Flowering of China-Israel commerce

From Asia Times, 11 Oct 2016, By Edouard Cukierman, Founding and Managing Partner of Catalyst:

Since its establishment 68 years ago, Israel has become a powerhouse for innovation, start-ups and high-tech. We have witnessed significant growth in the blooming Israeli start-up ecosystem throughout the years since its humble beginnings a few decades ago. On the other side of the globe, China has been going through its own transformation: over the past 30 years, China has become a super nation with a 20% share in the world’s GDP. Today, more than ever in its long history, China is looking to impact and cooperate outside the country’s physical borders.

Although still a relatively newly development, it seems that the economic relations between Israel and China have all the potential for a strong, successful and long-lasting business connection. 

Historically, the interest in Israeli technology came mainly from the US and Europe; a vast majority of Israeli companies and technologies were acquired by US and European players.
However, over the last decade, we see a growing trend of emerging market companies, especially from China, acquiring Israeli technologies. Over the past 4 years alone, Chinese investors have invested over US$15 billion in Israeli companies.

List of Israeli acquisitions by Chinese investors as announced on public media.

Big Chinese conglomerates and leading companies such as Fosun, ChemChina, Brightfood, Horzion Ventures and China Everbright have invested significant capital and resources into Israeli companies and many others are following their example.

Chinese investors have discovered the enormous potential of the Israeli high-tech industry across a wide variety of sectors and have quickly began investing and acquiring a number of Israeli companies to help along their own innovation needs. It seems that China discovered Israel as an innovation hub and source for leading technology – and Israeli companies welcome the vast market opportunities China has to offer with open arms and investment rounds for local players to come in.

With each year, we see more joint ventures blossoming from the Israeli-Chinese love story. To only name a few of the very recent transactions we witnessed and were part of: ChemChina invested US$3.7 billion in world’s biggest producer of generic crop protection products Israeli company Adama, Israeli diagnostics company Check-Cap completed a successful pre-IPO round with Fosun as the lead investor, Brightfood invested US$2.5 billion in Israel’s leading dairy producer Tnuva, the first Israel-China private equity Fund was established between Israeli firm Catalyst and China Everbright Limited, Israeli gaming company Playtika was acquired for US$4.4 billion by a consortium of Chinese investors and Baidu made a strategic investment into Taboola, a leading online discovery platform company.

We believe that the Chinese-Israeli economic alliance is here to stay. What we have witnessed over the last years is a mere beginning of a beautiful, long-lasting and mutually beneficial friendship.
Catalyst is very proud to be at the forefront of these developments. Catalyst established the first dedicated Israel-China Private Equity Fund together with its partners, China Everbright Limited (CEL). The Fund supports the long term growth of innovative mature Israeli companies and their entry into the Chinese market. In parallel, our investment bank, Cukierman & Co. Investment House, established a successful joint venture with our Shanghai-based partner Yafo Capital, focusing on Israeli-Chinese cross-border transactions. Our deep involvement and commitment to China is maybe illustrated best by choosing to organize our annual conference, the 16th GoforIsrael, in China – for the first time in its 15 year history the conference was held outside of Israel.

In the coming years, we hope to see these two ancient cultures, the Chinese and the Jewish, both dating back thousands of years, creating a robust and long term business partnership. We are very enthusiastic to see the synergy this alliance will create in the coming years.

Israel's Strategic Challenges (this year)

From JPost, 13 October 2016, by Yaakov Katz:

First, the good news: At the onset of 5777, the new Jewish year, there is no conventional or existential military threat against the State of Israel.

That is no small feat, considering that it was just 43 years ago when Israel was getting clobbered in Sinai and on the Golan Heights in the bloody debacle known as the Yom Kippur War. In a coordinated assault, the Egyptian and Syrian armies attacked Israel and killed over 2,600 IDF soldiers, and created an unprecedented sense of vulnerability that would take decades to shake off.

Today though, there is peace with Egypt, and no Syrian military to speak of.

Five years into a bloody and costly civil war, the Syrian military – Israel’s primary threat until recently – is almost completely eroded. Practically, this means that there is no adversary currently parked along Israel’s borders with the ability to conquer Israeli’s territory, no mobilized armored divisions or infantry corps that pose a serious threat today to the IDF.

 In addition, while the Iran nuclear deal has plenty of problems and weak points – specifically, that in just a few years the deal will enable Tehran to be just weeks away from a nuclear device – for the time being it is working, and has stopped the mullah’s race to the bomb.

Within the IDF General Staff, the deal is looked at like this: it has stopped Iran’s nuclear program, but not Iran’s nuclear desire. One day, probably sooner than later, Iran’s nuclear sites will again need to be considered as potential military targets.

So the good news, if it can even be called that, is that because of Syria’s civil war there is no conventional military threat against Israel, and because of the unreliable nuclear deal, Iran is for now not an existential threat to the Jewish state.

But here is the bad news.

Israel today is challenged on five different but simultaneous fronts, each of which draws different resources, focuses and responses. The common denominator among all five is that while none presents Israel with an existential or conventional threat, they are all extremely unpredictable. On all five fronts, small tactical-level incidents have the potential to quickly escalate into full-blown conflicts.

Here is the breakdown:

West Bank
The stabbing intifada, as it has become known, started last October with the murder of the Henkin couple in northern Samaria. Since then, the IDF has recorded nearly 300 attacks, over 100 directed against civilians. As recent events show – the violence in Silwan over Yom Kippur, and the murder earlier this week of two Israelis in Jerusalem – these sporadic attacks by lone attackers are likely to continue.

This, by the way, is the IDF’s working assumption. Terrorism, senior officers explain, has unfortunately always been part of the Israel story, since before the state was established. Despite everything the IDF and other security forces do, they don’t really expect it to ever fully go away.

