does not hinder relations with Jerusalem in areas important to their national interests. Their sensitivity to the imagined or real misfortunes of the Palestinians is very low.
The US and rising powers
Similarly, diplomatic ties with the most important country in the world, the US, have greatly improved since 1973 and the strategic relationship is still very strong, despite the misguided Middle Eastern policies of the Barack Obama administration. For the past four decades, the level of American public support for Israel has remained remarkably stable (about 65%). This translates, of course, into congressional support. Israel is still popular in the US primarily because of how it is perceived and not because of the Jewish lobby. We have recently seen President Obama bow to this popular sentiment and adopt a friendlier posture toward the Israeli government of Binyamin Netanyahu.
A high level of friendship toward Israel and the Jewish people characterizes the two most populous and dynamic states on the world scene – India and China – rising powers in every sense of the word. Both are old civilizations that have not been burdened by anti-Semitic baggage, like Europe. They treat the Jewish State with reverence as they see in it a similar old civilization that has had remarkable achievements. Most Asian countries, even if they vote against Israel in international forums, have a similar attitude. Likewise, countries on the Pacific Rim, an area that has gained international significance, are usually pro-Israel. South Korea and Australia are prime examples. Sub-Saharan African countries also contain very pro-Israel circles for a variety of reasons.
European attitudes
Old Europe" is indeed a different planet on this matter. Its naïve strategic culture, where there is no threat perception and the use of force is seen as anachronistic, makes Israel a difficult case to swallow. This is reinforced by latent traditional anti-Semitism that singles out the Jews as responsible for the problems of the world. Belgium, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden, in particular, display anti-Israeli positions bordering on anti-Semitism. Fortunately, none are core European states. Some European universities have become unpleasant places for Israelis, and a large portion of the European intelligentsia is intuitively anti-Israel, even denying Israel’s right to exist. It is also true that much of the elite European media is hysterically biased against Israel.
At the same time France, Germany, and Italy (the power centers of the European Union) are ruled nowadays by leaders that have a soft spot for Israel. Influential pockets of strong pro-Israeli sentiment are still present in all Western European states. Some even view Israel’s struggle as a vanguard of their own beleaguered Western civilization, threatened by moral relativism and Islamic fanaticism. The growing fears of Muslim immigration in the Old Continent provide an important corrective on the prism of Israel.
Then there’s the expansion of the European Union that has worked in Israel’s favor. "New Europe," the Eastern European states, is very different from the Western part of Europe. Its strategic culture is dominated by a historic threat perception from Russia; as a result, it is more understanding of the dilemmas associated with the necessary use of force by Israel. So is small Finland.
Little evidence of growing Israeli isolation
Generally, most states are not ready to have their relations with Jerusalem held hostage by the vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. We can also detect the beginning of weariness with the Arab-Israeli conflict and an attitude reminiscent of “a plague on both your houses.” Some have even begun to realize that the Palestinians have a stake in not ending the conflict and in propagating the victim image to continue to get financial support from gullible Western donors.
Most international forums remain rabidly anti-Israel and Israel continues to be singled out as the culprit of a variety of “sins.” But as no real change has taken place in the anti-Israel arena in past decades, it is difficult to conclude that Israel’s position has worsened in such international organizations. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the UN rescinded the 1975 UN General Assembly Resolution terming Zionism – the Jewish national movement – racist. This year Israel was also accepted into the exclusive club of the OECD, which is a significant diplomatic feat. The OECD brings together the 33 most developed countries in the world that are committed to democracy and the market economy.
A growing and real problem for Israel is the phenomenon of “lawfare,” whereby anti-Israel groups exploit the legal system of Western states to criminalize Israel and Israeli government officials in these states and in international forums. Several states have been sensitized to this issue and have taken legislative actions to remedy the situation. This is particularly true of states operating military forces beyond their borders, such as the US, UK, or France, which could one day face similar challenges. Another growing challenge to Israel's legitimacy comes from NGOs that single out Israel for alleged human rights abuses. The real impact this has on Israel's international status is not yet clear.
Isolation in the international community, the literature shows, is more often than not connected to the international power configuration. Obviously, normative considerations have little impact on the decision making of the authoritarian states that deplore the human rights “abuses” of Israel. Indeed, the growing weakness of the US, particularly since the advent of President Obama, has exposed its small ally, Israel to somewhat harder times.
