Tehran pulls strings of Gaza missile war, proxy Jihad Islami leads offensive

From a DEBKAfile Exclusive ReportAugust 21, 2011:


Iran's trap for Israel on the Eilat Highway

... Iran and Hizballah ...planned, orchestrated and funded the coordinated attacks on the Eilat Highway Thursday, Aug. 18 - in which gunmen shot dead eight Israelis and injured 40 - and its sequel: volleys of 90 missiles launched day and night from Gaza against a million Israeli civilians since then.

Yossi Shoshan, 38, from Ofakim, was killed by one of the dozen Grad missiles hitting Beersheba and his home town Saturday night. More than a dozen people were injured, at least one critically.

The prime mover in the missile blitz is Tehran's Palestinian arm, the Jihad Islami, which is responsible for 90 percent of the launches. Hamas is left on the sidelines, cut off for the first time from top levels of authority in Tehran and Damascus.

...Tehran managed to transfer to its Palestinian arm in Gaza, the Jihad Islami, more than 10,000 missiles well in advance of the violence launched three days ago. Most of them are heavy Grads bringing Beersheba, capital of the Negev and Israel's 7th largest town (pop. 200,000), within their 30-kilometer range for a sustained, massive missile offensive.

Tehran has now launched the hardware smuggled into the Gaza Strip ready for a Middle East war offensive for five objectives:
1. To leave Syrian President Bashar Assad free to continue brutalizing his population and ignoring President Barack Obama's demand backed by Europe that he step down.
2. To manufacture a direct military threat on the Jewish state, whose destruction is a fundamental of the Islamic Republic of Iran's ideology.
3.  To thwart the Egyptian military junta's operation last week for regaining control of the lawless Sinai Peninsula and destroying the vast weapons smuggling network serving Iran in its capacity as the leading international sponsor of terror.
4.  To render the Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and his bid for UN recognition of an independent state on Sept. 20 irrelevant.  His isolation was brought home to him last Thursday by the coordinated Palestinian terrorist attacks near Eilat last Thursday.
5.  To plant ticking bombs around Israel for potential detonation and explosion into a full-blown regional war.
debkafile's Washington sources disclose that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton outlined this peril to Egypt's military ruler, Field Marshall Muhammad Tantawi, Saturday night, Aug. 20, to dissuade him from recalling the Egyptian ambassador to Israel over the deaths of three or five Egyptian police in the melee over the Palestinian terror attack near the Sinai border.

This danger was on the table of Israel's inner cabinet of eight ministers when they met early Sunday to decide on IDF action for terminating the Palestinian missile war.

... three facts stand out from the fog of uncertainty:

First, the security crisis besetting Israel has the dangerous potential for dragging the Middle East into a regional war.

Second, America and Israel are paying in full the price of their quiescence in the face of Iranian, Hizballah and extremist Palestinian belligerence and active preparations for war, including the stockpiling of thousands of increasingly sophisticated weaponry on Israel's borders.

Third, the first step an Israeli soldier or tank takes into the Gaza Strip to silence Jihad Islami's  missile fire is more likely than not to precipitate a second Iranian-orchestrated assault on another of Israel's borders.

Sunday morning, no one in any of the capitals concerned was ready to risk guesstimating how far Tehran was ready to go in its current offensive and what orders Hizballah and its Palestinian puppets had received.  

Hezbollah implicated in Hariri Assassination

From NYT, August 17, 2011, by NADA BAKRI:

BEIRUT, Lebanon — The United Nations-backed tribunal investigating the assassination of a former Lebanese prime minister in 2005 released the full indictment Wednesday against members of Hezbollah named in the killing, a move that could exacerbate tensions in a country polarized by the repercussions of the investigation.

... many in Lebanon have feared that details of the indictment — how the assassination was actually carried out on a seaside corniche in the capital — would deepen divisions here.

...The tribunal’s prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, said in a statement that unsealing the 47-page indictment “answers many questions.”

...The tribunal delivered indictments on June 30 against four men that Hezbollah has acknowledged as members of the organization. ...The most prominent of the four members is Moustapha Badreddine, a brother-in-law of Imad Moughnieh, a shadowy Hezbollah commander killed in 2007 and blamed for some of the group’s most spectacular acts of violence. Among them was the 1983 bombing of the United States Marines barracks in Beirut, which killed 241 American service members.

The former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, was killed along with 22 others when his motorcade was bombed. A Sunni Muslim, he was admired by supporters for helping rebuild Lebanon, especially Beirut, after its 15-year civil war ended in 1990...

... Anxiety is even more pronounced [than usual, in Lebanon] these days, as Lebanese worry that the five-month uprising in Syria could spill over into their country. A series of mysterious blasts this month in the capital — some characterized by Hezbollah as accidents — have amplified unease.

Hezbollah accused of Hariri murder

From ABC News, 30 June 2011, by BASSEM MROUE and ELIZABETH A. KENNEDY Associated Press:

BEIRUT June 30, 2011 (AP) A U.N.-backed court investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri delivered four arrest warrants Thursday, the latest turn in a case that transformed this Arab nation and brought down the government earlier this year.

...The long-awaited indictment was confirmed by the office of Hariri's son, Saad, six years after the massive truck bombing along Beirut's waterfront on Feb. 14, 2005. Hariri was among 23 people killed.

...Hezbollah, which is also backed by Syria, fiercely denies any role in the killing and says the tribunal is a conspiracy by Israel and the United States.

The dispute over the court encapsulates Lebanon's most explosive conflicts: the role of Hezbollah, the country's most powerful political and military force; the country's dark history of sectarian divisions and violence; and Lebanon's fraught relationship with neighboring Syria.

The indictment raises concerns of a possible resurgence of violence that has bedeviled this tiny Arab country of 4 million people for years, including a devastating 1975-1990 civil war and sectarian battles between Sunnis and Shiites in 2008.

Rafik Hariri was one of Lebanon's most prominent Sunni leaders.

Last year, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said the group "will cut off the hand" of anyone who tries to arrest any of its members. It was a potent threat, given that Nasrallah commands an arsenal that far outweighs that of the national army.

Reverberations from the death of Hariri, a billionaire businessman, are still being felt today.

In January, the investigation triggered a political crisis that brought down the Western-backed government of Saad Hariri, who had been prime minister since 2009. Saad Hariri had refused Hezbollah's demands to renounce the court, prompting 11 Hezbollah ministers and their allies to resign from his unity government.