Nevertheless, there is plenty they can and are already doing to try to keep it at a minimum. Today, an unprecedented number of IDF battalions and soldiers are deployed in the West Bank, and Israel Police officers are stationed in larger and greater numbers in known flash points like Jerusalem. Over 3,700 Palestinians have been arrested in the past year, alongside dozens of weapons workshops that have been demolished and hundreds of guns and rifles that have been seized.

The increased IDF presence – alongside impressive intelligence work that includes hunting for potential attackers on social media – has brought the number of attacks down in recent months. In September 2015, the IDF recorded 69 attacks, and in October, 43. This past September there were 14, after six straight months when the number was under 10.

The policy of staying away from collective punishment and differentiating between Palestinians who participate in attacks and those who don’t – put into place by former defense minister Moshe Ya’alon and continued by his successor, Avigdor Liberman – is believed to be the main reason why this past year has not spiraled into a full-fledged intifada with the participation of PA security forces.

Despite the violence, some 60,000 Palestinians still cross daily into Israel, and freedom of movement is allowed throughout the West Bank. The PA security services for the most part still cooperate with the IDF – the military says their effectiveness is at about 40% – and carry out arrests against Hamas terrorists.

Gaza Strip
Since 1968, the IDF has not recorded such a quiet period in the Gaza Strip as it has since the war in Gaza ended two summers ago. This does not mean the situation is quiet, or the potential for war does not exist. It definitely does, and when considering Israel’s various fronts, the most explosive is Gaza.

Since 2014, Gazan terrorists have fired 47 rockets and mortar shells into Israel.

This is almost nothing compared to 2014, when 4,891 rockets and mortar shells hit Israel, mostly during the war.

Of the rockets and mortar shells that have been fired this past year, 95% were launched by organizations other than Hamas, such as Islamic Jihad, which continues to receive tens of millions of dollars annually in support from Iran.

Even so, the IDF has struck nearly 100 targets throughout the Strip – many of them in recent weeks – and all of them belonged to Hamas, which Israel holds responsible for anything that happens in Gaza. None of these targets were just sand dunes. They were all real Hamas assets.

At the same time, the IDF is investing heavily in tunnel detection technology, and has set aside NIS 600 million from its own budget to match the same amount from the Treasury to continue the development and enable the eventual procurement.

There have been some successes, but the system is not fool-proof and will need more time for development.

What this means practically is that when it comes to Gaza, the IDF is currently focused mostly on intelligence collection and the creation of target banks for when another war breaks out. Soldiers are also constantly training for the guerrilla and tunnel warfare they will face.

But even as it prepares for war, the defense establishment is also supportive of initiatives – like the construction of a port off the Gaza coast – which it believes could improve the economic situation in the Strip and help stave off another conflict.

While economic prosperity is not directly tied to terrorism, there is a correlation.

Within the defense establishment there is no question that the worse off Gaza is, the less hope there is for change, and the more motivation there will be to engage in terrorist activity against Israel.

SinaiSinai remains a point of concern for Israel and a focus for IDF intelligence. On the one hand, Egypt seems to be doing a better job at cracking down on Islamic terrorist elements in Sinai, but ISIS cells still operate freely throughout the peninsula.

According to the IDF, many of the ISIS fighters in Sinai train with Hamas in Gaza, and receive funding, weapons and assistance from the Palestinian terrorist organization.

One of the last known attacks against Israel was in July 2015, when a rocket was fired from Sinai into Israel.

That October, a Russian airliner blew up over Sinai, killing all 224 people on board.

The attack is believed to have been carried out by ISIS.

To counter this growing threat, the IDF in recent years has beefed up its presence along the 400-kilometer border, with additional troops alongside electronic warning systems like phased-radar systems.

According to various reports, it seems that Israel and Egypt are cooperating in combating ISIS. In July, Bloomberg reported that Israel was carrying out drone attacks in Sinai “with Egypt’s blessing.” Israel has also allowed Egypt to deploy additional troops and combat vehicles in Sinai by slightly modifying the Camp David Accords.

Israel’s concern is that the Sinai front will escalate beyond an occasional rocket attack. It hopes that Egypt’s military campaign will keep ISIS preoccupied and away from the Jewish state.

Syria
For Israel, the situation in Syria presents an opportunity and a challenge. On the one hand, Israel benefits from the erosion of the Syrian military. On the other hand, today Israel is vulnerable – as recent skirmishes have shown – to attacks from terrorist elements based in Syria like ISIS or Jabhat al-Nusra, a known al-Qaida affiliate.

Israel has laid down three redlines when it comes to Syria that if crossed, will necessitate action: the transfer of sophisticated weaponry from Syria to Lebanon; the establishment of an Iranian presence on the Golan Heights; and any violation of Israeli sovereignty.

In recent months, Israel has noticed terrorist elements fleeing northern Syria and moving to the South, where they could shift their focus to Israel.

Russia’s expanding presence in Syria and investment in Bashar Assad’s survival – alongside its standoff with the US – means that there is very little chance a sustainable cease-fire can be reached that would end the war and return some semblance of quiet to the region.

What it also means is that Israel will need to watch over its three redlines to ensure they are not violated.

Lebanon
With its 130,000 rockets and missiles – some of which are capable of striking almost anywhere in Israel – Hezbollah is Israel’s primary threat for the year ahead.

The potential devastation that would be caused to Israel in a war with Hezbollah is incomparable to anything Israel has seen in past conflicts, with some estimates that up to 1,000 rockets could be fired in a single day.

However, according to Israeli intelligence, Hezbollah remains deterred from engaging in a full-fledged conflict with Israel due to two primary factors: the deterrence Israel created during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, and the organization’s continued involvement in the Syrian war.