Nevertheless, taking into account that Israel cannot benefit from an association with a big international bloc, such as the developing countries or the Muslim bloc, or with regional blocs such as Latin America, Europe, or Asia, Israel is doing quite well on the international scene. Moreover, the world has shown that it can live with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for many years.
Conclusion
Jews are historically conditioned to sense isolation and de-legitimization. Already in the Bible, the prophet Balaam called the Jewish nation “a people that dwells alone.” Today, according to a recent poll, 56% of the Israeli Jewish public believes that "the whole world is against us." Yet, a larger majority (77%) thinks it makes no difference what Israel does and how far it may go on the Palestinian issue; the world will continue to be very critical of it. While the Jewish prism on international relations could amplify this sense of isolation, the realistic outlook on international relations can prevent unwarranted fears and lead to a balanced Israeli position on issues of war and peace.
Abbas in Wonderland
From Ynet News, 12 Sept 2010, by Martin Sherman [channelling Lewis Carroll and Franz Kafka, reincarnated...]:
Obama, after the "pragmatic" Palestinians have repudiated any idea of "historic compromise," [and] any recognition of Jewish national sovereignty:
"…so far the talks are moving forward in a constructive way…"You couldn’t make this stuff up!
...It has been an almost inconceivable spectacle, beginning with the Israeli prime minister traveling to Washington to express his resolve and commitment to implement a policy that he has repeatedly repudiated – and ridiculed - for over a decade and a half.
Even more astonishing is the fact that he did so not because his earlier criticism was proven unfounded in any way, but despite the fact that it was proven well founded in every way; not because his previous warnings that the policy would herald disaster were proven wrong but despite the fact that they were proven right.
Yet the absurdity does not end here. In the Alice-in-Wonderland world of Middle East politics things get "curiouser and curiouser."
No less astounding than Netanyahu's acquiescence to discuss the implementation of the very policy he correctly predicted would fail, is the identity of the "partner" with whom he assented to do so.
The Palestinian negotiation team is led by Mahmoud Abbas, someone who has neither the formal legality (since his terms of office has expired) nor the political legitimacy (since his authority in not recognized by a sizeable segment of the electorate) to do so.
And then enter Hamas. With an impeccable sense of timing, Abbas' radical adversaries carried out two brutal terror attacks on Israelis, dramatically demonstrating that the man Netanyahu has incongruously deemed “my-partner-in-peace” cannot control events in the areas he purports to administer- underscoring both the impotence of the Palestinian "partner" and pointlessness of negotiating with him.
...what would be the value of an agreement... if there is no guarantee that the Palestinian signatories will be any position to honor or enforce them, even assuming they desire to do so?
Abbas wants to shape Israel
And just to drive home the absurdity and futility of the entire exercise, after explicitly rejecting Netanyahu's call for a "historic compromise," Abbas pronounced categorically that
"we won't recognize Israel as a Jewish state," as to do so would "block any chance of Palestinian refugees from returning to their original homes inside Israel."This was reiterated the very next day by senior Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath... ...by obdurately insisting on the "right of return," they make it quite clear that the only agreement acceptable to them is one that would [destroy Israel].
...Indeed, Abbas' demands are not restricted to shaping the future state of Palestine...[as] Judenrein with all the Jewish "settlements" evacuated and all the Jewish settlers expelled...
His demands extend to shaping the character of the State of Israel and to what the composition of its population should be ...millions of non-Jewish Palestinian "refugees..." from third-party countries ....
Like I said: You couldn’t make this stuff up!
...And if anyone thought that matter could not get any more farcical ...Obama issued his latest exhortation for Netanyahu to make another gesture and extend the soon-to-expire building freeze. His reasoning: After the "pragmatic" Palestinians have repudiated any idea of making an "historic compromise" and any recognition of Jewish national sovereignty 60 years after Israel's establishment, was:
"…so far the talks are moving forward in a constructive way, it makes sense to extend that moratorium so long as the talks are moving in a constructive way."You couldn't make this stuff up! Or have I said that before?
Iranian regime continues to crumble: Rafsanjani attacks Ahmadinejad
Washington Post Foreign Service, Tuesday, September 14, 2010, by Thomas Erdbrink*:
TEHRAN, IRAN - An influential former Iranian president on Tuesday criticized the government in unusually blunt terms, saying that it is not taking U.S.-led sanctions seriously enough and that Iran could become a "dictatorship."