The move further polarized the country's rival factions: Hezbollah with its patrons in Syria and Iran on one side, and Hariri's Western-backed bloc on the other, with support by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. called Hezbollah's walkout a transparent effort to subvert justice.

After Rafik Hariri was assassinated, suspicion immediately fell on Syria, since Hariri had been seeking to weaken its domination of the country.

Syria has denied having any role in the murder, but the killing galvanized opposition to Damascus and led to huge street demonstrations that helped end Syria's 29-year military presence.

From JPost, 30 June 2011:

...Mughniyeh's brother-in-law among suspects.

Former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri on Thursday welcomed indictments issued in his father's 2005 assassination, calling the move a "historic moment."

....

The four suspects are Mustafa Badreddine, Salim al-Ayyash, Hasan Aineysseh and Asad Sabra, The Daily Star reported, quoting a judicial source. Badreddine is cousin and a brother-in-law of slain Hezbollah terrorist Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Damascus in 2008.

... Lebanese media reported that the four arrest warrants presented were for Hezbollah members.

...On Monday, London-based Asharq Alawsat had reported that five high ranking Hezbollah officials were expected to be indicted by the special tribunal. ...

Russians arm Hezbollah

From JPost 26 Feb 2011*:

Following Russia's announcement that it will transfer missiles to Syria, Defense Ministry fears weapons could fall into "wrong hands." ...Security officials warned that the Russian cruise missiles "are potentially dangerous weapons and they may come fall into the hands of Hezbollah, just as other weapons systems came from Syria."

The announcement came after Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said that Russia would fulfill its contractual obligation and complete the transfer of cruise missiles to Syria...despite the objections of Israel and the United States...

*Yaakov Katz contributed to this report.

Hezbollah Aiming for Lebanon Takeover

From The Israel Project 14 January 2011, by Alan Elsner (Senior Director of Communications):

•Iranian-backed organization has 45,000 rockets aimed at Israel
•U.S.-backed government is powerless to oppose Hezbollah
•Its members helped murder former prime minister

Washington, Jan 14 - The Iranian-backed Hezbollah organization with its 40,000 rockets aimed at Israel clearly aims to dominate the country and control the selection of its next leader, analysts believe.

Hezbollah this week brought down the U.S.-backed Lebanese government of Prime Minister Saad Hariri when its 11 ministers resigned. The organization is desperate to prevent the indictment of several of its members in the 2005 assassination of Hariri’s father, former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. He died along with 22 others in a gruesome suicide bombing that also left 494 people wounded.

A United Nations tribunal is about to issue indictments. Hezbollah’s move came after the younger Hariri rejected its demands to cut off cooperation with the tribunal and instead investigate those who have provided the panel with evidence.

“Lebanon is about to fall into another dark period. But this time, the forces of Hezbollah and its patron Iran seem finally to have the upper hand,” wrote Marc Ginsberg, a former U.S. ambassador to Morocco.
“With a provocative infusion of tens of thousands of sophisticated new missiles allegedly to defend Lebanese "sovereignty" (that's a bad joke) and financing to buy off or bump off any Lebanese authority that stands in its way, Hezbollah may ironically be on the verge of converting its dastardly assassination of Hariri into a golden opportunity to finally seize full power in Lebanon,” he wrote in a commentary on Huffington Post.

Hezbollah fought a war with Israel in 2006 during which it fired some 4,000 rockets at Israeli civilians, killing around 50 and driving much of the population in the north of the country into shelters or forcing them to flee. Since the end of that conflict, it has rearmed and acquired much more sophisticated long-range weapons from Syrian and Iran capable of hitting Tel Aviv, a flagrant violation of the ceasefire agreement. United Nations UNIFIL peacekeepers have stood by helplessly while this took place.

...Now, the fundamentalist Shiite organization may be on the verge of taking over the entire country. Mustapha Alloush, a member of the political bureau of Hariri's Future Movement told the Washington Post Hezbollah was trying to "rule Lebanon" and annex it for Iran.

With 20,000 trained fighters, Hezbollah is already much more powerful than the Lebanese army and in 2008 demonstrated its superiority by seizing part of the capital, brushing aside the army’s resistance. “There is currently no force within Lebanon able to stand firmly against the physical power of Hezbollah,” wrote Jonathan Spyer, a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center in Herzliya in the Jerusalem Post.

The impending Hezbollah takeover threatens to destabilize the entire region as well as Lebanon itself. It could heighten sectarian tensions as well as fears of Iran, already widespread throughout the Arab world. While analysts do not see an immediate outbreak of hostilities with Israel, few doubt that another confrontation is coming some time down the road...

An Imminent Coup by Hezbollah in Lebanon

From the International Analyst Network, 18 Sep 2010, by Elias Youssef Bejjani:

A Saudi advice has delayed the return of Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, from Saudi Arabia to Beirut.

Meanwhile, 3500 Hezbollah militiamen are secretly deployed in the Eastern Christian region according to a report that was published yesterday by the "Beirut Observer" web site. Hezbollah has reached its final logistic preparations to execute an armed coup to take over all of Lebanon by force.

The web site attributed its information to well-informed sources in the Saudi media.

Below is a summary of the report with other related information:

Well-informed Saudi sources have confirmed to the "Beirut Observer" that the delay of Lebanon's PM return to Beirut came in response to advice by Saudi officials. The Saudis are extremely concerned in regards to information became available to them indicating that an imminent Hezbollah coup is in on the horizon. The Saudis are fearful that Hezbollah’s threats are not mere political rhetoric this time. The Iranian-armed militia has set all the needed logistic preparations for the coup and is only waiting for the zero hour.

According to the report, Hezbollah's planned coup will take a camouflaged cover of civilian protection this time. But the reality on the ground is that it will not be different from Hezbollah's bloody and cruel invasion of Western Sunni Beirut and Druze Mount Lebanon in May 2008. The coup will be initiated by putting government officials under house arrest. This will include Lebanon's PM, Saad Al Hariri, General prosecutor Said Mirza, Internal Security Forces General Director General Ashraf Rifi as well as many other officials and politicians. Sources said that Information Branch President Colonel Wesam Hassan will be spared from house arrest in the early hours of the coup.

The report went on to conclude that at the present time the centre of attention is a scheduled visit by a Saudi envoy to Damascus today and on the results of his talks with Syrian officials. The Saudi mission to Syria will focus on the current volatile situation in Lebanon, the avoidance of bloodshed, strife and and the repetition of what happened on May 2008. The Saudis fear that the impact of any military coup executed by Hezbollah in Lebanon will spread chaos over the entire region.