There are approximately 7,000 Hezbollah operatives currently working inside Syria, fighting alongside the Syrian army.

Over the last few years, some 2,000 have been killed and more than 6,000 have been injured. Out of a force of around 20,000, that is a significant number.

Hezbollah also recently lost its top military commander, Mustafa Badreddine, who was killed in May in a blast at a base near Damascus airport. Badreddine was the most senior Hezbollah operative killed since his brother-in-law, longtime military commander Imad Mughniyah, was blown up on February 12, 2008, by a bomb planted in his car in the Kafr Sousa neighborhood of Damascus that Hezbollah blamed on Israel.

Hezbollah leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has not forgotten the devastation Israel wreaked on Lebanon during the 2006 war, and the long-term negative impact it had on the country’s two key sources of income: tourism and banking.

Nevertheless, the political deadlock in Lebanon – illustrated by the inability to appoint a president – alongside growing tension in the region could lead to a change in Hezbollah’s calculus.

FORTY-THREE years after the Yom Kippur War, the enemy has changed. While Israel no longer needs to worry about tank divisions trying to plow their way into the Golan or the Negev, the unpredictability of its enemies and their changing modes of warfare mean that the IDF needs to constantly be at a state of readiness.

War can come from any of these fronts at a moment’s notice, and for that, the IDF is always preparing. On the other hand, victory with enemies like these is not absolute. Conflicts are like cycles these days. They come and then disappear for some time until the enemies rebuild their capabilities and reignite the passion and ideology of their followers.

The IDF’s real challenge is how to remain versatile in the face of multiple threats and adversaries that it faces in the region. 

Hopefully, 5777 will go down as a quiet year for Israel. It has the potential to be something completely different.

From Tehran to the Mediterranean coast

From Israel Hayom, 13 Oct 2016, by Prof Eyal Zisser: 

It appears that there is already a clear winner in the struggle over prestige between Russia and the United States.  ...the winner in the Russian-American squabble is actually Iran, which is silently but surely establishing for itself a realm of influence that extends from Tehran to the Mediterranean coast, over which it will have complete control.

Iran's accomplishment comes with its fair share of irony. Only six years ago, when the Arab Spring began, it appeared that the upheavals in the Arab world would deliver a decisive blow to Iran's efforts to create an "axis of resistance" under its own influence that would stretch from Tehran, though Baghdad and Damascus, all the way to Beirut and Gaza [not to mention the Red Sea, via Iranian Houthi proxies in Yemen - SL]

At the end of the day, the Arab Spring proved to be nothing other than an Arab-Sunni awakening directed more against the Iranian threat and Shiism than against Israel. And so Iran watched with longing as radical Sunni Islam -- with the rebel groups in Syria and the Islamic State group on the Syria-Iraq border -- prepared to overtake its grasp on Syria, Iraq and even Lebanon.

However, the Russian involvement in Syria that began in September 2015 changed the game. The Russians saved Syrian President Bashar Assad from a near-certain ouster, and they even returned to him broad swathes of the country. But the Russians did not come alone. The platform upon which Moscow based its return to the region was an Iranian-Shiite one. And indeed, Russian involvement in Syria is based on Iranian and Shiite fighters, who complete the work of Russian aircraft and fight Moscow's war on the ground.

But the Iranians are not joining in for the sake of altruism, nor strictly for their love of Assad or Putin. They also do not intend to be used as pawns on Putin's chess board. 

This past August, a senior official in the Iranian Revolutionary Guard revealed that Tehran is working toward the establishment of a "Shiite liberation army," using Shiite volunteers from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, along with, of course, Hezbollah fighters. This army, he explained, includes units separated by ethnicity: an Afghan unit, a Pakistani unit and an Iraqi unit, alongside the Lebanese Hezbollah. This army is deployed along the battle fronts where Iran is fighting, from Yemen, to Iraq, to Syria. It helped save Assad's regime and push Islamic State out of Baghdad, but it's ultimate goal, the Iranian official explained, is to destroy the State of Israel, the fight against which is Iran's lifeblood.

There were those who saw in this declaration and in other similar ones heard from Tehran nothing more than the baseless boasting we are used to hearing from Iranian spokespeople from time to time. But just this week, Western media reported about Iran's intentions to advance plans for a land passage from Tehran to the Mediterranean coast. This plan, includes the management of two critical campaigns: One in the Syrian city of Aleppo, which the Iranians and the Russians have been crushing in recent weeks. And in addition to this, a campaign to conquer the Iraqi city of Mosul from Islamic State and to ensure reinforced Shiite control in Iraq as well as Iraq's connection to Syria.

Iran's path to the Shiite land passage from Tehran to Beirut is still a long one, but under the auspices of the Russian-American quarrel, and with Moscow's quiet blessing, Iran is advancing its interests in the region. Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump's remarks that Assad and the Russians are fighting Islamic State and serving the American interest may be indicative of new winds blowing in the West, of an inclination to see Iran as a partner and its presence in Syria and Iraq as a stabilizing force. This would certainly be an unpleasant scenario for Israel.