The remarks by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani represent a rebuke of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, though Rafsanjani did not mention him by name. Rafsanjani was also quoted by the semi-official Iranian Labor News Agency as indirectly saying that the government is not adhering to the Islamic Republic's laws.
Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been under increasing pressure from multiple power centers in Iran.
A series of public disagreements between Ahmadinejad's government and the parliament, influential clerics and even some of the president's own ministers have led to a crisis atmosphere, which has heightened political tensions in the country.
The government has said the sanctions stemming from Iran's controversial nuclear program have strengthened the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad has called them "pathetic" and less effective than "a used handkerchief." But business owners complain that the prices of raw materials are skyrocketing because of shortages.
"We have never been faced with so many sanctions," Rafsanjani said at a meeting of an influential clerical council. "I would like to ask you and all the country's officials to take the sanctions seriously and not as a joke."
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad have long been rivals, and Rafsanjani was considered a behind-the-scenes force in the Green Movement that challenged the government after last year's disputed elections.
His words could be an opening shot that allows lower-level politicians to increase pressure on the president. Already, members of parliament are hinting at a possible impeachment motion against Ahmadinejad.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has called for a special mediation council to solve rising problems between the government and the parliament.
Rafsanjani warned that a "fifth column" was posing as supporters and enemies of Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad's supporters have tried to purge Rafsanjani from the establishment, but he has strongly aligned himself with Khamenei, who in turn has publicly supported the president.
Speaking out during a meeting of the 86-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical council, Rafsanjani also deplored violent groups that in recent months have besieged houses of prominent clerics, the parliament and shops in the Tehran bazaar.
Calling those groups a "poison for the country," Rafsanjani warned that "the enemy must be stopped . . . before we will face problems at the core."
*Special correspondent Kay Armin Serjoie contributed to this report.
TEHRAN, IRAN - An influential former Iranian president on Tuesday criticized the government in unusually blunt terms, saying that it is not taking U.S.-led sanctions seriously enough and that Iran could become a "dictatorship."
The remarks by Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani represent a rebuke of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, though Rafsanjani did not mention him by name. Rafsanjani was also quoted by the semi-official Iranian Labor News Agency as indirectly saying that the government is not adhering to the Islamic Republic's laws.
Ahmadinejad and his supporters have been under increasing pressure from multiple power centers in Iran.
A series of public disagreements between Ahmadinejad's government and the parliament, influential clerics and even some of the president's own ministers have led to a crisis atmosphere, which has heightened political tensions in the country.
The government has said the sanctions stemming from Iran's controversial nuclear program have strengthened the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad has called them "pathetic" and less effective than "a used handkerchief." But business owners complain that the prices of raw materials are skyrocketing because of shortages.
"We have never been faced with so many sanctions," Rafsanjani said at a meeting of an influential clerical council. "I would like to ask you and all the country's officials to take the sanctions seriously and not as a joke."
Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad have long been rivals, and Rafsanjani was considered a behind-the-scenes force in the Green Movement that challenged the government after last year's disputed elections.
His words could be an opening shot that allows lower-level politicians to increase pressure on the president. Already, members of parliament are hinting at a possible impeachment motion against Ahmadinejad.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has called for a special mediation council to solve rising problems between the government and the parliament.
Rafsanjani warned that a "fifth column" was posing as supporters and enemies of Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad's supporters have tried to purge Rafsanjani from the establishment, but he has strongly aligned himself with Khamenei, who in turn has publicly supported the president.
Speaking out during a meeting of the 86-member Assembly of Experts, a clerical council, Rafsanjani also deplored violent groups that in recent months have besieged houses of prominent clerics, the parliament and shops in the Tehran bazaar.
Calling those groups a "poison for the country," Rafsanjani warned that "the enemy must be stopped . . . before we will face problems at the core."
*Special correspondent Kay Armin Serjoie contributed to this report.
US massively arm Saudis against Iran
From: The Australian & The Times September 15, 2010:
WASHINGTON: The US is finalising the largest arms deal in its history: a $US60 billion ($64bn) package of fighter jets and helicopter gunships for Saudi Arabia...
...To put the deal's $US60bn price tag in context, however, total US arms sales between 2001 and 2008 were $US155bn.
Serious reservations are inevitable among senators who will view the deal as a challenge for Israel and the balance of power in the Middle East...