Private sources from Beirut unveiled that Hezbollah has deployed 3500 of its armed militia men along the Mediterranean coast in the Christian region from Beirut northwards through the cities of Junieh, Tabarja and Batroun. These bearded Hezbollah men are residing in chalets and apartments located in Christian areas and on standby alert status in case of any political development or security emergency that may require their armed intervention.

According to the report, a decision was taken by Hezbollah's leadership to invade Christian regions loyal to the March 14 Coalition, and subdue them by military force. Hezbollah's Leadership aim from such an invasion is to deliver a bloody intimidation message to all Lebanese who oppose its hegemony over the country. They want to prove on the ground that they have the upper hand, the sole power and the authority all over the country...

Follow this link to the Arabic report published yesterday by the Beirut Observer web site.

Russia supplies advance weapons to Syria

From Ynet News, 19 September 2010, by Itamar Eichner:

Jerusalem angered at sale of Russian [cruise] missiles to Syria...

Israeli officials are threatening to sell weapons to "areas of strategic importance" to Russia after Moscow announced over the weekend that it would go through with the sale of P800 [cruise] missiles to Syria...

Russia's announcement came after both Israel and the US implored that it abandon the sale. The cruise missiles discussed, dubbed Yakhont, have a range of 300 km, which puts Israeli ships off of Lebanon's coast at risk of being hit by missiles fired from Syria's southern port.

...last month Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Russian President Vladimir Putin and requested that he call it off, for fear the missiles will be handed to Hezbollah.

More recently Defense Minister Ehud Barak visited Moscow on a similar mission. Barak spoke with both Putin and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. ...

Despite the extensive efforts, the deal was announced Friday to be proceeding as planned. "They've gone one step too far," one Jerusalem official said. "This is not in keeping with our cooperation with them."

The official said Israel had so far refrained from selling "strategic, tie-breaking weapons" to third-world countries, and that it expected Russia to do the same.

"The supply of advanced weapons to Syria, one of Hezbollah's two main supporters, especially on the eve of the fateful peace talks with the Palestinians, is not a move encouraging the moderate forces of the Middle East – but rather a prize for extremist states," the source said.

...The P800 is considered one of the world's most advanced cruising missiles due to its speed and low flight. Israel fears it will fall into the hands of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which would put its ships in the Mediterranean at risk, especially in light of terror organizations' desire to derail peace talks with the Palestinians...

Sunni-Shi’ite clashes in Beirut

From JERUSALEM POST, 25 Aug 2010*:

At least 3 dead; LAF deployed to help calm worst violence since 2008.

Shi’ite and Sunni groups traded machine gun fire and grenades in Beirut on Tuesday, killing [three] people and wounding several others just blocks from a busy downtown packed with tourists.

...The shootout erupted between supporters of the Shi’ite Hizbullah and a Sunni conservative group in the mixed residential area of Bourj Abu Haidar near Beirut’s downtown, security officials said.

Hizbullah was battling the pro-Syrian Sunni Association of Islamic Charitable Projects, known as the Al-Ahbash group, which has a history of feuding with the Shi’ite group, they added.

The officials said Muhammad Fawaz, the local Hizbullah commander in Bourj Abu Haidar, had been killed along with his subordinate Ali Jouaz. Fawaz Omeirat of Al-Ahbash was also killed in the fighting.

...According to Lebanese paper Al-Akhabr, the clash started when Al-Ahbash members tried to bar Hizbullah men from passing through a neighborhood where the Sunni group holds control.

Shortly afterward, Shi’ite supporters of Hizbullah and sister organization Amal set fire to a Sunni mosque in the nearby neighborhood of Basta, according to an AP photographer.

...Local Lebanese media said rocket-propelled grenades and heavy machine guns were used.

...It was the worst clash since May 2008, when Hizbullah gunmen swept through Sunni neighborhoods of Beirut after the pro-Western government tried to dismantle the group’s telecommunications network. The fighting at the time brought the country to the brink of a new civil war. Lebanon has a history of deadly sectarian strife.

Tensions have been running high in recent weeks over signs a UN tribunal could indict Hizbullah members in the 2005 killing of former prime minister Rafik Hariri...

*AP and Bloomberg contributed to this report.

Failure of US policy in Lebanon

From a JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL, 6 August 2010:

The sniper fire directed at IDF soldiers by the Lebanese Armed Forces on Tuesday, which killed Lt.- Col. Dov Harari and seriously wounded Capt. Ezra Lakia, has spurred a flurry of speculation about the precise causes of the incident.

UNIFIL made it clear that Lebanese forces were to blame for the attack....
...In the four years since the Second Lebanon War, much has happened to undermine the uneasy quiet that prevailed until this week between Israel and Lebanon. But none of it has to do with Israeli actions. Most of the reason for the exacerbated tension lies in the inspiring, funding, training and arming of Hizbullah by Iran and Syria.


And some of it has to do with the US’s and Europe’s ineffective Middle East policy.

Unimpeded by America or Europe and with massive Iranian backing, Hizbullah has consolidated its military and political hegemony in Lebanon. Syria, meanwhile, has fully reinstated its military and political presence after being temporarily expelled from Lebanon by the March 14 Alliance.

Formed by Saad Hariri, Druse leader Walid Jumblatt and others after the February 14, 2005, assassination of Saad Hariri’s father, the Alliance had hoped to transform Lebanon into the Arab world’s first truly free democratic state. But the Second Lebanon War, sparked by Hizbullah aggression, diverted attention and energy from the movement’s push for an independent Lebanon, and in 2008 it effectively capitulated to Hizbullah and Syria.

Ostensibly, it was Saudi Arabia, the patron of present Prime Minister Saad Hariri, that pushed for reconciliation with Syria and Hizbullah. But in reality, this macabrely sycophantic act, in which Hariri the son courted his father’s murderers, is the direct result of the US’s weakening position in the region.

The Saudis, Hariri, and the courageous Jumblatt, whose war-hardened Druse community fought the Party of God to a standstill in May 2008, have come to the realization that with the US and Europe out of the picture in Lebanon, it would be suicidal to stand up to the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah axis, which is increasingly being joined by Turkey. In light of US passivity, meanwhile, the Saudis hope to maintain a semblance of influence in Lebanon by improving relations with Syria. Just this week, Saudi King Abdullah met with President Bashar Assad of Syria in Beirut.

The US refrained from providing the March 14 Alliance with crucial support when it needed it most, missing an historic chance to encourage the creation of new, democratic momentum. The Obama administration’s attempt to “engage” Damascus, instead of sanctioning it for tightening its ties with Teheran and turning Lebanon into a satellite state, has failed miserably. Nor have the US or Europe taken steps against Hizbullah, a key member of the Lebanese government, for bullying the UN peacekeeping forces in Lebanon that are responsible for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701.