Iranian Proxies: Houthis, Threaten Freedom of Navigation in Red Sea

From JCPA, Vol. 16, No. 17, October 13, 2016, by Lt. Col. (ret.) Michael Segall:

The remains of the United Arab Emirate High Speed Vessel HSV 2 Swift ship
(Tasnim [Iran])

• Since the beginning of October 2016, the Houthi-Yemeni conflict has assumed a new naval and international dimension that could endanger civilian freedom of navigation in the Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal. The Houthis are backed and armed by Iran; the Yemen army is backed by a Saudi-led Arab coalition.
• On October 1, 2016, the Houthi-allied Yemeni Republican Guard launched an anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) near the Red Sea port of Mocha in the strategic Bab el-Mandeb shipping lane. It struck a humanitarian ship in the service of the United Arab Emirates Navy.
• The United States dispatched three battleships to the area. On October 9, Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired on the USS Mason in the same area; on October 11, they fired two more cruise missiles at the ship. No damages or injuries were reported.
• In retaliation, the USS Nitze launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes knocking out three Houthi coastal radar sites “that were active during previous attacks and attempted attacks on ships in the Red Sea.” The strikes, authorized by President Barack Obama, represent Washington’s first direct military action against suspected Houthi-controlled targets in Yemen’s conflict.
• Apparent in Yemen are the absence of the American player and the weakening of its overall policy in the Middle East. Not far from Yemen in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian fast boats continue to harass and provoke American warships, which operate without any appropriate response. Meanwhile, Iran continues to build its naval and missile power.
• Playing down the incident will play into Iranian propaganda and bolster Iran’s already overconfident and defiant stance.

Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have been waging war against the Yemeni army and the Saudi-led Arab coalition in Yemen for several years. Since the beginning of October 2016, the conflict has assumed a new naval and international dimension that could endanger civilian freedom of navigation in the Red Sea’s Bab el-Mandeb Strait, which serves as a gateway for oil tankers headed to Europe through the Suez Canal.

On October 1, the Houthi-allied Yemeni Republican Guard launched [an]...anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) near the Red Sea port of Mocha in the strategic Bab el-Mandeb shipping lane. ...Iran supports Houthis in their struggle to take control of Yemen, including their firing of missiles at Saudi Arabia... 

Map of Yemen. Note the Bab el Mandeb choke point (CIA)

The missile struck an HSV-2 Swift hybrid catamaran belonging to the United Arab Emirates navy operating in the area as part of the Saudi coalition. The ship was carrying a humanitarian cargo as well as people injured in the combat areas of the city of Aden – the temporary capital for the Yemeni government since the Houthi conquest of Sana’a. This is not the first time the Houthis have claimed they are acting against ships of the Saudi-led Arab coalition in the area of Bab el-Mandeb.

The UAE Foreign Ministry said in a statement: “The targeting of the civilian ship in an international channel has serious implications for freedom of navigation, and is an act of terror.” The United Nations also condemned the act. It is worth noting that, during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, a Noor missile that Iran supplied to Hizbullah struck the Israeli naval vessel INS Hanit and killed four crew members.

C-802 Chinese designed missile

The Houthi rebels claimed to have fired the missile that destroyed the UAE ship. They also posted videos on social networks that document the surveillance, the launch of the missile, the moment it hit the ship, as well as rocket fire toward rescue boats that came to the area...

The ship when it once belonged to the U.S. Navy (DOD photo)

A few days after the missile was fired at the UAE ship, the Houthis, under the name Yemeni Navy Coastal Defense, issued a warning to any vessel belonging to the Saudi-led coalition not to take action against Yemen, with a reminder about the strike on the UAE vessel. The vessels were warned not to approach Yemeni territorial waters without permission from the Yemeni authorities. The statement cautioned: “In case of witnessing any uncoordinated movements near Yemen’s territorial waters or trespass of our sea border, the vessels of Saudi Arabia and its allies will be destroyed.”

Following the firing of the missile at the UAE ship, the United States dispatched three naval ships to the area...

...On October 9, two presumed cruise missiles, launched within 60 minutes of each other from Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, targeted the USS Mason (DDG-87) in the same area; on October 11, Iranian-backed Houthi militants fired two more cruise missiles within a 60-minute window at the USS Mason.

The ship’s crew employed a variety of onboard defensive measures to defend the guided-missile destroyer and nearby USS Ponce. Mason launched [several missiles and] used its Nulka anti-ship missile decoy. No damage or injuries were reported. The attack marks the first time in recent memory that a U.S. Navy vessel was forced to engage its on-board defense systems.

...In retaliation, the USS Nitze launched Tomahawk cruise missile strikes knocking out three coastal radar sites in areas of Yemen controlled by Iran-aligned Houthi forces...

Abd al-Malek Houthi’s assistant receiving the “resistance” award. (Tasnim)

On the day the missile was fired at the UAE ship, Iran was holding an annual ceremony for those who have contributed to the resistance. The first place among the resistance movements was taken by Houthi leader Abd al-Malek Houthi. The personal certificate of merit for “Resistance 2016” was given to his assistant by Ali Jafari, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Arab media saw the award as further evidence of Iran’s growing involvement in the Yemeni conflict. Notably, unlike in the past, Iran is no longer concealing its involvement in Yemen and the aid it is providing to the Shiite Houthi rebels.

The firing of guided shore-to-sea missiles at U.S. and UAE ships constitutes an escalation in the Yemeni conflict and could pose a threat to a key international sea lane in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The ability to fire guided missiles, along with their long range (120 km.), endangers not only the coalition’s freedom of action and ability to enforce the Arab embargo but also civilian vessels, including tankers that operate in the area.

Iran’s aid to the Houthi rebels has apparently increased beyond Tehran’s ongoing assistance to fighting at the different fronts in Yemen. Iran is prepared to provide tie-breaking weapons that could help the Houthis breach the naval blockade that Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have imposed on Yemen. In the past, weapons-smuggling ships have been intercepted as Iran was trying to transfer arms to the Houthi rebels. It appears, however, that with the Houthis holding their own in the battles, the embargo is ineffective and Iran has found other lanes for transferring weapons to the Houthis.
The ceasefire in Yemen collapsed at the beginning of August. ...

