From BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 115, October 7, 2010, by Prof. Hillel Frisch, senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The US can and should withdraw its forces from Afghanistan because there are other states capable of shouldering the burden of stabilizing the country, and the threat from Afghanistan to US security is no longer acute. Iraq, however, can be stabilized only by the US, and its long-term stability is a vital US interest with lasting and broad implications. Consequently, Obama should not be withdrawing troops from Iraq now.
President Barack Obama is making a serious mistake of potentially historical proportions in withdrawing from Iraq. He should reverse direction and withdraw from Afghanistan while staying put in Iraq. Failure to do so might spell the end of America’s preeminence on the world stage, a presence that is critical to global security.
The White House errs in focusing on the war against terror instead of focusing on more traditional concerns, like relations with and between states and mechanisms of maintaining regional balances of power. A reconsideration of the situation in Afghanistan with a balance of power prism leads to the conclusion that at least two emerging world powers, China and India, can be encouraged to become more involved in containing the Afghani situation. Rather than piggybacking on American taxpayers’ money – as Europe did in the Cold War under a US umbrella – these countries should be cajoled in assuming greater responsibility for the situation in Afghanistan.
Indeed, for the first time since the Cold War, other states could play the role of policeman in a battle in Afghanistan and could contain the risk of nuclear fallout in Pakistan. China and India have more to lose than the US in not coping with these problems.
Furthermore, Afghanistan is less important to America today for the following additional reason: Despite the formidable comeback of the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2005, and the expansion of the terrorist sanctuary there, terrorism against the West has actually declined. This draws into question the link between available sanctuaries and the protection of the US from terrorism.
Though it is true that a Pakistani-Chinese alliance supportive of the Taliban might emerge against the present Karzai regime, which would be supported by India and perhaps Iran, the costs of such instability would be borne by these states. They are sufficiently mature states to resolve the conflict without needing the US to shoulder the burden and drain its resources. A preeminent power should know where to get involved and where, at maximum, to use its good offices, in order to foster stability. America should take advantage of what the British Empire lacked during its very problematic involvement in the region in the 19th century – a regional array of strong states to cope with the fallout and tensions emanating from the Afghani crisis.
By contrast, no one in the Middle East can fill the place of the US if America withdraws from Iraq. Egypt, a state in relative decline, will be lucky if it can cope in the near future with its domestic problems. Saudi Arabia projects no effective power beyond its borders no matter how large the arms deal it signs with the US. The Gulf States are vulnerable to aggressive states, as the Iraq takeover of Kuwait proved a generation ago. All they can and should do is foot more of the bill for US protection.
Another regional power, Turkey, is a problematic player. Its relationship with the US since 2003, and increasingly since Prime Minister Erdogan’s reelection to office in 2007 during which he showed his Islamist colors, suggests that Turkey might become more of a problem for America than a solution to the fallout. Only Israel, a strategic ally of consequence, could conceivably play a role in aiding moderate Arab states in times of crisis.
The future of Iraq, by contrast, is a critical component in maintaining key US interests, if not its continued preeminence. The fall of Iraq could have a domino effect, threatening stability in Jordan and inducing the emergence of a Shiite corridor. Turkey could conceivably join the ranks of Islamic radicalism, alongside Iran, as it carves up the state of Iraq. An expanded Iranian presence in Iraq might embolden Syria to become an even more destabilizing force than at present.
Above all, a stable, pro-Western Iraq is necessary in containing Iran and preventing Saudi Arabia and the weak Gulf States from "bandwagoning" with Iran, just as Jordan was induced to join forces with Egypt’s Nasser in 1967. There is a palpable danger that the world’s major oil resources could then come under control of a nascent, undemocratic counter-alliance that could include China as well.
The facile idea that it does not matter who controls the oil because it would have to be sold in the international market place ignores the reality of a rising Chinese demand for energy sources. Such a control of oil would enable Iran to cut the supply of this crucial resource to democratic states like India. Politically motivated small cuts in oil supply to specific states could raise prices and damage relations between Western allies, making it more difficult for them to meet shared international challenges.