AGAINST THE backdrop of this dismal US track record in Lebanon, it was not surprising that, in response to Tuesday’s deadly incident at the border, Washington declined to take a firm stand against Lebanese forces.

State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said, “We deeply regret the loss of life; we urge both sides to exercise maximum restraint to avoid an escalation and maintain the cease-fire that is now in place.” Even UNIFIL was more robust than that, conveying the message that if the Lebanese Armed Forces fired into Israel again – the IDF was targeted beyond the border fence but inside Israeli territory – the IDF would blow up its border positions, and flatly rejecting Lebanon’s suggestion that the peacekeepers should be doing the IDF’s gardening work at the border.

The truth is that it is the US, not “both sides,” that can do the most to avoid further escalation in Lebanon.

Washington should take steps to strengthen moderate Lebanese forces while imposing sanctions against the extremists. Otherwise, Israel will be forced, against its will, to fill the vacuum where a robust and savvy American Middle East policy ought to be.

Hezbollah stirs violence against UNFIL in Lebanon

From Reuters Africa, 3 July 2010:

Villagers threw stones at U.N. peacekeepers in southern Lebanon on Saturday, seizing their weapons and wounding their patrol leader...

Tension has increased in recent months between the UNIFIL peacekeepers and residents in Lebanon's south, a stronghold of the militant Hezbollah group.

Some Western diplomats say Hezbollah members have encouraged and taken part in the confrontations...
...U.N. special coordinator for Lebanon Michael Williams told reporters on Thursday there were several incidents in southern Lebanon last week. "Some of these may have been something spontaneous in the street, but some were clearly organised," he said.

[U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon]'s latest report to the U.N. Security Council on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701, which halted hostilities in the Israeli-Hezbollah war in 2006, said there was reason for "doubt on the motives of those (civilians) involved" in some of the recent confrontations with UNIFIL.

...Resolution 1701 calls for a stop to arms smuggling and bans all unauthorised weapons between the Litani River and the Blue Line, the U.N.-monitored border between Israel and Lebanon.

Israel has criticised UNIFIL for not stopping weapons it says are flowing to Hezbollah guerrillas. The United Nations says that is the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities.

BAN terrorist television in Australia!!

From: The Australian March 09, 2010, by Bren Carlill, analyst at the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council:

CONCERN about domestic radicalisation and home-grown terrorism is a big part of the government's white paper on counter-terrorism released last week. So why haven't successive governments banned Hezbollah's television station, al-Manar, from screening in Australia?


After all, al-Manar is all about radicalising its viewers.

The paper advises that Hezbollah has an Australian support base. It goes on to caution that "terrorist movements with a presence or support base in Australia could become willing to engage in operational activity here".

This is no idle threat. US intelligence reports have stated that Hezbollah has cells in Europe, North and South America and Africa. The group has never constrained its actions to Israel and Lebanon, having carried out terrorist attacks in Argentina, Britain, France, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Spain, with numerous failed attempts in Asian countries.

Hezbollah established al-Manar in 1991. It has been glorifying terrorism and encouraging its viewers to follow the path of the "martyrs" who have gone before them since.

The station also regularly broadcasts anti-Jewish propaganda in sermons, miniseries and children's shows.

The Australian Communications and Media Authority has an anti-terrorism standard by which it assesses whether any TV station crosses the line between free speech and raising money or recruits for terrorist groups. The standard stipulates that TV providers must not directly recruit people or solicit funds for a terrorist organisation.

When al-Manar began broadcasting into Australia a few years ago, ACMA applied its anti-terrorism standard against its broadcasts. However, even though al-Manar extensively praises Hezbollah, ACMA cleared it to keep on broadcasting since it doesn't flash the phone number of Hezbollah's recruitment office on the screen.

The problem lies with the anti-terrorism standard's guidelines, which suggest that directly recruiting for a terrorist organisation means providing details on how to become members, and directly soliciting funds means providing bank account numbers.

This standard should be changed. Any TV station owned and-or operated by a terrorist organisation should be banned in Australia.

If our law enforcement agencies - and, in the case of al-Qa'ida, our defence forces - are in battle against these terrorists, why should their terrorist-promoting, racist propaganda be allowed to beam into Australian homes?

It seems as if ACMA has recognised this problem. It recently announced a new investigation into al-Manar and suggested that, at its conclusion, it will determine whether its anti-terrorism standard will need to be changed.

But this is a weighty matter beyond the responsibility of the broadcasting authority.

It's ultimately up to the government of the day to make this decision, a decision in line with existing Australian law.

The Australian criminal code states that any organisation that "directly or indirectly counsels or urges the doing of a terrorist act [or] directly praises the doing of a terrorist act in circumstances where there is a risk that such praise might have the effect of leading a person to engage in a terrorist act" will be proscribed by the Attorney-General.

Al-Manar has been doing this for years, but successive governments haven't done anything about it.

France, Spain, Germany and the US have all banned al-Manar, resulting in eight satellite providers dropping it from their services. It can no longer be seen in North or South America, most of Africa or most of Europe.

Only the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Australia are subjected to its poisonous messages.

...Al-Manar is a TV station that calls for terrorist actions, triumphs in violent jihad and martyrdom, revels in promoting overt racism and hopes to radicalise its Lebanese and international viewers in support of a terrorist organisation.

It needs to be banned.

Targeted assassination is one of the weapons of states at war

From FT, March 2 2010, by Andrew Roberts:

Is state-sanctioned assassination justifiable, or does it somehow de-legitimise the state that undertakes it?

Two articles in this newspaper last week, by Henry Siegman and David Gardner, have been violently critical of Israel in the wake of the assassination of the Hamas arms smuggler Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai on 19 January.


Mr Siegman wrote of how “Israel’s colonial ambitions” and “checkpoints, barbed wire and separation walls” were “turning Israel from a democracy into an apartheid state”, thereby creating a “looming global threat to the country’s legitimacy”. Two days later Mr Gardner wrote of how Israel’s “militarist extroversion” over the Dubai murder demonstrated an “Israeli preference for instantly satisfying executive solutions to complex political and geopolitical problems” which would “widen the international battle-space for tit-for-tat attacks” and “encourage the perception that [Israel] is a rogue state”.