This war constitutes an additional arena for the “Battle of the Titans” between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which is also being waged in other venues including Syria, Iraq, and Bahrain, and is part of the realignment of the Middle East in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

...Iran views the maritime domain as an important channel for its influence. It enables it to protect its borders as it develops a special battle doctrine, “swarming,” to confront technologically superior (American) naval forces. It also enables Iran to ship aid to its proxies including the Houthis in Yemen, the Palestinian terror organizations, and Hizbullah.

The ongoing war in Yemen serves as a perfect venue for the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN), IRGC missile forces, IRGC Quds forces, and Hizbullah to battle-test some of their new weapons against Iran’s enemies – Saudi Arabia and its Arab-coalition and its arch enemy, the “Great Satan,” the United States.

Part of a cartoon on Khamenei’s webpage. Caption: “Iranian leader conveys a strong message – the Islamic Republic of Iran – unlike in the past when foreign powers exploited its natural resources and humiliated its people  – is powerful enough to defend itself and humiliate its enemies.”

For Iran, Yemen is a perfect venue for such tests.

Iran is preparing for future engagement with the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf where the IRGCN frequently provokes and sometimes humiliates American naval presence in the area. The Americans’ reaction to launching the missiles against its ships may change the dynamics. Playing the incident down will again play into Iranian propaganda and bolster Iran’s already overconfident and defiant stance.

Israel Should Avoid Turkey, Include Cyprus in Gas Export Projects

From BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 370, October 7, 2016, by Ariel Ben Solomon: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Israel should rule out building a natural gas pipeline to Islamist Turkey because of the political risk involved. It should instead consider using LNG technology for export through Cyprus. Although this would be expensive, it would be a less risky and more durable option over the long term. This should be in addition to exporting to Jordan and possibly to Egypt.  As Israel begins closing deals for its natural gas, it should avoid linking itself to any expensive long-term pipeline deal with Turkey at the expense of allies Cyprus, Greece, or even Egypt. Notwithstanding the recent easing of tensions between the two countries, Israel cannot trust Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist regime as a linchpin in its natural gas export strategy. A crisis could erupt at any moment that might cause Erdoğan, an erratic anti-Semite, to stop the gas from flowing, essentially holding Israel hostage. The trigger could be a new war with Hamas-ruled Gaza, which is allied with Turkey, or a general escalation in violence with the Palestinians, or any of a host of other unexpected incidents. The deterioration of the already cool relationship is only a matter of time. The recent improvement in ties between Israel and Turkey must be viewed within the context of the poor relations Ankara had with Russia and other states at the time, and should not be viewed as reflecting any real change in Erdoğan’s attitude toward Israel. Turkey experienced a crisis in its relations with Russia after Turkey’s air force downed a Russian fighter jet near its border with Syria last November. The crisis had Turkey scrambling, as it depends on Russia for over half its gas needs and over 12% of its oil. Turkey also has tense relations with the US and the EU, as well as with various Arab states that oppose its support for Islamists in their countries. The subsequent rapprochement between Turkey and Russia changes the picture, and will give Erdoğan a freer hand to dispose of the Israel relationship as he sees fit. In addition, there are various other countries from which Turkey can receive gas, including Russia and Iran. Turkey would therefore have leverage in any gas deal with Israel. The proposed gas pipeline to Turkey would cost around US$5 billion and take seven to eight years to build. Other options for gas export are Egypt and Greece. Though Cairo is friendly with Jerusalem, Egypt suffers from political instability and terrorism. Even without those issues, Egypt is not an ideal option, because it has its own gas reserves and will not need Israel’s gas in the long run. And while Greece could be part of a plan to export to Europe, this would involve Cyprus as a way-station. On September 26, investors in Israel’s large Leviathan natural gas field closed a $10 billion deal to export gas to Jordan, though production is still a few years away. A pipeline between the two countries is under construction. However, the deal with Jordan still leaves much gas to be sold elsewhere. This leaves what appears to be the safer but more expensive option of developing a liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Cyprus. LNG technology converts natural gas to liquid to make transport easier. Israel would be wise to focus its long-term gas strategy on Cyprus. The Aphrodite gas field south of the Cyprus coast and Israel’s nearby Leviathan gas field could turn Cyprus into a hub for further export of gas to Europe and Asia. An LNG facility would need to be built on a coastline, and it has been estimated that building one in Cyprus would cost upwards of $20 billion. Asked about the possibility of Israel’s building its own LNG facility in Eilat or anywhere else on the Israeli coast, an industry source in Israel dealing with LNG told the author that this will not happen because environmentalists and their political supporters would block it. The opportunity to use LNG thus appears to be narrowed down to using the existing facility in Egypt, building a new one in Cyprus, or creating a floating one at sea. “Cyprus is the safest bet,” the source said. “It is stable for the long term and if Lebanon finds gas, it could be transported by pipeline to Cyprus.” The other idea under discussion is a gas pipeline that would go from Israel to Cyprus and then on to Greece, but some experts see this as unrealistic. A report in the Israeli business newspaper Globesstated in April that while officials from the three countries have discussed this option, it would require at least 1,100 kilometers of pipeline, some of which would pass through depths of 3,000 meters, making it a complex and expensive option. Another industry insider, questioned about the chances of building an LNG facility in Cyprus, responded that it depends on politics and on the building up of feed gas and customers. He added that there is also “a price issue, and if the math works and politics isn’t an obstacle, then a project gets financing.” Some still see Egypt as a viable option. George Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor to US presidential candidate Donald Trump, says that Egypt “faces its worst power crisis in decades due to long-term inefficiencies in the gas sector and is desperate for imported gas until its own legacy production ramps back up.” Egypt is weighing importing gas from Israel and Cyprus. “The Israeli Leviathan and Tamar gas fields, along with the Egyptian Zohr and Cypriot Aphrodite, have the potential to be the linchpins that transform the region into an integrated energy zone,” he said. Accordingly, a strategic relationship between Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt could involve energy cooperation around a prospective Cyprus hub. These countries are all ideologically opposed to Islamist Turkey’s agenda, and Greece and Cyprus have their own historical reasons for preferring cooperation with Israel over Turkey.