The implications of such empowerment, including the creation of a terrorist groundswell – with obvious ramifications for American allies in the region, from Saudi Arabia to Ethiopia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel - should not be underestimated. A failed Iraq would only increase the danger that Somalia and the potential state failures of Yemen and Lebanon pose to regional and world stability. In short, the state-directed terrorist fallout from Iraq is potentially far greater than from Pakistan/Afghanistan.
State-building in Iraq is doable, but problematic. The party that secured the most votes in the last election is led by Iyad Allawi, a secular Shiite, while most of its voters were Sunnis. The Shiites and Kurds, two groups who have oil, know that they must come to terms with the Sunni minority in order to ensure that the oil reaches international markets, for the benefit of all Iraqis. In Afghanistan, the sharp societal disparities, the lack of a strong modern state tradition, and the mountainous terrain, render a solution to the state-building problem virtually impossible.
Does Obama have the political courage to re-assess his current direction and reevaluate America's troop deployments in line with true, long-term US national interests? As outlined above, these interests clearly require a long-term American presence in Iraq, while Afghanistan is the front from which he could relatively safely order a withdrawal.
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Tuesday, August 31, 2010
Lebanon, Turkey, and next Iraq...?
From American Thinker, August 21, 2010, by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, intern at Middle East Forum:
With the official end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, what bodes for Iraq's future in terms of its relations to other nations in the Middle East? One useful way to examine this question is through the lens of what Daniel Pipes describes as the present "Middle Eastern Cold War."
This new Cold War represents the current ideological division in the Middle East between the "revolutionary bloc," led chiefly by Iran, Syria, and more recently Turkey, and the "status-quo bloc," led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While most Sunni Arab states align themselves with the "status-quo bloc," there are notable exceptions in that Qatar and Oman back the "revolutionary bloc," while Libya simply sits on the sidelines.
...the most recent sign of this Cold War could well lie in Iraq as Saudi Arabia and Iran jostle for influence. With the ongoing political stalemate that has created a power vacuum, it is Saudi Arabia's hope that the current Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki does not retain his position in power for fear that he will tilt Iraq towards Iran's regional bloc. Meanwhile, Iran not only wishes for him to remain as prime minister, but also hopes for Maliki's State of Law (SOA) coalition and the Sadrist Iraqi National Alliance (INA) to form the backbone of a new government, whereas the U.S. views a coalition between SOA and Iyad Allawi's Iraqiya bloc as the best option.
Indeed, on repeated occasions, Saudi officials have been open in expressing their dislike for Maliki. For instance, in May, former Saudi intelligence chief Turki Al-Faisal accused Maliki of attempting to "deny the Iraqi people their legitimately elected government," meaning that Allawi should be given the right to form a government.
In addition, the Saudi government has made a series of goodwill gestures, including receiving several Iraqi politicians such as Allawi and the president of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Massoud Barzani on visits to Riyadh in an attempt to contain Iran's influence in the country. Winning over the latter is viewed as especially important since the Kurdish parties are reported to have extensive economic ties with Iran that date back at least two decades, above all in the smuggling of oil and other refined petroleum products to Iran.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia has been trying to take advantage of recent, tougher sanctions against Iran to expand its influence in Iraq through economic cooperation with the country. For example, in July, a Saudi airline launched the first direct flights to Iraq in almost twenty years, having been suspended in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Furthermore, Saudi food firms like Almarai have become involved in the export of foodstuffs to Iraq via Kuwait and Jordan.
Simultaneously, however, Saudi Arabia is concerned that Iraq's aspiring potential to produce some 10-12 million barrels of oil a day could dislodge it from its position as a leader of the OPEC cartel. Hence, cooperation in the field of oil production is nonexistent.