Both commentators are completely wrong. All that the Dubai operation will do is remind the world that the security services of states at war – and Israel’s struggle with Hamas, Fatah and Hizbollah certainly constitutes that – occasionally employ targeted assassination as one of the weapons in their armoury, and that this in no way weakens their legitimacy.

As for the “separation walls” and checkpoints that one sees in Israel, the 99 per cent drop in the number of suicide bombings since their erection justifies the policy.

There is simply no parallel between apartheid South Africa – where the white minority wielded power over the black majority – and the occupied territories, taken by Israel only after it was invaded by its neighbours. To make such a link is not only inaccurate, but offensive. If Arab Israelis were deprived of civil and franchise rights, that would justify such hyperbole, but of course they have the same rights as every Jewish Israeli.

Far from having any colonial ambitions, Israel wants nothing more than to live peaceably within defensible borders. But equally it demands nothing less.

Furthermore, rather than some kind of knee-jerk “preference for instantly satisfying executive solutions”, the decision to kill Mahmoud al-Mabhouh – assuming it was sanctioned, planned and carried out by Mossad alone, which is anything but clear at this stage – would have been minutely examined from every political and operational angle. Yet sometimes complex political and geopolitical problems do require the cutting of the Gordian knot, and this was one such.

When Britain was at war, Winston Churchill sanctioned the assassination by its Special Operations Executive of the SS General Reinhard Heydrich, the capture (and killing if necessary) of General Heinrich Kreipe on Crete; ditto Erwin Rommel. Just as with some Mossad operations, such as the disaster in Amman in 1997 when agents were captured after failing to kill Khaled Meshal of Hamas, not all Churchill’s hits were successful. But the British state was not de-legitimised in any way as a result.

The intelligence agents of states – sometimes operating with direct authority, sometimes not – have carried out many assassinations and assassination attempts in peacetime without the legitimacy of those states being called into question, or their being described as “rogue”. In 1985 the French Deuxième Bureau sank Greenpeace’s Rainbow Warrior trawler, killing photographer Fernando Pereira, without anyone denouncing France as a rogue state. Similarly, in 2006, polonium 210 was used to murder Alexander Litvinenko without Putin’s Russia being described as “illegitimate”. That kind of language is only reserved for Israel, even though neither Pereira nor Litvinenko posed the danger to French and Russian citizens that was posed to Israelis by the activities of Mahmoud al-Mabhouh.

The reason that such double standards still apply – more than six decades after the foundation of the state of Israel – is not because of the nature of that doughty, brave, embattled, tiny, surrounded, yet proudly defiant country, but because of the nature of its foes.

Even though one has to be in one’s seventies to remember a time when Israel didn’t exist, nevertheless there are still those who call the country’s legitimacy into question, employing anything that happens to be in the news at the time – such as this latest assassination – to try to argue that Israel is not a real country, and therefore doesn’t really deserve to exist. Real rogue states such as North Korea might be loathed and criticised, but even they do not have their very legitimacy as a state called into question because of their actions.

Those who wish to understand Israel’s actions and put them in their proper historical context should read Michael Burleigh’s cultural history of terrorism, Blood and Rage. Burleigh quotes a senior Mossad agent saying after the Munich Olympics massacre of 11 Israeli athletes: “If there was intelligence information, the target was reachable and if there was an opportunity, we took it. As far as we were concerned we were creating a deterrence, forcing them to crawl into a defensive shell and not plan offensive attacks against us.”

Is that attitude so very different from the pre-emptive targeted assassination of Taliban leaders that Nato carries out by flying drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan today? Yet are Messrs Siegman and Gardner going to call into question America’s legitimacy? No, that insult is reserved for only one country: Israel.

Australia to investigate Al-Manar TV

From an Australian Communications and Media Authority press release, 4 February 2010:

The Australian Communications and Media Authority will further investigate Al-Manar TV program content to ascertain its compliance with regulatory obligations relating to terrorist-related content, as well as racial vilification and hate speech.

The ACMA is conscious of some public concern [notably from AIJAC - SL] about the content of Al-Manar TV. In response to these concerns, a broad-ranging investigation will be undertaken which would incorporate consideration of any specific complaints about content that are referred to the ACMA.

Al-Manar TV is an open narrowcasting television service which is reported to have links to the Hezbollah organisation. Al-Manar TV is currently re-transmitted into Australia via satellite.

...If members of the public are aware of specific content on the Al Manar service that they consider is terrorist-related or includes racial vilification and hate speech, they can refer this content to the ACMA for consideration as part of the investigation...

Syria is the lynchpin

From The Middle East Forum, December 2009, by Michael Rubin (brief excerpt only - follow the link to the full paper):

[After the] 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel ...United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 restored calm, but only a tenuous one. While the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) returned to Lebanon, it failed to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah with an arsenal even more advanced than before the 2006 conflict. The Lebanese and Israeli border may be calm today, but the potential for regional conflict has only grown. If a new conflict erupts, it likely will be deadlier and harder to contain to Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah now possesses missiles capable of striking not only Haifa, but also Tel Aviv.

The Obama administration, meanwhile, has reached out diplomatically to both Syria and Iran in the belief that a less confrontational approach to conflict resolution might lead the two states to reconsider their rejectionist behavior. It has not worked. While Tehran and Damascus may welcome the incentives inherent in U.S. engagement, both states continue to use proxies to pursue radical aims and undercut stability. Iran may be Hezbollah's chief patron, but Syria is the lynchpin that makes Iranian support for foreign fighters possible. While Israel may be the immediate target of the Iran-Syria nexus, the partnership threatens broader U.S. interests...

...Syria's continued support for terrorists and other foreign fighters undermines any diplomatic gains the United States achieves. Because of Syria, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. Meanwhile, the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards] has more political power now than at any previous point in its history. As such, statements by its commander that "in the near future, we will witness the destruction of Israel, the aggressor, this cancerous microbe Israel, at the able hands of the soldiers of the community of Hezbollah," should raise concerns in Washington and European capitals about the possibility of a regional conflagration.

Recent reports that Iran transshipped gas masks and chemical weapons through Syria to Hezbollah should only heighten concern as the Islamic Republic increases its defiance in international discussions about its nuclear activities. Across the U.S. political spectrum, analysts agree that, should Israel, the United States, or any other power strike at Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would respond, at least in part, by activating its proxy terrorist networks.

Palestinian groups in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and foreign fighters in Iraq all have Syrian support in common.

Not only Hezbollah's rhetoric but also its track record suggest a willingness to attack Western targets, should war against Iran erupt.