The Legal Israeli Settlements

From First One Through:

Many people have argued that it is illegal for Israelis to live beyond the 1949 Armistice Lines (east of the Green Line, EGL/Judea and Samaria/West Bank).  The question of “legitimacy” (not legality) has been repeated often by the USA’s Obama Administration.  Those comments are more harsh towards Israel than prior American administrations that simply viewed new settlements as “unhelpful” to a peace agreement between Israel and the Arab states.  Jimmy Carter was the only US president that actually called the settlements “illegal”.  Below is a review of the international laws that apply towards the settlements.

Street sign in Judea and Samaria

Fourth Geneva Convention

Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention deals with the treatment of “occupied territory“.  It is unclear whether it applies to territory obtained in both offensive and defensive wars, but this review will assume that the law stands in either case.

The majority of Article 49 is about the treatment of the inhabitants of the occupied territory and not about the “Occupying Power” transferring in its own population.  The opening paragraph:

“Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected personsfrom occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive.”

This paragraph does not relate to Israelis living in EGL for several reasons:

• The language is about people from the occupied territory, not to the occupied territory.  It underscores the flagrant illegal eviction of Jews from Judea and Samaria by the Jordanians in 1949.
• As the Arabs living in EGL were not forcibly transferred to any country, Israel did nothing counter to this law.

The next paragraphs deal with exceptions to the main directive stated above for military reasons:

“Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand. Such evacuations may not involve the displacement of protected persons outside the bounds of the occupied territory except when for material reasons it is impossible to avoid such displacement. Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.”

• The law permits operations involving security.  This clause allows the building of the security barrier inside the West Bank that Israel erected in reaction to the Second Intifada, and relocation of people impacted to construct such barrier.

 “The Occupying Power undertaking such transfers or evacuations shall ensure, to the greatest practicable extent, that proper accommodation is provided to receive the protected persons, that the removals are effected in satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition, and that members of the same family are not separated. The Protecting Power shall be informed of any transfers and evacuationsas soon as they have taken place. The Occupying Power shall not detain protected persons in an area particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand.”

• These paragraphs seek to protect people, even in the case of a necessary evacuation.  The only Arabs that Israel moved out of the West Bank were people who were arrested and therefore not relevant to this clause.

As seen above, almost the entirety of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention has to do with the local population- in this case, a theoretical transfer of Arabs out of EGL/Judea and Samaria/West Bank.  Only the last paragraph addresses the civilians of an “Occupying Power”.

 “The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own
civilian population into the territory it occupies.”

• Israelis moving and living in EGL/J&S do so of their own free will.  The government does not “deport or transfer its own civilians” to EGL.
• The “territory” in question, Judea and Samaria, was settled by Jews long before the Jordanians occupied the area and evicted the Jews. As such, Jews were part of the indigenous population before being illegally evicted in 1949. Returning to the region is in keeping with Article 49’s goal above stating “Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.“
• Additionally, this territory was never a distinct country, but part and parcel of the Mandate of Palestine which specifically called for “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”  As such, Jews moving to Judea and Samaria is part of the ongoing provision established internationally in 1922.

The Hague Regulations

Another law that people contend relates to Israel’s administration of EGL/West Bank isArticle 55 of the Hague Regulations:

 “Art. 55. The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, andadminister them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.”

This rule clearly affirms Israel’s role as administrator for public lands.  The Hague regulations – and this provision in particular – deal with situations that are temporary in nature, and are impractical for those that last for decades.  To wit, the Arab population in the West Bank has grown four times since 1967, in one of the largest population increaseson the planet. New infrastructure was established to accommodate the growth in the region, and Israel authorized these new homes, roads and other infrastructure, thereby necessitating a change to public lands.

In terms of minimizing the changes to public lands, it is unclear whether the role of Israel is to maintain a status quo according to the laws of Jordan, which illegally seized and annexed the area, or to administer the region according to British laws which had an international mandate before the Jordanians took control.

• The Jordanians took this area in an offensive war against Israel in 1948-9
• The Jordanian annexation in 1950 was never recognized by the United Nations
• The area in question was part of the internationally approved British Mandate of Palestine (from 1922-1948).

Therefore, to comply with Article 55 above, which rules were appropriate for Israel to maintain: the illegal occupying Jordanian laws of 1949-1967 or those accorded in international law in the British Mandate 1922-1948?

If the British laws regarding property were to be maintained, then those laws state that no person should be forbidden to live in any part of the entirety of the Mandate (including Gaza, Israel and the West Bank) on the basis of religion, per Article 15 of that 1922 Mandate:

“The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.”

As it relates to the use of public lands (which is the focus of Article 55 of the Hague Regulations), the British Mandate clearly states that public land is to be used for Jewish settlement:

“The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.”

Administration under British law encouraged Jews to live throughout Judea and Samaria, including state lands, and it can therefore not be illegal for any Jew to live there.

The only possibility that Jews moving to and living in the West Bank could be considered illegal, was if Jordanian law was to be maintained in the area.  However, even if one were to assume that despite the Jordanian’s forcible seizure and illegal annexation of the area, that their laws should still be maintained, could any law possibly suggest that it be a requirement to maintain particular laws that were flagrant violations of the Geneva Convention such as the racist Jordanian laws that evicted and barred Jews from living in the land?

Even further, if Israeli actions of Jews moving to EGL/West Bank were somehow considered illegal (which is not the case), Article 3 of the Hague Resolution states that a “belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, beliable to pay compensation,” so remedy would be a fine, not eviction of the Jews.