...However, the Israelis are buying the US's even more advanced F35 Joint Strike Fighter and will retain the military edge. Also absent from the Saudi package is the most sophisticated standoff long-range missiles for the F15s.
"We appreciate the administration's efforts to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge, and we expect to continue to discuss our concerns," said Michael Oren, the Israeli ambassador to the US.
The US also hopes to expand Saudi Arabia's defences as a deterrent to Iran's burgeoning medium-range ballistic missiles.
Boeing estimates that the deal will safeguard or create 77,000 US jobs.
But Aljazeera, in a shoddy op-ed by Teymoor Nabili in Middle East, on September 14th, 2010 complains ...about what?...
...Ignoring the fact that miltary aircraft ...are prettty [sic] much useless against a nuclear missile, especially one that does not exist, $60bn buys a mind boggling amount of firepower, so that must mean that Saudi Arabia's military capacity right now is woefully insufficent compared to Iran's, right?
Er, no.
Saudi military spending already dwarfs Iran's by a factor of six. Indeed, by head of population, Saudi is the world's biggest purchaser of military hardware.
... Iran's military is only superior in terms of manpower numbers.
So if Iran's intention is to send waves of soldiers marching across the desert, then maybe Saudi has something to fear. [Yes, and they've done it before: sending hundreds of thousands of pubescent boys to their deaths in the desert minefields, with plastic "keys to paradise" around their necks, in the war with Iraq - SL]
...the suggestion that Riyadh has something to fear from Tehran is laughable. [No, this op-ed is what's laughable - SL]
... the suggestion that Iran is keen to invade Saudi Arabia makes even less sense than the suggestion that Tehran intends to attack Israel.... the Arab world is much more concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than any Iran issue. [ha ha ha - who are you kidding??? - SL]
And, as a major survey of the Arab public opinion [which survey?] found recently, the Arab majority ... is in fact very sympathetic of Iran's right to nuclear technology, with a majority saying a nuclear-armed Iran may in fact be a good thing for the region.
WASHINGTON: The US is finalising the largest arms deal in its history: a $US60 billion ($64bn) package of fighter jets and helicopter gunships for Saudi Arabia...
...To put the deal's $US60bn price tag in context, however, total US arms sales between 2001 and 2008 were $US155bn.
Serious reservations are inevitable among senators who will view the deal as a challenge for Israel and the balance of power in the Middle East...
...However, the Israelis are buying the US's even more advanced F35 Joint Strike Fighter and will retain the military edge. Also absent from the Saudi package is the most sophisticated standoff long-range missiles for the F15s.
"We appreciate the administration's efforts to maintain Israel's qualitative military edge, and we expect to continue to discuss our concerns," said Michael Oren, the Israeli ambassador to the US.
The US also hopes to expand Saudi Arabia's defences as a deterrent to Iran's burgeoning medium-range ballistic missiles.
Boeing estimates that the deal will safeguard or create 77,000 US jobs.
But Aljazeera, in a shoddy op-ed by Teymoor Nabili in Middle East, on September 14th, 2010 complains ...about what?...
...Ignoring the fact that miltary aircraft ...are prettty [sic] much useless against a nuclear missile, especially one that does not exist, $60bn buys a mind boggling amount of firepower, so that must mean that Saudi Arabia's military capacity right now is woefully insufficent compared to Iran's, right?
Er, no.
Saudi military spending already dwarfs Iran's by a factor of six. Indeed, by head of population, Saudi is the world's biggest purchaser of military hardware.
... Iran's military is only superior in terms of manpower numbers.
So if Iran's intention is to send waves of soldiers marching across the desert, then maybe Saudi has something to fear. [Yes, and they've done it before: sending hundreds of thousands of pubescent boys to their deaths in the desert minefields, with plastic "keys to paradise" around their necks, in the war with Iraq - SL]
...the suggestion that Riyadh has something to fear from Tehran is laughable. [No, this op-ed is what's laughable - SL]
... the suggestion that Iran is keen to invade Saudi Arabia makes even less sense than the suggestion that Tehran intends to attack Israel.... the Arab world is much more concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict than any Iran issue. [ha ha ha - who are you kidding??? - SL]
And, as a major survey of the Arab public opinion [which survey?] found recently, the Arab majority ... is in fact very sympathetic of Iran's right to nuclear technology, with a majority saying a nuclear-armed Iran may in fact be a good thing for the region.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
"Echoes of a Shofar" - according to PA TV: "sin and filth"
From ToldotYisrael, September 02, 2010:
...Under a British law in Palestine passed in 1930, Jews were forbidden to blow the shofar at the Kotel, pray loudly there, or bring Torah scrolls, so as not to offend the Arab population.