Given both the circumstances and the stakes, it is ironic that U.S. officials continue to accept the fiction of Syrian sincerity. As difficult as stopping terrorist supplies may be, the likelihood that proxy groups will voluntarily forfeit their capability is low, and the cost of allowing terrorists to use such arms is high.

Lebanon & Hezbollah ...it's all the same

From FoxNews.com, December 2, 2009, by Michael Tobin:

Lebanon ’s new government just took a game changing step in the event of another military conflict with Israel . It involves Hezbollah being folded into the Government of the new Prime Minister Saad Hariri.

The Prime Minister answered Hezbollah’s demand and backed the groups’ demand to keep all of its weapons. Hezbollah says the weapons are for the purpose of deterring an Israeli invasion.

This puts Lebanon in a conflict with the U.S. and French sponsored U.N. resolution 1559 – which calls for the disarmament of all groups in Lebanon other than the Army.

From Israel ’s perspective, it puts the Lebanese government in an alliance with the armed wing of Hezbollah.

Mark Regev, spokesman for Israel ’s Prime Minister says, “Any attack from Hezbollah will be seen by Israel as an attack from the Lebanese state.” In the 2nd Lebanon war more than 1000 Lebanese were killed, most of them civilian. The damage to infrastructure was significant and more than 1 million Lebanese were displaced form their homes. According to Israel , these painful figures will only increase now if there is a 3rd Lebanon war because the entire state becomes a target.

“In the 2nd Lebanon war, a strategic decision was made that Lebanon was not the target,” says Regev. “ Israel made the distinction between Hezbollah and Lebanese.”

Hezbollah is now said to possess 40,000 rockets in Lebanon . The weapons stockpile is reported to be larger than it was at the start of the 2nd Lebanon war in July of 2006.

Hezbollah gears up for more war

From The Guardian Observer, Sunday 8 November 2009, by Mitchell Prothero and Peter Beamont:

Hezbollah is rapidly rearming in preparation for a new conflict with Israel....

Last week, Israeli commandos seized a ship in the Mediterranean loaded with almost 400 tonnes of rockets and small arms ...being sent from Iran to its Hezbollah allies. ...Hezbollah fighters have been busy reinforcing fixed defence positions north of the Litani river.

Having lost many of its bunkers in the south, Hezbollah is preparing a new strategy to defend villages there. ...senior commanders have done little to disguise the scale of rearmament. "Sure, we are rearming, we have even said that we have far more rockets and missiles than we did in 2006," said a Hezbollah commander, speaking on condition of anonymity....

Hezbollah: let them try

From The Wall Street Journal, 16/10/09, by RONEN BERGMAN:

On Monday, a secret Hezbollah munitions bunker in South Lebanon blew up under mysterious circumstances ...the second such incident in recent months. ...Hezbollah immediately pointed fingers at the Mossad.

Whether or not Israel was to blame, the explosion caused Hezbollah considerable discomfort by proving that it was in flagrant violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701...The U.N. issued a strongly worded rebuke and sent representatives to investigate. But their efforts were thwarted by Hezbollah fighters, who, with the assistance of Lebanese troops, prevented the foreigners from examining the site. This caused further embarrassment to Lebanon, as it exposed the army's lack of neutrality and the active aid that it extends to Hezbollah.

...The specter of renewed fighting between Israel and Hezbollah looms as large today as it has at any time since the end of the Lebanon war in August 2006. ..."By all means, let the Hezbollah try," one officer told me .... "The welcome party that we are preparing for them is one that they will remember for a very long time." That sentiment is shared by many of his colleagues.

...Hezbollah has stockpiled its weapons throughout Lebanon, but particularly near the Israeli border. According to current Israeli intelligence estimates, Hezbollah has an arsenal of 40,000 rockets, including Iranian-made Zelzal, Fajr-3, Fajr-5, and 122 mm rockets (some of which have cluster warheads) and Syrian-made 302 mm rockets. Some of its rockets can reach greater Tel Aviv. Hezbollah also has a number of highly advanced weapons systems, including antiaircraft missiles, that constitute a threat to Israeli combat aircraft.

But all is not rosy for Hezbollah. After the war, considerable dissatisfaction with the organization was voiced inside Lebanon. Many blamed its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, for Israel's retaliatory bombardments that caused widespread damage. Nasrallah stated that had he known Israel would respond as forcefully as it did, he would have thought twice before ordering the abduction of the two Israeli soldiers—the act that sparked the conflict.

Harsh criticism of Hezbollah also came from an unexpected source: Tehran. The Iranian strategy calls for Hezbollah to play two roles. One is to instigate minor border provocations. The other is to launch, on Tehran's command, a full-scale retaliatory attack should Israel target Iran's nuclear facilities. The 2006 war met neither criterion, and, as the Iranians complained, merely served to reveal the extent of Hezbollah's military capabilities.

Then, in February 2008, Imad Mughniyeh, the organization's military commander and Nasrallah's close associate, was killed in a car bomb in Damascus. ....a severe blow to morale, as well as to Hezbollah's strategic capabilities. Nasrallah was convinced that the Mossad was responsible, and vowed to take revenge "outside of the Israel-Lebanon arena."

...But as of today, Hezbollah has not exacted its revenge....Israeli officials raised four possible reasons for Hezbollah's failure to act, all of which reflect its current weakness.

First, no replacement has been found for Mughniyeh, whose strategic brilliance, originality and powers of execution are sorely missed by Hezbollah.

Second, Israel's intelligence coverage of Iran and Hezbollah is far superior today to what it was in the past. Planned attacks, including one targeting the Israeli Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan, have all been foiled. The Israeli security services have warned Israeli businessmen abroad of possible abduction attempts by Hezbollah. They also shared information with Egyptian authorities that led to the arrest of members of a Hezbollah network who intended to kill Israeli tourists in Sinai. The arrest of these operatives resulted in sharp public exchanges between Egypt, Hezbollah and its Iranian masters, when Nasrallah admitted that these, in fact, were his men.

Third, Nasrallah cannot afford to be viewed domestically as the cause of yet another retaliation against Lebanon. ...Israel has made it clear that because Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government...any Hezbollah action against Israel would be viewed as an action taken by the Lebanese government. Thus Israel would regard Lebanese infrastructure as a legitimate target for a military response.

Finally, there are the Iranians. Their primary focus is on proceeding with their nuclear program without unnecessary distractions. Tehran's main concern is that a terror attack that can be linked to Iran would result in the arrest of its agents overseas, who are currently procuring equipment for its uranium-enrichment centrifuges.