(Also note that Hague Regulation Article 40, specifically gave Israel the right to attack Jordan after Jordan broke the 1949 armistice agreement in 1967.)

United Nations Reinterpretation for Israel

Since 1967, the United Nations crafted various resolutions condemning Israel for a wide variety of perceived “sins” such as the infamous “Zionism is Racism” resolution in 1975.  Many resolutions have inverted the meaning of the Geneva Convention such as a UN Security Council Resolution in 1980 which “Deplor[es] the decision of the Government of Israel to officially support Israeli settlement in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967.”  It continued further:

“[A]ll measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have
no legal validity and that Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its population andnew immigrants in those territories constitute a flagrant violation of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive,
just and lasting peace in the Middle East;”

Arguing that “new immigrants” (many of whom were actually returning residents from 1949) are a threat to the security of the existing population is xenophobia at its most extreme.  Arguing that is a “flagrant violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention” is disproved above.

Status of Jerusalem

The inclusion of Jerusalem in the United Nations attacks on Israel is telling.  Greater Jerusalem and Greater Bethlehem were planned to be an international “Holy Basin” according to the UN 1947 Partition Plan – neither Arab nor Israeli.  After Jordan attacked Israel and seized the eastern half of Jerusalem and annexed it, the United Nations remained silent.  The UN issued no declaration against the Jordanian invasion and land grab for the entire period it held the territory through 1967.  However, when Israel took control of Jerusalem and later annexed it in 1980, the United Nations went on tirades about the illegal nature of Israel’s authority. The UN’s motions are absurd and duplicitous in granting tacit approval to the Jordanian Arab illegal annexation of Jerusalem and condemning Israel for its annexation. If Jordan’s offensive war to take a planned international city was viewed as permissible, how can Israel’s defensive war be viewed any less so?

The ongoing dynamic in Jerusalem is also different than the rest of EGL/West Bank since the eastern part of the city was annexed by Israel and all of the residents were offered citizenship (almost all of the Arabs declined and took residency papers instead). As such, clauses in international law about offering citizenship to people are not applicable to the eastern half of Jerusalem (while still relevant in the remainder of EGL/West Bank).

As reviewed above, Israel abides by the global rules of international law relating to Jews living in EGL.  However, the United Nations reinterpretation of law solely as it relates to Israel – whether for national movements like Zionism, or for allowing Jews to move and live freely like other peoples in lands they lived in for thousands of years – is not law, but anti-Semitism.

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Source:

Fourth Geneva Convention:https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/c525816bde96b7fd41256739003e636a/77068f12b8857c4dc12563cd0051bdb0?OpenDocument

Hague Resolution: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/WebART/195-200065?OpenDocument

Hague Resolution Article 3: https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/195-200004?OpenDocument

Hague Resolution Article 40: “Any serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right of denouncing it, and even, in cases of urgency, of recommencing hostilities immediately.“

British Mandate of Palestine: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/palmanda.asp

Israel-Jordan Armistice agreement: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arm03.asp

UN Security Council Resolution 465 (1980):http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/5AA254A1C8F8B1CB852560E50075D7D5

UN Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) attacking Israel on Jerusalem:http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6DE6DA8A650B4C3B852560DF00663826

UN call that Zionism is racism (1975):http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/761C1063530766A7052566A2005B74D1

FirstOneThrough article on the Green Line:https://firstonethrough.wordpress.com/2014/12/09/the-green-line/

FirstOneThrough article on Judea and Samaria/ West Bank terminology:https://firstonethrough.wordpress.com/2014/12/08/names-and-narrative-the-green-line-west-bank-judea-and-samaria/

Summary of US administrations attitudes towards Israeli settlements:http://www.cmep.org/content/us-statements-israeli-settlements_short#Obama

Empty ‘Peace’ Rhetoric An Insult to Peres’ Legacy

From the Spectator, 30 September 2016, by Jonathan Greenberg:

With the death ... of Israeli founding father Shimon Peres, there is likely to be a lot of talk, some of it abstract but much of it related to Israel, about peace. Which is, one supposes, as it should be. Among Peres’ greatest attributes was his ability to maintain his hope for an Israel at peace and to envision a pathway to it; often in spite of reality. Such visionaries not only impact, but also demonstrate the greatness of free societies. Even when they make mistakes.

But the peace talk about to wash over us will be the boilerplate kind; the easy kind. It will be the kind of pap that makes us feel good about ourselves without moving the ball down the field to actually achieving peace. In fact, such rhetoric about peace can be harmful. We can get stuck in it; wallow in it.

So when Pope Francis says Peres’ “legacy will truly be honored and the common good for which he so diligently labored will find new expressions, as humanity strives to advance on the path toward enduring peace,” I sigh. When John Kerry and a thousand other world leaders call Peres a “warrior for peace,” I roll my eyes.

When the eulogies are over and we begin speaking of Peres’ legacy in prose, it will be time for the people currently reenacting the opening scene of Evita to face some hard truths about Israeli-Palestinian peace:

First, there is no peace to be had right now. Peace requires two parties willing and able to make it. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority has shown no interest in working to change Palestinian culture to prepare it for peace or in making the kind of concessions necessary to obtain it. If they did make such changes and could arrive at a deal, they would still lack the ability to enforce it. And decades of public polling of Palestinians shows that the population simply isn’t ready to bury the hatchet.

Second, continuing to push for a peace that isn’t going to happen may make you feel good about yourself, but it forestalls the conditions that will actually bring the conflict to an end. Our long-term strategic goal should be fostering peace prospect-enhancing changes in Palestinian society. Why Palestinian society? Because where’s their Shimon Peres?