Despite this restriction, for the next seventeen years, the shofar was sounded at the Kotel every Yom Kippur. Shofars were smuggled in to the Kotel where brave teenagers defiantly blew them at the conclusion of the fast. Some managed to get away - others were captured and sent to jail for up to six months.
Six of these men are still alive.
Two weeks ago, these six men returned to the scene of their "crime". Armed with shofars, they recounted their individual stories and blew shofar again at the Kotel.
This is their powerful and inspiring story.
From a PMW Bulletin, Sept. 14, 2010, by Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik:
On the Jewish New Year, PA TV broadcast a documentary showing Jews praying at the Western Wall while the narrator called it "sin and filth."
The same program also described Jewish history as "false."
PA TV narrator:
...Under a British law in Palestine passed in 1930, Jews were forbidden to blow the shofar at the Kotel, pray loudly there, or bring Torah scrolls, so as not to offend the Arab population.
Despite this restriction, for the next seventeen years, the shofar was sounded at the Kotel every Yom Kippur. Shofars were smuggled in to the Kotel where brave teenagers defiantly blew them at the conclusion of the fast. Some managed to get away - others were captured and sent to jail for up to six months.
Six of these men are still alive.
Two weeks ago, these six men returned to the scene of their "crime". Armed with shofars, they recounted their individual stories and blew shofar again at the Kotel.
This is their powerful and inspiring story.
From a PMW Bulletin, Sept. 14, 2010, by Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik:
On the Jewish New Year, PA TV broadcast a documentary showing Jews praying at the Western Wall while the narrator called it "sin and filth."
The same program also described Jewish history as "false."
PA TV narrator:
"They [Israelis] know for certain that our [Palestinian] roots are deeper than their false history. We, from the balcony of our home, look out over [Islamic] holiness and on sin and filth [Jews praying at the Western Wall]."[PA TV (Fatah), Sept. 10, 2010]
Even if Abbas wants an agreement (doubtful), he simply doesn't have the authority
From The Washington Post, Friday, September 10, 2010, by Charles Krauthammer:
The prospects are dim but the process is right.
...we're leaving behind interim agreements, of which the most lamentable were the Oslo accords of 1993.
The logic then was that issues so complicated could only be addressed step by step ...Israel made concrete concessions -- bringing in Yasser Arafat to run the West Bank and Gaza -- in return for which Israel received growing threats, continuous incitement and finally a full-scale terror war that killed more than a thousand innocent Israelis.
Among the victims was the Israeli peace movement and its illusions about Palestinian acceptance of Israel. The Israeli left, mugged by reality, is now moribund.
...[NOW] No interim deals, no partial agreements. ... if Israel gives up its dream of a united Jerusalem, for example, the Palestinians in return give up their dream of the right of return.
...What's under discussion is a final settlement of the conflict. Meaning, no further claims. Conflict over.
What's standing in the way? Israeli settlements? Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, one of Israel's most nationalist politicians, lives in a settlement and has said openly that to achieve peace he and his family would abandon their home. What about the religious settlers? Might they not resist? Some tried that during the Gaza withdrawal, clinging to synagogue rooftops. What happened? Jewish soldiers pulled them down and took them away. If Israel is offered real peace, the soldiers will do that again.
The obstacle today, as always, is Palestinian refusal to accept a Jewish state. That has been the core issue of the conflict from 1947 [actually from 1921 - SL] ....
...Unfortunately, there's no more sign today of a Palestinian desire for final peace than there was at Camp David. Even if Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas wants such an agreement (doubtful but possible), he simply doesn't have the authority.
To accept a Jewish state, Abbas needs some kind of national consensus behind him. He doesn't even have a partial consensus. Hamas, which exists to destroy Israel, controls part of Palestine (Gaza) and is a powerful rival to Abbas's Fatah even in his home territory of the West Bank.
Indeed, this week Abbas flatly told al-Quds, the leading Palestinian newspaper, "We won't recognize Israel as a Jewish state." Nice way to get things off on the right foot...