Despite these measures undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Iran and the "revolutionary bloc's" influence on Iraq is all too evident. Iran has repeatedly urged the Shi'a parties in Iraq to put aside their differences and form a ruling Shi'a-led government, fearing that allowing Allawi's Iraqiya bloc to form a government will lead to a resurgence of Sunni minority rule and Baathism. Also noteworthy, besides Kurdish smuggling of petroleum to Iran, are the already close economic ties between the key players of the "revolutionary bloc" and Iraq that will likely grow in the future as Iran, Turkey, and Syria continue to restrict Iraq's water supplies through building dams on the Tigris and Euphrates and diverting water for irrigation projects. This could create future "oil for water" trade schemes. Moreover, there are the Iranian-backed "Special Groups" like the Kataib Hezb'allah that can resort to insurgent-style attacks to quash any efforts by the Sunni Arabs to exert their diminished political influence and tilt Iraq towards the "status-quo bloc."
Thus, it is possible that Iraq will emerge as a sort of theatre of proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is improbable that the struggle will be prolonged, as Iran, the leader of the "revolutionary bloc," and most of the Shi'a population of Iraq share the goal of ensuring Shi'a dominance in the country, such that Iraq, under a Shi'a-led government, will likely become an auxiliary for the "revolutionary bloc." This outcome becomes much more conceivable when one considers that Iran could well have nuclear weapons in the next few years, which will make it much harder for its rivals to contain Iranian influence in Iraq.
With the official end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq, what bodes for Iraq's future in terms of its relations to other nations in the Middle East? One useful way to examine this question is through the lens of what Daniel Pipes describes as the present "Middle Eastern Cold War."
This new Cold War represents the current ideological division in the Middle East between the "revolutionary bloc," led chiefly by Iran, Syria, and more recently Turkey, and the "status-quo bloc," led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While most Sunni Arab states align themselves with the "status-quo bloc," there are notable exceptions in that Qatar and Oman back the "revolutionary bloc," while Libya simply sits on the sidelines.
...the most recent sign of this Cold War could well lie in Iraq as Saudi Arabia and Iran jostle for influence. With the ongoing political stalemate that has created a power vacuum, it is Saudi Arabia's hope that the current Shi'a Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki does not retain his position in power for fear that he will tilt Iraq towards Iran's regional bloc. Meanwhile, Iran not only wishes for him to remain as prime minister, but also hopes for Maliki's State of Law (SOA) coalition and the Sadrist Iraqi National Alliance (INA) to form the backbone of a new government, whereas the U.S. views a coalition between SOA and Iyad Allawi's Iraqiya bloc as the best option.
Indeed, on repeated occasions, Saudi officials have been open in expressing their dislike for Maliki. For instance, in May, former Saudi intelligence chief Turki Al-Faisal accused Maliki of attempting to "deny the Iraqi people their legitimately elected government," meaning that Allawi should be given the right to form a government.
In addition, the Saudi government has made a series of goodwill gestures, including receiving several Iraqi politicians such as Allawi and the president of autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Massoud Barzani on visits to Riyadh in an attempt to contain Iran's influence in the country. Winning over the latter is viewed as especially important since the Kurdish parties are reported to have extensive economic ties with Iran that date back at least two decades, above all in the smuggling of oil and other refined petroleum products to Iran.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia has been trying to take advantage of recent, tougher sanctions against Iran to expand its influence in Iraq through economic cooperation with the country. For example, in July, a Saudi airline launched the first direct flights to Iraq in almost twenty years, having been suspended in the aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Furthermore, Saudi food firms like Almarai have become involved in the export of foodstuffs to Iraq via Kuwait and Jordan.
Simultaneously, however, Saudi Arabia is concerned that Iraq's aspiring potential to produce some 10-12 million barrels of oil a day could dislodge it from its position as a leader of the OPEC cartel. Hence, cooperation in the field of oil production is nonexistent.