Tehran has avoided direct involvement in foreign terrorism ever since 1996, when a group of Iranians were convicted in Germany of murdering political opponents of the Iranian regime. And unlike in the past (as, for instance, in the case of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires in retaliation for the assassination of Nasrallah's predecessor), it is now reluctant to place intelligence resources at Hezbollah's disposal. This is a serious blow to Hezbollah, which is not yet able to function as a full-fledged independent operational organization internationally.
Hezbollah is also clearly aware of the severe blow in terms of power and prestige that the Iranian mullahs suffered as a result of the massive protests following June's presidential election. Automatic support from Tehran is no longer a certainty. For now, at least, the Iranian hardliners have troubles of their own.

In short, despite the fact that Hezbollah today is substantially stronger in purely military terms than it was three years ago, its political stature and its autonomy have been significantly reduced. ...There are some experts in Israel who believe that even Hezbollah's retaliatory role in the Iranian game plan is currently in question.

Whether or not this is the case, all of this is being considered in Jerusalem as part of Israel's calculations about whether to strike Iran's nuclear facilities.

UN extends its uselessness in Lebanon

From Reuters, Thu Aug 27, 2009 , by Patrick Worsnip:

Israel seeks tougher U.N. action to stop weapons - U.N. says that is responsibility of Lebanon

The Security Council extended on Thursday the mandate of U.N. peacekeepers in Lebanon but sidestepped the issue of whether they could do more to stop Hezbollah building up an armed presence in the south.

Israel has criticized the UNIFIL force for not stopping weapons it says are flowing to Hezbollah guerrillas who might again bombard northern Israel with rockets as they did during a 2006 war. The United Nations says that is the primary responsibility of the Lebanese authorities. [So what is the UN's responsibility? ...to drink tea, and spend the world's money? - SL]

On July 14, an arms dump exploded in the south Lebanese village of Khirbet Selim. Israel said the incident showed Hezbollah was stockpiling weapons in breach of Security Council resolution 1701, passed after the war.

UNIFIL is still investigating the blast. In a letter this month to the Security Council, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said there were signs the dump was Hezbollah-controlled... [...wow!! amazing....! What a revelation!]

... council diplomats said privately that Israel made clear it would like UNIFIL to more aggressively counter any rearming by Hezbollah...

...Hezbollah has said its guerrilla force is back to full strength after the 2006 war and has recently hinted it could add anti-aircraft missiles to its arsenal of short-range rockets and small arms...

UN official: Arms cache that exploded in Lebanon was Hezbollah's

From Ynet News, 23/7/09, by Yitzhak Benhorin:

Security Council discusses Israeli complaints on recent incidents near its northern border; Under-Secretary-General LeRoy says Shiite group responsible for blast at arms cache and subsequent attack on UNIFIL soldiers sent to investigate it

United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Alain LeRoy said Thursday that Hezbollah was responsible for heightened tensions in southern Lebanon.

...Ambassador Alex Wolff, of the US Mission to the UN, said the Shiite group's arms cache constituted a clear violation of UN Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War.

...Earlier this week Israeli Ambassador to the UN Gabriela Shalev ...[sent a letter] stating that the explosion at the Hezbollah weapons cache verified that the Shiite group "consistently obstructs the implementation of Resolution 1701 by building new military infrastructure south of the Litani River." ...[and] also mentioned the attack on UNIFIL peacekeepers who attempted to search a suspicious building near the arms cache as an indication that Hezbollah was looking to "obstruct" UNIFIL's mission, also by "using civilians in a violent manner."

Israel is also seeking a similar condemnation of two more incidents that took place over the weekend, namely the infiltration of 15 unarmed Lebanese civilians into Israel and the attack on UN peacekeepers by villagers in Bir el-Salasel.

"Such violations jeopardize the fragile stability along Israel’s northern border and stand in contravention of UN Security Council resolution 1701, in particular paragraph 8 that calls for 'full respect for the Blue Line by both parties'," the letter read.

What do the present financial crisis and U.S. Middle East policy have in common?

From The Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies, The Shalem Center, 27/11/08, by Martin Kramer:

Behind the financial crisis was a well-practiced mechanism for concealing risk. The risk was there, and it was constantly growing, but it could be disguised, repackaged and renamed, so that in the end it seemed to have disappeared. Much of the debate about foreign policy in the United States is conducted in the same manner: policymakers and pundits, to get what they want, conceal the risks.

In the case of the Middle East, they concealed the risks of bringing Yasser Arafat in from the cold; they concealed the risks of neglecting the growth of Al Qaeda; and they concealed the risks involved in occupying Iraq. It isn't that the risks weren't knownג€”to someone. The intelligence was always there. But if you were clever enough, and determined enough, you could find a way to conceal them.

But concealed risk doesn't go away. It accumulates away from sight, until the moment when it surges back to the surface. It did that after Camp David in 2000, when the "peace process" collapsed in blood; it did that on 9/11, when hijackers shattered the skies over New York in Washington; and it happened in Iraq, when an insurgency kicked us back. This tendency to downplay risk may be an American trait: we have seen it in U.S. markets, and now we see it in U.S. election-year politics. In Middle East policy, its outcome has been a string of very unpleasant surprises.

A case in point is radical Islam. One would think that after the Iranian revolution, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the terrorism of Hezbollah, the Rushdie affair, the suicide attacks of Hamas and Al Qaeda, the Danish cartoons, and a host of other "surprises," that we would not be inclined to ignore the risks posed by radical Islam. And yet there are batteries of interpreters, analysts and pundits whose principal project is to obscure if not conceal the risks. Here are some of the most widespread variations on the theme:

Worried about Ahmadinejad? Pay him no mind. He doesn't really call the shots in Iran, he's just a figurehead. And anyway, he didn't really say what he's purported to have said, about wiping Israel off the map. What the Iranians really want is to sit down with us and cut a deal. They have a few grievances, some of them are even legitimate, so let's hear them out and invite them to the table, without preconditions. Iran isn't all that dangerous; it's just a small country; and even their own people are tired of the revolution. So pay no attention to Ahmadinejad, and pay no attention to the old slogans of "death to America," because that's not the real Iran.

Worried about the Palestinian Hamas? You've got it wrong. They merely represent another face of Palestinian nationalism. They aren't really Islamists at all: Hamas is basically a protest movement against corruption. Given the right incentives, they can be drawn into the peace process. Sure, they say they will never recognize Israel, but that is what the PLO once said, and didn't they change their tune? Anyway, Hamas controls Gaza, so there can't be a real peace processג€”a settlement of the big issues like Jerusalem, refugees, bordersג€”without bringing them into the tent. So let's sit down and talk to them, figure out what their grievances areג€”no doubt, some of them are legitimate too. And let's get the process back on track.