The prospects are dim but the process is right.
...we're leaving behind interim agreements, of which the most lamentable were the Oslo accords of 1993.
The logic then was that issues so complicated could only be addressed step by step ...Israel made concrete concessions -- bringing in Yasser Arafat to run the West Bank and Gaza -- in return for which Israel received growing threats, continuous incitement and finally a full-scale terror war that killed more than a thousand innocent Israelis.
Among the victims was the Israeli peace movement and its illusions about Palestinian acceptance of Israel. The Israeli left, mugged by reality, is now moribund.
...[NOW] No interim deals, no partial agreements. ... if Israel gives up its dream of a united Jerusalem, for example, the Palestinians in return give up their dream of the right of return.
...What's under discussion is a final settlement of the conflict. Meaning, no further claims. Conflict over.
What's standing in the way? Israeli settlements? Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, one of Israel's most nationalist politicians, lives in a settlement and has said openly that to achieve peace he and his family would abandon their home. What about the religious settlers? Might they not resist? Some tried that during the Gaza withdrawal, clinging to synagogue rooftops. What happened? Jewish soldiers pulled them down and took them away. If Israel is offered real peace, the soldiers will do that again.
The obstacle today, as always, is Palestinian refusal to accept a Jewish state. That has been the core issue of the conflict from 1947 [actually from 1921 - SL] ....
...Unfortunately, there's no more sign today of a Palestinian desire for final peace than there was at Camp David. Even if Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas wants such an agreement (doubtful but possible), he simply doesn't have the authority.
To accept a Jewish state, Abbas needs some kind of national consensus behind him. He doesn't even have a partial consensus. Hamas, which exists to destroy Israel, controls part of Palestine (Gaza) and is a powerful rival to Abbas's Fatah even in his home territory of the West Bank.
Indeed, this week Abbas flatly told al-Quds, the leading Palestinian newspaper, "We won't recognize Israel as a Jewish state." Nice way to get things off on the right foot...
Dissident group says Iran has secret nuclear facility
From the Washington Post, September 9, 2010, by Greg Miller:
An Iranian dissident group said on Thursday that it has identified a previously undisclosed nuclear facility under construction northwest of Tehran, claiming to have evidence that shows the Islamic nation is deceiving inspectors and moving forward in its pursuit of a bomb.
...The information was presented by the People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran, a group that has been on the mark in the past in exposing Iranian nuclear activities, including the identification in 2002 of a large centrifuge installation at Natanz.
But U.S. officials have greeted some of the organization's other claims with skepticism, and note that it has for years been on a State Department list of designated terrorist organizations.
"This facility has been under construction for years, and we've known about it for years. While there's still some ambiguity about its ultimate purpose - not unusual for something that's still taking shape - there's no reason at this point to think it's nuclear," a U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "The Iranians put military stuff in tunnels, too. People should be cautious about reaching conclusions here."
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed late last year that Tehran would build 10 new sites to enrich uranium. No evidence has surfaced yet to indicated that any of those facilities have been built.
...Noting that Iran had told the IAEA last year that there were no other nuclear facilities under construction, another group spokesman, Alireza Jafarzadeh, said, "Iranian officials were lying through their teeth."
Still, experts expressed skepticism about the new allegations.
"We saw nothing in the images that suggests a centrifuge plant," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "There are many underground facilities in Iran."
The Mujaheddin group aims to overthrow of the government in Tehran, and has lobbied to have the State Department terrorist label removed...
Satellite image of site alleged to be a previously undisclosed nuclear facility in Iran. (Courtesy DigitalGlobe and Globalsecurity.org).
An Iranian dissident group said on Thursday that it has identified a previously undisclosed nuclear facility under construction northwest of Tehran, claiming to have evidence that shows the Islamic nation is deceiving inspectors and moving forward in its pursuit of a bomb.
...The information was presented by the People's Mujaheddin Organization of Iran, a group that has been on the mark in the past in exposing Iranian nuclear activities, including the identification in 2002 of a large centrifuge installation at Natanz.
But U.S. officials have greeted some of the organization's other claims with skepticism, and note that it has for years been on a State Department list of designated terrorist organizations.
"This facility has been under construction for years, and we've known about it for years. While there's still some ambiguity about its ultimate purpose - not unusual for something that's still taking shape - there's no reason at this point to think it's nuclear," a U.S. official said, speaking on condition of anonymity. "The Iranians put military stuff in tunnels, too. People should be cautious about reaching conclusions here."