Third, building from the previous point, arm-twisting retreat from the side that is both a liberal democracy and a producer of leaders like Shimon Peres is monumentally unfair, strategically inept, and likely to produce unpleasant results. Condemning Israeli housing in the West Bank, as the current administration and European countries prefer, is counterproductive. Israel has a demonstrated history of willingness to uproot Jewish communities and forfeit territory. Where is the concomitant Palestinian example of positive cultural change? Of negotiated concession?

Last, the Israeli electorate figured all of these things out about 15 years ago. Because, for them, the complexities at work here are local news. 

Listening to [the Israeli electorate]— not the minority viewpoint you happen to agree with, but the public in general — is where every other free country should start when determining its policies on Israel.

Richard Haas, the normally sober president of the Council on Foreign Relations, reacted to Peres’ death by tweeting, “Shimon Peres great if tragic: never fully bonded w Israeli people who didn’t quite trust his peacemaking, lack of mil experience, erudition.” This is nonsense and deeply offensive both to Peres and to the Israeli public whose verdict on him was clear: they wanted him at the table and kept sending him there for every important national decision for seven decades. In fact, the Israeli people kept him there far longer than any other leader in their history. Even his political opponents understood his value and wanted him in the room when decisions were being made.

More than a bond between a politician and his people, the relationship between Peres and Israelis was aspirational. They wanted to believe as he did. He respected their reasonable fears.

We can and should admire leaders like Shimon Peres. Our civilization should aspire to raise up more people like him. We best honor him by first speaking honestly and then acting in the realistic service of peace.

Conflicting messages from the Peres funeral

From The JPost, 1 Oct 2016:

The parade of presidents, prime ministers and princes that filed into Mount Herzl ... to pay final respects to Shimon Peres should, rightfully, fill the country with pride.

Here was an A-list of world leaders who – at a moment’s notice – dropped everything, and flew halfway around the world to attend the funeral of the last of Israel’s founding fathers.

Even those extremely critical of US President Barack Obama’s policies toward Israel over the years had to admit that it was both an impressive and moving gesture on his part to spend almost a full day-and-night on a plane in order to spend just six hours on the ground in Israel to pay his respects to Peres.

But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – undoubtedly moved by such a massive show of respect by much of the world for a man who had become a walking symbol of the country – should be careful not to misinterpret the gesture.

Obama’s arrival, like that of so many of the other leaders – at least the European ones – was a gesture toward Peres, not the government of Israel.

This was a salute to an idealized Israel that Peres represented, not to the flesh-and-blood Israel that is.

And, if anybody had any doubts about this, all they had to do was listen to Obama’s eulogy. It was a eulogy that recognized the travails of Jewish history, and celebrated the wonder of Israel’s rebirth.

But it also praised Peres for his big dreams, while needling the current leadership for its small ones. 

It contrasted the Israel that Peres believed the country could be, to the one that actually exists.

Obama said he didn’t believe – as so many critics have said over the years – that Peres was naïve. Rather, he asserted, Peres understood that “true security comes from making peace with your neighbors.”

Even in the face of terrorist attacks and negotiations that disappointed, Peres “insisted that, as human beings, Palestinians must be seen as equal in dignity to Jews and, therefore, must be equal in self-determination,” Obama said.

The US president compared Peres to other leaders he has met – people such as Nelson Mandela and Queen Elizabeth – “leaders who have seen so much, whose lives spanned such momentous epochs that they find no need to posture or traffic in what is popular at the moment.

“People who speak with depth and knowledge, not in sound bites. They find no interest in polls or fads. Like these leaders, Shimon could be true to his convictions even if they cut against the grain of popular opinion,” Obama said. “He knew better than the cynics that if you look out over the arc of history, human beings should be filled not with fear, but with hope.”

Though he may not have been looking directly at Netanyahu, it was clear to whom his words were directed.

Obama’s words outlined the ideal Israel, the Israel Obama – and much of the world – want to see, even in the face of endless terrorism and threats.

They came to Jerusalem Friday because they were touched by Peres’s vision and wanted to do something to nurture it.

That is one message the Israeli public could take from Friday’s funeral: This is the Israel to which the world wants you to aspire.

But the other message was that it doesn’t really matter what you aspire to, because the other side is not going to be there for you anyway.

And this message was rammed home by the absence – with the very notable exception of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas – of the leaders of the Arab world or the elected representatives of the Israeli-Arab public.

Abbas’s presence is highly commendable, especially in light of the harsh criticism he has come under from various factions in the Palestinian territories because of his decision to come to the funeral.

This was a courageous political move, and an important gesture to the Israeli public from a man not known for caring all that much about gestures to the Israeli public.

But equally telling was the fact that he was the highest ranking Arab leader in attendance.

Peres had a vision – a vision embraced by the world, as evidence by the number of leaders who arrived. How ironic, therefore, that the objects of this vision – the Arab world – were so noticeably absent.

For the last 30 years of his life, Peres tried to forge a new reality with Israel’s neighbors.

World leaders beat a path to Mount Herzl on Friday because they identified and supported his vision of peace with the Arab world, and because they wanted to send a message of encouragement to Israelis to keep going down that path.

But the people with whom he had hoped to make peace were, for the most part, missing from the crowd. That, too, sends a message.

If the Joint List MKs boycott the funeral of Peres, the man who preached coexistence; if Jordan’s King Abdullah II, whose father had a close relationship with Peres, can’t make the journey across the Allenby Bridge to pay last respects; then why go through the motions? It won’t work.

On the one hand, the public can look at who came to the funeral and be awed by the respect the country could garner if it pursues Peres’s path.

But, on the other, it can also look and see who among the country’s neighbors did not come and ask themselves a simple question: What’s the use?