Despite these measures undertaken by Saudi Arabia, Iran and the "revolutionary bloc's" influence on Iraq is all too evident. Iran has repeatedly urged the Shi'a parties in Iraq to put aside their differences and form a ruling Shi'a-led government, fearing that allowing Allawi's Iraqiya bloc to form a government will lead to a resurgence of Sunni minority rule and Baathism. Also noteworthy, besides Kurdish smuggling of petroleum to Iran, are the already close economic ties between the key players of the "revolutionary bloc" and Iraq that will likely grow in the future as Iran, Turkey, and Syria continue to restrict Iraq's water supplies through building dams on the Tigris and Euphrates and diverting water for irrigation projects. This could create future "oil for water" trade schemes. Moreover, there are the Iranian-backed "Special Groups" like the Kataib Hezb'allah that can resort to insurgent-style attacks to quash any efforts by the Sunni Arabs to exert their diminished political influence and tilt Iraq towards the "status-quo bloc."
Thus, it is possible that Iraq will emerge as a sort of theatre of proxy warfare between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the near future.
Nevertheless, it is improbable that the struggle will be prolonged, as Iran, the leader of the "revolutionary bloc," and most of the Shi'a population of Iraq share the goal of ensuring Shi'a dominance in the country, such that Iraq, under a Shi'a-led government, will likely become an auxiliary for the "revolutionary bloc." This outcome becomes much more conceivable when one considers that Iran could well have nuclear weapons in the next few years, which will make it much harder for its rivals to contain Iranian influence in Iraq.
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
US rethinks its 'Muddle East' tactics
From: From The Australian July 21, 2010, by Ehud Yaari, Lafer International Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Middle East Commentator for Channel 2 news in Israel, based on a talk he gave in Melbourne on July 12:
THE foreign policy team of US President Barack Obama is undertaking a reassessment of its policy all over the Middle East, including Israel ...and we can already detect the first products of this rethinking of policy.
The policy of keeping a distance from Israel, of picking fights with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led nowhere. There was a nominal freeze of construction in the settlements. The settlement freeze was not important in the first place and Mr Obama has decided, as you could tell during his latest meeting with Netanyahu, not to make it the central issue anymore.
Instead, we are going to see a policy that emphasises co-operation with Israel, understanding of Israel, working together, hand in hand, to bring the Palestinians to direct negotiations with Israel, instead of what is now in place -- proximity talks. Nobody talks about anything serious in proximity talks...
...Washington ...[has also] reached the conclusion that the US cannot adopt the option of containing a nuclear Iran.
The option of accepting a nuclear Iran, unwillingly of course, and then trying to contain it, was advocated by many important players on the American foreign policy scene. This option is now apparently off the table.
There is a change of policy not only in terms of sanctions, both at the UN Security Council and those unilateral sanctions now imposed by both the US, the EU and others; but also an understanding by the administration that in no way can Iran be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.
...why have they changed their minds? Because of what the leaders of the Gulf states, including the king of Saudi Arabia, have been saying to Obama for some time now; "We cannot live with a nuclear Iran."
...In Iraq we had elections that constitute ...a major victory to George W. Bush. The good guys won. The two main secular lists, Iyad Allawi's Iraqia, which is a Sunni-Shia alliance backed by Saudi Arabia, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law list, both won in the elections ["secular"??? - are you kidding Yaari? - SL]...
...Mr Obama and some of the people around him are reaching the conclusion a policy that is based on engagement, on "unclenching the fist", "let's talk", and especially, "let's talk to enemies" ...doesn't really work. They got a no for an answer from the Syrians, they repeatedly get a no from the Iranians, they get slapped back all over the place. They are saying to themselves, "That's about as much as we are prepared to take." [If that's true, it's welcome news, and long overdue - SL]
THE foreign policy team of US President Barack Obama is undertaking a reassessment of its policy all over the Middle East, including Israel ...and we can already detect the first products of this rethinking of policy.
The policy of keeping a distance from Israel, of picking fights with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, led nowhere. There was a nominal freeze of construction in the settlements. The settlement freeze was not important in the first place and Mr Obama has decided, as you could tell during his latest meeting with Netanyahu, not to make it the central issue anymore.
Instead, we are going to see a policy that emphasises co-operation with Israel, understanding of Israel, working together, hand in hand, to bring the Palestinians to direct negotiations with Israel, instead of what is now in place -- proximity talks. Nobody talks about anything serious in proximity talks...