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad vowed late last year that Tehran would build 10 new sites to enrich uranium. No evidence has surfaced yet to indicated that any of those facilities have been built.
...Noting that Iran had told the IAEA last year that there were no other nuclear facilities under construction, another group spokesman, Alireza Jafarzadeh, said, "Iranian officials were lying through their teeth."
Still, experts expressed skepticism about the new allegations.
"We saw nothing in the images that suggests a centrifuge plant," said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security. "There are many underground facilities in Iran."
The Mujaheddin group aims to overthrow of the government in Tehran, and has lobbied to have the State Department terrorist label removed...
Monday, September 13, 2010
Islamists Tighten Their Grip on Turkey as Erdogan Extends Powers Over Courts and Army
From Bloomberg, September 12, 2010, by Benjamin Harvey and Steve Bryant*:
Sept. 13 (Bloomberg) -- Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won a referendum on constitutional changes that will strengthen his government’s powers over the courts and army, boosting his prospects of re-election next year.
The package was supported by 58 percent of voters to 42 percent against, with a 78 percent turnout in yesterday’s vote, state broadcaster TRT said citing official figures from the country’s election board. ...
The referendum was widely viewed as a preview of Erdogan’s chances of winning a third term in office at general elections to be held by July. The “yes” vote will bolster a government that has presided over record economic growth even as critics accuse it of seeking to undermine Turkey’s secular system.
Generals and judges who see themselves as the last line of defense against encroaching Islamism, and have frequently clashed with the prime minister since his party came to power in 2002, will have their powers curtailed under the amendments.
The strong win “indicates the prospects of a third term look solid,” and shows that Erdogan’s “political machine” is “far superior to any of its competitors,” said Wolfango Piccoli, an analyst of political risk at the Eurasia Group in London.
Speaking to supporters in Istanbul, Erdogan welcomed the “yes” vote and said he will work on a complete overhaul of Turkey’s constitution, drafted in 1982 when the country was under military rule, after next year’s elections.
...Opposition politicians campaigned against the measures, saying they undermine the separation of powers and would hand Erdogan too much power....
...The amendments ...[will allow] members of the armed forces to be tried in civilian rather than military courts for crimes against the state...
The amendments also restructure the judiciary, giving the government more control over appointments to the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, which has frequently clashed with Erdogan and struck down measures passed by his lawmakers, will be expanded to 17 members from 11, with 14 appointed by the president and the other three by parliament.
Critics including the opposition Republic People’s Party and Nationalist Action Party say the amendments allow Erdogan to enact what they say is his hidden Islamist agenda...
*With assistance from Seda Sezer in Istanbul. Editors: Ben Holland, Louis Meixler.
From Aljazeera, 12 Sep 2010: Turkish analysts discuss their views on the referendum:
...Al Jazeera spoke to several analysts to get their thoughts on the vote.
Cengiz Aktar, Turkish columnist and journalist
..."There is no unity among the 26 articles unfortunately, and the referendum has turned into a referendum on the AKP [Erdogan's party]. But this is how things happen in this country.
"Now we are heading towards an election next year and if the vote is a 'yes' vote, the hand of the government will be strengthened for a brand new constitution in Turkey."
Semih Idiz, columnist at Turkey's Milliyet newspaper
"There are really only two articles that are controversial. Even the opposition in the past has said it will endorse the remaining articles.
"These two articles are to do with the composition of the high judiciary. The government is basically trying to introduce a system where there can be more parliamentary and effectively government control over the judiciary.
"The hardcore secular camp in Turkey are objecting to this very severely because it believes that this will open a back door to an Islamic agenda for the government in the future.
"So, the lines are pretty well drawn here and they are not really discussing the merits of the article in questions. In fact, they are discussing ideological things.
"The stakes are high for both sides. In fact, we can say for three sides - the Kurdish side as well.
"...there is, what I call, the post-modern civil war between the secularists and the 'Islamists' in this country....
Cuneyt Ulsever, columnist at Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper
"There are two amendments that directly talk about judiciary, with an accusation that the judiciary had been too independent and made another coalition in the country and done many injuries to the political system. This is the allegation of the government.
"The problem is, if the amendments are accepted as proposed by the government, 10 out of 17 members of the constitutional court will be decided directly by the government people."
