Pundits Are Wrong

From GLORIA, December 5, 2006, by Barry Rubin Director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary Center university....

... here are some things I feel confident are not going to happen, at least for a very long time to come:

• Hamas is not going to moderate, stop terrorism against Israel, or make a compromise peace. - The Palestinians will not reach an internal political solution, turn toward economic development, or moderate their positions.
• Syria's government is not going to help any compromise solution in Iraq, make peace with Israel, or stop trying to take over Lebanon.
• The current regime in Iran will not stop trying to get nuclear weapons, subvert the region, or sponsor terrorism.
• The incumbent Arab regimes--with a few exceptions among the smaller Gulf states--will not implement any substantive economic or political reforms.
• Hizballah will not moderate its goals. Even if it adopts "political methods," these are merely at the service of its extremist goals. Any way, Hizballah--like other radical groups--sees no reason why it shouldn't use violence at the same time as it holds demonstrations or runs in elections. All the same points apply to the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in Turkey. - The communities in Iraq will not reach any power-sharing compromise until one side in the civil war has decisively defeated the other.
• Democracy, in the meaningful sense of the word, is not coming to the Arabic-speaking world very soon.
• Most Western Middle East "experts" will continue in failing to understand the Middle East.

[ Prof. Rubin's columns can be read online at: http://gloria.idc.ac.il/columns/column.html.]

The Iraq Study Group: Implications for Israel

From Jerusalem Centre Report, December 2006, Vol. 6, No. 15 (8 December 2006), by Dore Gold (President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, and Israel's ambassador to the UN from 1997 to 1999)....

• Israel should not try to second-guess U.S. decisions about putting American soldiers in harm's way. However, the specific strategy that the Baker-Hamilton report proposes for facilitating an American pullback in Iraq - the use of an international support group including Iran and Syria - poses serious problems that affect vital Israeli interests.
• Baker confirmed on December 6, 2006, that the Iraq Study Group derived some of its inspiration from the "six-plus-two" talks on the future of Afghanistan at the UN. But in Afghanistan, back in the 1990s, Iran sought to contain a radical Sunni regime under the Taliban. In 2006, in contrast, Iran seeks to dominate Iraq through its Shiite majority. The two situations are entirely different.
• Obtaining a constructive approach from Iran and Syria would involve a 180-degree shift in their policies. Clearly the authors of the report have no awareness of the ideological commitment of the Iranian regime to export its revolution to Shiite communities throughout the Middle East as it seeks to achieve regional hegemony.
• Should the Bush administration adopt this approach from the Iraq Study Group, it would not be seeking a radical shift in Iranian and Syrian policies from a position of strength. From the perspective of Teheran and Damascus, the U.S. would be seeking their help after they had succeeded in defeating coalition forces. As a result, the price for their cooperation would be exorbitant.
• The Iraq Study Group suggests that "the Israelis should return the Golan Heights." There is no negotiation over the withdrawal as in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It appears that the Golan Heights are being used as an inducement to obtain cooperative Syrian behavior on Iraq. On the Palestinian track, the Baker-Hamilton report does not call for talks over "refugees," but rather over "the right of return," adopting Palestinian legal nomenclature and undermining Israel's legal position.

The Iraq Study Group (ISG) which was chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and former House member Lee H. Hamilton, argues in its newly-released report that there is a growing dissatisfaction in the American public with the continuing U.S. military presence in Iraq, and therefore it seeks to outline an exit strategy for U.S. forces. One Saudi advisor writing in the Washington Post on November 29, 2006, already warned, in anticipation of the report, that a U.S. withdrawal could lead to ethnic cleansing of Iraq's Sunni Muslim minority by Iraqi Shiites, backed by Iran.

While a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will have enormous implications for the security of the Middle East as a whole, Israel and other American regional partners should not try to second-guess this decision when it involves questions about whether the U.S. should put its soldiers in harm's way. However, the specific strategy that the Baker-Hamilton report proposes for facilitating an American pullback - the use of an international support group including Iran and Syria - poses serious problems that affect vital Israeli interests.