...Washington ...[has also] reached the conclusion that the US cannot adopt the option of containing a nuclear Iran.
The option of accepting a nuclear Iran, unwillingly of course, and then trying to contain it, was advocated by many important players on the American foreign policy scene. This option is now apparently off the table.
There is a change of policy not only in terms of sanctions, both at the UN Security Council and those unilateral sanctions now imposed by both the US, the EU and others; but also an understanding by the administration that in no way can Iran be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon.
...why have they changed their minds? Because of what the leaders of the Gulf states, including the king of Saudi Arabia, have been saying to Obama for some time now; "We cannot live with a nuclear Iran."
...In Iraq we had elections that constitute ...a major victory to George W. Bush. The good guys won. The two main secular lists, Iyad Allawi's Iraqia, which is a Sunni-Shia alliance backed by Saudi Arabia, and Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law list, both won in the elections ["secular"??? - are you kidding Yaari? - SL]...
...Mr Obama and some of the people around him are reaching the conclusion a policy that is based on engagement, on "unclenching the fist", "let's talk", and especially, "let's talk to enemies" ...doesn't really work. They got a no for an answer from the Syrians, they repeatedly get a no from the Iranians, they get slapped back all over the place. They are saying to themselves, "That's about as much as we are prepared to take." [If that's true, it's welcome news, and long overdue - SL]
Saturday, March 06, 2010
Turkish "honor" threatened
From JPost, 05/03/2010, by ASSOCIATED PRESS:
Turkish FM calls US recognition of World War I [Armenian] genocide a matter of "honor."
Turkey warned the Obama administration on Friday of negative diplomatic consequences if it fails to impede a US resolution branding the World War I-era killing of Armenians as genocide. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said his country, a key Muslim ally of the US, would assess what measures it would take, adding that the issue was a matter of "honor" for Ankara.
A US congressional committee approved the measure Thursday. The 23-22 vote sends the measure to the full House of Representatives, where prospects for passage are uncertain. Minutes after the vote, Turkey withdrew its ambassador to the US
Historians estimate that up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed by Ottoman Turks around the time of World War I, an event widely viewed by scholars as the first genocide of the 20th century. Turkey denies that the deaths constituted genocide, saying the toll has been inflated and those killed were victims of civil war and unrest.
...[Foreign Minister] Davutoglu ...complained of a lack of "strategic vision" in Washington. ...The measure was approved at a time when Washington is expected to press Turkey to back sanctions against Iran to be approved in the UN Security Council, where Turkey currently holds a rotating seat. Turkish cooperation is also important to US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Also at stake are defense contracts. Turkey is an important market for US defense companies, many of which had lobbied against the measure.
Davutoglu ...added that the vote had put the ratification of agreements to normalize ties with Armenia into jeopardy.
...Armenian-American groups have sought congressional affirmation of the killings as genocide for decades and welcomed Thursday's vote.
The vote also came at a time when relations with the United States — strained by Turkey's refusal to allow its territory to be used for the invasion of Iraq — had recently improved. Turkey was the first Muslim country Obama visited after taking office.
Turkish FM calls US recognition of World War I [Armenian] genocide a matter of "honor."
Turkey warned the Obama administration on Friday of negative diplomatic consequences if it fails to impede a US resolution branding the World War I-era killing of Armenians as genocide. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said his country, a key Muslim ally of the US, would assess what measures it would take, adding that the issue was a matter of "honor" for Ankara.
A US congressional committee approved the measure Thursday. The 23-22 vote sends the measure to the full House of Representatives, where prospects for passage are uncertain. Minutes after the vote, Turkey withdrew its ambassador to the US
Historians estimate that up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed by Ottoman Turks around the time of World War I, an event widely viewed by scholars as the first genocide of the 20th century. Turkey denies that the deaths constituted genocide, saying the toll has been inflated and those killed were victims of civil war and unrest.
