But whether Operation Pillar of Defense turns out to be a
success ultimately depends on how the next few days unfold. Will Israel be able
to hold onto its early gains? Will it avoid a military and diplomatic
entanglement in the Gaza Strip? Will the operation help usher in a new modus
vivendi that allows the residents of the south to lead their lives peacefully?
Israel's decision to carry out the assassination
underscores a realization that Hamas, under Jabari's leadership, changed its
modus operandi by taking an active role in terrorist attacks, effectively
abandoning its long-held policy of restraint. This was evident is the repeated
rocket launches against the communities near the Gaza Strip and its stepped-up
attacks against IDF troops patrolling the border fence and combating its
tunneling activity.
Hamas' audacity reached a new high on Saturday, when it
fired an antitank missile on Givati troops near the Gaza security fence,
wounding four. This proved Hamas was no longer going to shy away from an
escalation.
The massive salvos on Sderot and Hamas' half-hearted
efforts to ensure other terrorist groups abide by the cease-fire that has been
in place since Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 were an indication that [Hamas] was now running the show and was leading the terrorist
campaign against Israel. Israel knew full well that if it let the recent
violations slide it would invite a new, more painful round of hostilities in the
near future.
The response came on Wednesday, after a few days of stormy
weather that prevented action. In hindsight, the unfavorable weather conditions
played into Israel's hands. On the one hand, the government's inaction elicited
scathing criticism for forsaking the residents of the south, but it bought
Israeli leaders some time to put on a show that convinced Hamas that the latest
round was drawing to a close. Hamas let its guard down, expecting calm, and
allowed its leaders to come out of hiding. This provided an opening to Israel to
make its move and embark on its campaign.
The decision to allow trucks to flow into the Gaza Strip
with goods on Wednesday was also designed to create a false impression of calm.
Another layer of deception was added when the Israeli media showed the prime
minister and defense minister touring the north. Other politicians also played
along, stating that a military operation was unlikely. This added to Hamas'
sense of complacency.
A top-down attack
The Jabari assassination was greenlighted by the Forum of
Nine (comprising the prime minister and other top ministers) on Wednesday.
Israel opted to begin the campaign with a top-down attack focusing on Hamas'
higher-ups, knowing that an incremental campaign would allow Jabari and the
other leaders to lie low (as was the case in Operation Cast Lead), which would
make their assassination unfeasible.
In Wednesday's Forum of Nine meeting, the Israel Security
Agency (Shin Bet) and the IDF predicted that Hamas would try to retaliate by
firing rockets on Tel Aviv, a strategic tit-for-tat that would change the rules
of the game. The IDF was thus given the go-ahead to take out all the long-range
rockets and rocket launchers in the Gaza Strip.
The two-pronged campaign was run simultaneously from the
IDF and Shin Bet headquarters. The IDF, from its underground bunker at the
General Staff Headquarters (the Kirya), was tasked with targeting the rocket
disposition; the Shin Bet's operations center was in charge of the
assassination.
The IDF had in its target repository an elaborate file on
the Fajr-3 and Fajr-5 rockets, which have ranges of up to 75 kilometers (46
miles). The Israel Air Force used the coordinates in these files to carry out
precision strikes on the bunkers where they had been stored as well as on other
caches and launching sites. As in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, which began with
Israel destroying Hezbollah's long-range rockets, the most pressing objective
was to deny Hamas (and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad) the ability to disrupt the
lives of those in the greater Tel Aviv area and central Israel by means of
long-range rockets.
IDF officials were careful on Wednesday not to declare
Hamas' long-range rocket apparatus as having been destroyed, lest they be
embarrassed by a successful launch. The Israel Navy and Israel Air Force, having
learned the lessons of Hezbollah’s surprise attack on the INS Hanit in 2006 by
means of a coastal missile, stepped up security to prepare for Hamas surprises
down the road.
Jabari's death stunned Hamas and put it on the defensive.
Over the past several years, Jabari had become the dominant figure in the
organization, the Gaza Strip's all-powerful wheeler and dealer. He was seared
into the collective minds of Israelis as the one who masterminded the abduction
of Gilad Schalit in the 2006 cross-border raid (and who later handled his
release in the prisoner exchange). Israel's security officials considered him a
sophisticated and bitter enemy.
Under his leadership, Hamas assembled a military force
that was organized, trained and equipped. This has increasingly become a
challenge for the IDF. Jabari was to Hamas what Imad Mughniyeh was to Hezbollah
— the linchpin that holds together all the organization's military
infrastructure. No one in the Israeli decision-making apparatus was under any
illusion that Hamas would let this assassination slide. They nevertheless gave
it the go-ahead, knowing full well that after the initial shock subsided, Hamas
would retaliate forcefully.
The fact that Hamas did not pursue a large-scale
retaliation in the immediate aftermath of the assassination is a result of the
state of confusion in the Gaza Strip in the first few hours. The Israel Air
Force's highly effective shield over the Gaza Strip also effectively nipped much
of the rocket-launching activity in its bud...
...The IDF also deployed more infantry troops to the Gaza
Strip, as well as armored combat units that largely comprised Merkava Mark IV
tanks fitted with Rafael's Trophy active protection system that effectively
neutralizes the threat of antitank missiles. But for all the preparations, as of
Wednesday night, Israel still had no intention of waging a ground campaign in
the Gaza Strip.
The troop deployment was meant to render such a
contingency a viable option should things deteriorate, but it was chiefly
designed to shore up deterrence. Israel hopes that international pressure would
help limit the scope of the campaign and render a ground campaign unnecessary. A
ground war has both military and political pitfalls that Israel seeks to avoid.
The goal: a short campaign
Over the past several days Western officials have tried to
dissuade Israel from realizing its threat to attack hard. Egypt has even hinted
it would resort to strong measures if Israel was to trigger an escalation. All
the while Cairo has found it increasingly difficult to restrain Hamas.
Security officials assessed prior to the assassination
that Egypt would temporarily recall its ambassador from Tel Aviv. This
prediction proved accurate, although Cairo has so far stopped short of any
additional action. This could change should Israel engage in a protracted and
massive campaign that results in a large number of civilian casualties.
The officials further stressed that Egypt has a unique
role to play when it comes to preventing such a scenario from materializing if
it manages to use its ties and clout in the Gaza Strip to bring about a
cease-fire. Avoiding a quagmire is a chief concern of the political echelons,
and they have communicated that to the military's top brass through their
operational directives.
The goal of the campaign is to change the rules of the
game. Namely, to deter Hamas and the other terrorist groups and to restore calm
("normalcy") to the southern communities. Another, secondary, goal is to kill
the so-called high-value targets and compromise the terrorists' fire power,
primarily by means of targeting strategic weapon systems.
The military was also instructed to take special
precautions to avoid hurting noncombatants and to ensure its actions don’t
further undermine Israel's legitimacy abroad. The IDF's task is to create
favorable endgame scenarios that would allow the campaign to meet its objectives
as quickly as possible...
...Operation Pillar of Defense may be critical when it comes to the security in the
south for some time to come: When the dust settles, there should be no doubt as
to who won and who lost; who established deterrence and who has been
deterred.