"The minister of justice and his aides will be the chief of [the] council that will decide about the judges."
"I would say that, yes, the judiciary has done many wrongs in the past, but with this new amendment it is quite possible that the government will directly be the leader and the owner of the judiciary."
"The root of democracy, the separation of powers, will be completely voided."
"As is it today, we will see a more authoritarian prime minister than ever. Our prime minister is already a very authoritarian personality and now he will have all powers in his hands."
Sept. 13 (Bloomberg) -- Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan won a referendum on constitutional changes that will strengthen his government’s powers over the courts and army, boosting his prospects of re-election next year.
The package was supported by 58 percent of voters to 42 percent against, with a 78 percent turnout in yesterday’s vote, state broadcaster TRT said citing official figures from the country’s election board. ...
The referendum was widely viewed as a preview of Erdogan’s chances of winning a third term in office at general elections to be held by July. The “yes” vote will bolster a government that has presided over record economic growth even as critics accuse it of seeking to undermine Turkey’s secular system.
Generals and judges who see themselves as the last line of defense against encroaching Islamism, and have frequently clashed with the prime minister since his party came to power in 2002, will have their powers curtailed under the amendments.
The strong win “indicates the prospects of a third term look solid,” and shows that Erdogan’s “political machine” is “far superior to any of its competitors,” said Wolfango Piccoli, an analyst of political risk at the Eurasia Group in London.
Speaking to supporters in Istanbul, Erdogan welcomed the “yes” vote and said he will work on a complete overhaul of Turkey’s constitution, drafted in 1982 when the country was under military rule, after next year’s elections.
...Opposition politicians campaigned against the measures, saying they undermine the separation of powers and would hand Erdogan too much power....
...The amendments ...[will allow] members of the armed forces to be tried in civilian rather than military courts for crimes against the state...
The amendments also restructure the judiciary, giving the government more control over appointments to the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges and the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court, which has frequently clashed with Erdogan and struck down measures passed by his lawmakers, will be expanded to 17 members from 11, with 14 appointed by the president and the other three by parliament.
Critics including the opposition Republic People’s Party and Nationalist Action Party say the amendments allow Erdogan to enact what they say is his hidden Islamist agenda...
*With assistance from Seda Sezer in Istanbul. Editors: Ben Holland, Louis Meixler.
From Aljazeera, 12 Sep 2010: Turkish analysts discuss their views on the referendum:
...Al Jazeera spoke to several analysts to get their thoughts on the vote.
Cengiz Aktar, Turkish columnist and journalist
..."There is no unity among the 26 articles unfortunately, and the referendum has turned into a referendum on the AKP [Erdogan's party]. But this is how things happen in this country.
"Now we are heading towards an election next year and if the vote is a 'yes' vote, the hand of the government will be strengthened for a brand new constitution in Turkey."
Semih Idiz, columnist at Turkey's Milliyet newspaper
"There are really only two articles that are controversial. Even the opposition in the past has said it will endorse the remaining articles.
"These two articles are to do with the composition of the high judiciary. The government is basically trying to introduce a system where there can be more parliamentary and effectively government control over the judiciary.
"The hardcore secular camp in Turkey are objecting to this very severely because it believes that this will open a back door to an Islamic agenda for the government in the future.
"So, the lines are pretty well drawn here and they are not really discussing the merits of the article in questions. In fact, they are discussing ideological things.
"The stakes are high for both sides. In fact, we can say for three sides - the Kurdish side as well.
"...there is, what I call, the post-modern civil war between the secularists and the 'Islamists' in this country....
Cuneyt Ulsever, columnist at Turkey's Hurriyet newspaper
"There are two amendments that directly talk about judiciary, with an accusation that the judiciary had been too independent and made another coalition in the country and done many injuries to the political system. This is the allegation of the government.
"The problem is, if the amendments are accepted as proposed by the government, 10 out of 17 members of the constitutional court will be decided directly by the government people."
"The minister of justice and his aides will be the chief of [the] council that will decide about the judges."
"I would say that, yes, the judiciary has done many wrongs in the past, but with this new amendment it is quite possible that the government will directly be the leader and the owner of the judiciary."
"The root of democracy, the separation of powers, will be completely voided."
"As is it today, we will see a more authoritarian prime minister than ever. Our prime minister is already a very authoritarian personality and now he will have all powers in his hands."
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