Troubled by Hezbollah? Don't believe everything they say. They only pretend to be faithful to Iran's ayatollahs, and all their talk about "onwards to Jerusalem" is rhetoric for domestic consumption. What they really want is to earn the Shiites their rightful place in Lebanon, and improve the lot of their aggrieved sect. Engage them, dangle some carrots, give them a place at the table, and see how quickly they transform themselves from an armed militia into a peaceable political party.

And so on. There is a large industry out there, which has as its sole purpose the systematic downplaying of the risks posed by radical Islam. And in the best American tradition, these risks are repackaged as opportunities, under a new name. It could just as easily be called appeasement, but the public associates appeasement with high risk. So let's rename it engagement, which sounds low-risk--- after all, there's no harm in talking, right? And once the risk has been minimized, the possible pay-off is then inflated: if we engage with the Islamists, we will reap the reward in the form of a less tumultuous Middle East. Nuclear plans might be shelved, terror might wane, and peace might prevail.

The engagement package rests upon a key assumption: that these "radical" states, groups, and individuals are motivated by grievances. If only we were able to address or ameliorate those grievances, we could effectively domesticate just about every form of Islamism. Another assumption is that these grievances are finite--- that is, by ameliorating them, they will be diminished.

It is precisely here that advocates of "engagement" are concealing the risk. They do so in two ways. First, they distract us from the deep-down dimension of Islamism--- from the overarching narrative that drives all forms of Islamism. The narrative goes like this: the enemies of Islam--- America, Europe, the Christians, the Jews, Israel--- enjoy much more power than the believing Muslims do. But if we Muslim return to the faith, we can restore to ourselves the vast power we exercised in past, when Islam dominated the world as the West dominates it today. The Islamists believe that through faith--- exemplified by self-sacrifice and self-martyrdom--- they can put history in reverse.

Once this is understood, the second concealment of risk comes into focus. We are told that the demands of Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran are finite. If we give them a concession here, or a foothold there, we will have somehow diminished their demand for more concessions and footholds. But if their purpose is the reversal of history, then our gestures of accommodation, far from enticing them to give up their grand vision, only persuade them to press on. They understand our desire to engage them as a sign of weakness--- an attempt to appease them--- which is itself an enticement for them to push harder against us and our allies. And since they believe in their narrative of an empowered Islam with the fervency of religious conviction, no amount of insistence by us that we will go only so far and no further will stop them.

Our inability to estimate this risk derives in part from our unwillingness to give credence to religious conviction in politics. We are keen to recast Islamists in secular terms--- to see them as political parties, or reform movements, or interest groups. But what if Islamists are none of these things? What if they see themselves as soldiers of God, working his will in the world? How do you deal with someone who believes that a paradise awaits every jihadist "martyr," and that the existence of this paradise is as real and certain to him as the existence of a Sheraton Hotel in Chicago? Or that at any moment, the mahdi, the awaited one, could make a reappearance and usher in the end of days? How do we calculate that risk?

So what are the real risks posed by Islamic extremism? If I were preparing a prospectus for a potential investor in "engagement," or a warning label on possible side effects of "engagement," they would include these warnings:

With regards to Iran. The downside risk is that Iran will prolong "engagement" in such a way as to buy time for its nuclear program--- perhaps just the amount of time it needs to complete it. At the same time, it will use the fact of "engagement" with the United States to chisel away at the weak coalition of Arab states that the United States has cobbled together to contain Iran. If "engagement" is unconditionally offered, Iran will continue its subversive activities in Iraq and Lebanon until it receives some other massive concession. Indeed, it may even accelerate these activities, so as to demand a higher price for their cessation. If the United States stands its ground and "engagement" fails, many in the Middle East will automatically blame the United States, but by then, military options will be even less appealing than they are today.

In regards to Hamas. The downside risk is that "engagement"... will be the nail in the coffin of Mahmoud Abbas, and of any directly negotiated understandings between Israel and the Palestinians. It is true that Israelis and Palestinians aren't capable today of reaching a final status agreement. But the present situation in the West Bank allows for a degree of stability and cooperation. This is because Israel stands as the guarantor against Hamas subversion of the West Bank. "Engagement" with Hamas would weaken that guarantee, signal to Palestinians once again that terrorism pays, and validate and legitimate the anti-Semitic, racist rhetoric that emanates daily from the leaders and preachers of Hamas. It might do all this without bringing Israeli-Palestinian peace even one inch closer.

In regards to Hezbollah. The downside risk is that "engagement" will effectively concede control of Lebanon to an armed militia that constitutes a state within a state. It will undermine America's pretension to champion civil society and pluralism in the most diverse Arab state. It will constitute the final rout of the beleaguered democracy forces within Lebanon, which have been consistently pro-American. It will compound the unfortunate effects of the 2006 summer war, by seeming to acknowledge Hezbollah as the victor. And it might do all this without bringing about the disarming of a single Hezbollah terrorist, or the removal of a single Iranian-supplied missile from Lebanon.

...In the Middle East, the idea that "there's no harm in talking" is entirely incomprehensible. It matters whom you talk to, because you legitimize your interlocutors. Hence the Arab refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Remember the scene that unfolded this past summer, when Bashar Asad scrupulously avoided contact with Ehud Olmert on the same reviewing stand at a Mediterranean summit. An Arab head of state will never directly engage Israel before extracting every concession. Only an American would think of doing this at the outset, and in return for nothing: "unconditional talks" is a purely American concept, incomprehensible in the Middle East. There is harm in talking, if your talking legitimates your enemies, and persuades them and those on the sidelines that you have done so from weakness. For only the weak talk "unconditionally," which is tantamount to accepting the enemy's conditions. It is widely regarded as the prelude to unconditional surrender.

The United States cannot afford to roll the dice again in the Middle East, in the pious hope of winning it all. Chances are slim to nil that the United States is going to talk the Iranians, Hamas or Hezbollah out of their grand plan. Should that surprise us? We "engaged" before, with Yasser Arafat, and we know how that ended. We downplayed radical rhetoric before, with Osama bin Laden, and we know how that ended. We assumed we could talk people out of their passions in Iraq, and we know how that ended.

It is time to question risk-defying policies in the Middle East. The slogans of peace and democracy misled us. Let's not let the new slogan of engagement do the same. The United States is going to have to show the resolve and grit to wear and grind down adversaries, with soft power, hard power and will power. Paradoxically, that is the least risky path--- because if America persists, it will prevail.