Iran and Syria: Supporters of Regional Stability?
The underlying assumption of the Iraq Study Group is that it is possible to replicate the experience of the 1990s, when Iranian representatives sat with diplomats from the U.S., Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan to discuss the stabilization of that county in what was called the "six-plus-two" talks. Indeed, Baker confirmed on December 6, 2006, that the ISG derived some of its inspiration from the "six-plus-two" talks on the future of Afghanistan at the United Nations. By analogy, the ISG hopes that a similar multilateral group can end the chaos in Iraq. However, the "six-plus-two" talks failed to stop the conversion of Afghanistan into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda.

More importantly, given the fact that both Iran and Syria have played leading roles in de-stabilizing Iraq and resupplying the various Shiite and Sunni insurgency groups, obtaining a constructive approach from these countries would involve a 180-degree shift in their policies. Clearly the authors of the report have no awareness of the ideological commitment of the Iranian regime to export its revolution to Shiite communities throughout the Middle East as it seeks to achieve regional hegemony. This has been accentuated with the rise to power of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as Iran's president in 2005. In Afghanistan, back in the 1990s, Iran sought to contain a radical Sunni regime under the Taliban. In 2006, in contrast, Iran seeks to dominate Iraq through its Shiite majority. The two situations are entirely different.
Moreover, should the Bush administration adopt this approach from the Iraq Study Group, it would not be seeking a radical shift in Iranian and Syrian policies from a position of strength. The report characterizes the situation in Iraq as "grave and deteriorating." It asserts that there is no domestic consensus any longer on the war with mounting U.S. casualties. From the perspective of Teheran and Damascus, the U.S. would be seeking their help after they had succeeded in defeating coalition forces. As a result, the price for their cooperation would be exorbitant.

The Price of Iranian and Syrian Cooperation
The paramount Iranian interest in such a dialogue over Iraq would be the continuation of the Iranian nuclear program: it could be expected that Teheran would seek a quid pro quo, exchanging its cooperation on Iraq for Western acquiescence to its nuclear program. Syria would follow a similar course, seeking to protect its most vital interests in exchange for being helpful on Iraq: this might include halting the UN investigation into the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri or the reassertion of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon.

Because this constitutes a high price even for the Iraq Study Group, it suggests that "the Israelis should return the Golan Heights." There is no negotiation over the withdrawal as in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It appears that the Golan Heights are being used by the Iraq Study Group as an inducement to obtain cooperative Syrian behavior on Iraq.

It is particularly disturbing that the ISG does not call for the complete dismantling of international terrorist organizations in Syria as a precondition for the Israeli-Syrian agreement it foresees. Syria is supposed "to use its influence with Hamas and Hizballah" to obtain the release of Israeli soldiers. There is supposed to be a cessation of arms shipments to Hamas, Hizballah, and other groups. But their offices and training camps remain open. This situation would still constitute a violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which legally prohibits states from harboring international terrorist organizations. Adoption of these policies by the Bush administration would seriously compromise the war on terrorism that the U.S. declared after 9/11.

On the Palestinian track, the Baker-Hamilton report makes detailed suggestions that include support for a "Palestinian national unity government." The suggestion is tantamount to acquiescence to the Hamas role in the Palestinian political system. It is extremely disturbing that when the report lists the subjects for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over final status, it does not call for talks over "refugees," but rather over "the right of return" (p. 58), adopting Palestinian legal nomenclature and undermining Israel's legal position. At least, unlike in the Syrian case, the report calls for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over borders, and does not presume to suggest a predefined border ahead of time.

The report's contention that "the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict" seeks to make this issue the main root cause for regional instability. This has been proven in the past as a patently false assertion and remains so today. What do al-Qaeda attacks on Shiites in Iraq have to do with Israel? What does Israel have to do with Sudan's policy of genocide against black tribes in Darfur? Unfortunately, such thinking is likely to divert attention away from the real sources of instability in the Middle East - like revolutionary Iran - and blame Israel instead.

Clearly, the Iraq Study Group expresses a strong American desire to come up with an alternative strategy on Iraq that allows for graduated U.S. disengagement. Should the U.S. withdraw from Iraq, that will be its own decision. But at least the Bush administration should not adopt a line of policy that will leave its regional allies weaker and their adversaries emboldened, as it brings to a close a difficult period of its military involvement in the Middle East.

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Follow this link for a pdf version of the Iraq Study Group report.

Hamas escalates threats

From DEBKAfile, December 9, 2006, 11:59 AM (GMT+02:00) ...

Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal escalates threats, declares his Palestinian group has embraced strategic option of armed conflict against Israel

Speaking from his Damascus base, Meshaal says the US and Israel must undertake a withdrawal to 1967 boundaries, and accept a Palestinian state with Jerusalem its capital and return of Palestinian refugees.

In Tehran, Palestinian PM Ismail Haniya said Friday: Hamas will never recognize Israel or give up jihad. Iran is the Palestinians’ strategic support. The Islamic Republic’s had transferred $120 m to break the Western and Israeli boycott of his government, he reported.

Baker's failed record

From Ynet News 9/12/06, by Yoram Ettinger [former Israeli consul general in Texas and Israeli embassy staffer in Washington, D.C.]...

The failed diplomatic record of James Baker, who submitted his recommendations regarding the war in Iraq to top Bush Administration officials, stands in contradiction to his impressive record in Washington's business and political arenas. Therefore, the adoption of his recommendations would serve anti-American terror elements and undermine pro-American moderate elements.

....A reexamination of Baker's history shows that in 1990, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the "master dealmaker" from Texas decided to convince late Syrian President Hafez Assad to join the coalition against Iraq. Therefore, he ignored the Syrian dictator's terror activity, showered him with international legitimacy, hinted to American aid to Syria, and granted him a free hand in Lebanon.

In response to Baker's "pragmatism," Assad did nothing against Iraq, yet completed the takeover of Lebanon, killed thousands of Lebanese, crushed a Christian anti-Syrian government, and brought to power a pro-Syria puppet regime in Beirut. The Baker legacy has a significant role in Lebanon's breakdown.

Starting in the 1980s and up until Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, Baker viewed him as a "constructive leader" worthy of American support, and referred to him by saying that "the enemy of my enemy (Iran) is an ally." Therefore, Baker ignored the belligerence displayed by the butcher of Baghdad towards Iran (the 1980 invasion) and towards the Shiites in Iraq, granted it loan guarantees worth USD five billion and Export-Import Bank credit, approved the transfer of sensitive technologies and classified intelligence information to Baghdad, and made it clear to Saddam in April 1990 that an invasion of Kuwait would be an internal Arab affair.

In response to Baker's "green light," Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and threatened to take over Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Gulf states. Under the auspices of Baker's "realism," Saddam brutally suppressed a Shiite uprising and rehabilitated the capabilities that were destroyed in 1991. Baker failed to understand that "my enemy's enemy" could also be "my enemy." The bitter results of his misunderstanding are being felt in the region to this day.

From the end of the 1980s and up until the invasion of Kuwait, Baker focused on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and viewed Yasser Arafat as a vital partner in the peace process. Therefore, he ignored Arafat's and the PLO's treacherous terror record, nurtured ties with them, attempted to break former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, and prevented loan guarantees to the tune of USD 10 billion meant for absorbing Soviet Jews. In addition, he convinced President Bush to threaten a veto of any pro-Israel bill, pressed for freezing settlement activity and an Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 borders, and blamed Israel for the absence of peace with its neighbors.

In response to Baker's gestures, the PLO provided Saddam with vital information for the Kuwait invasion, PLO units in Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the organization remained loyal to Saddam, Bin Laden, and other anti-American groups active to this day.

In 2006, Baker views the two terror states, Syria and particularly Iran, as countries that may calm the situation in Iraq. In order to advance this objective, he is willing to enhance their strategic maneuvering space. The adoption of his recommendations would advance the Iranian nuclear effort, turn Saudi Arabia and Gulf states to Teheran's hostages, free Assad from the noose of international pressure tightening around his neck, endanger the regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, and force Israel to act unilaterally in order to remove the lethal Iranian threat.

Baker's failures stem from, among other things, baseless assumptions that terror leaders also prefer a "deal" over ideology, that the Palestinian issue is at the heart of Middle Eastern violence and the root of anti-American terror, that peaceful coexistence can be reached with determined terrorists, that the Israeli conflict is over the size of Israel rather than its very existence, and that the US can pay with Israeli concessions for improving its relations with the Muslim and Arab world.

...Baker's determination to strike a "deal" at any price leads to the sacrifice of long-term interests on the altar of short-term illusions. .....Will American and Israeli leaders adopt Baker's "pragmatism" and "realism," or would they be wise enough to learn from his failures?