...[Foreign Minister] Davutoglu ...complained of a lack of "strategic vision" in Washington. ...The measure was approved at a time when Washington is expected to press Turkey to back sanctions against Iran to be approved in the UN Security Council, where Turkey currently holds a rotating seat. Turkish cooperation is also important to US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Also at stake are defense contracts. Turkey is an important market for US defense companies, many of which had lobbied against the measure.
Davutoglu ...added that the vote had put the ratification of agreements to normalize ties with Armenia into jeopardy.
...Armenian-American groups have sought congressional affirmation of the killings as genocide for decades and welcomed Thursday's vote.
The vote also came at a time when relations with the United States — strained by Turkey's refusal to allow its territory to be used for the invasion of Iraq — had recently improved. Turkey was the first Muslim country Obama visited after taking office.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
Iraq Desecrating Ezekiel's memory
From THE JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 15, 2010, by KSENIA SVETLOVA:
For centuries Jews, Christians and Muslims came to Al-Kifl, a small town south of Baghdad, to visit the tomb of the Prophet Ezekiel and pray.
The distinctive Jewish character of the Al-Kifl shrine, namely the Hebrew inscriptions and the Torah Ark, never bothered the gentile worshipers. In the 14th century a minaret was built next to the shrine, but the interior design remained Jewish. The vast majority of Iraq's Jewish community left some 60 years ago, but Shi'ites took good care of the holy site.
Until now.
Recently "Ur," a local Iraqi news agency, reported that a huge mosque will be built on top of the grave by Iraq's Antiquities and Heritage Authority, while Hebrew inscriptions and ornaments are being removed from the site, all as part of renovations.
..."I first heard the news of tomb desecration from a friend of mine who is a German scholar. After visiting the site he called me and said that some Hebrew inscriptions on the grave were covered by plaster and that a mosque is planned to be built on top of the tomb. He told me that he found the changes at the tomb disturbing and warned me that I'd better act quickly, before any irreversible damage will be inflicted...Then I saw the report from the Ur news agency, mentioning the decision of the Antiquities and Heritage Authority to build a mosque and to erase the Hebrew inscriptions and ornaments..." [Prof. Shmuel Moreh of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem] said.
...[Mr. Shelomo Alfassa, US director of Justice for Jews from Arab Countries] believes that Iraq's Antiquities and Heritage Authority "has been pressured by Islamists to historically cleanse all evidence of a Jewish connection to Iraq - a land where Jews had lived for over a thousand years before the advent of Islam."
According to the Baghdad-born Moreh, many of the Muslims who visit the tomb today are unaware Ezekiel was a Jew.
Iraq, the biblical Aram Naharaim, is rich in Jewish religious sites. Not only Ezekiel is buried there, but also Ezra, Daniel, Nehemiah, Nahum and Jonah. (Another tomb attributed to Ezekiel is located in Dezful, in southwestern Iran.)
...the future of Jewish sacred sites looks grim in the intolerant current climate of post-Saddam Iraq, where only eight Jews are left, the Christian minority is severely persecuted by the fundamentalists and ancient Shi'ite mosques are blown up.
"Let's hope that the Jewish sites will be spared, but someone must intervene before it's too late," Moreh warned.
For centuries Jews, Christians and Muslims came to Al-Kifl, a small town south of Baghdad, to visit the tomb of the Prophet Ezekiel and pray.
The distinctive Jewish character of the Al-Kifl shrine, namely the Hebrew inscriptions and the Torah Ark, never bothered the gentile worshipers. In the 14th century a minaret was built next to the shrine, but the interior design remained Jewish. The vast majority of Iraq's Jewish community left some 60 years ago, but Shi'ites took good care of the holy site.
Until now.
Recently "Ur," a local Iraqi news agency, reported that a huge mosque will be built on top of the grave by Iraq's Antiquities and Heritage Authority, while Hebrew inscriptions and ornaments are being removed from the site, all as part of renovations.
..."I first heard the news of tomb desecration from a friend of mine who is a German scholar. After visiting the site he called me and said that some Hebrew inscriptions on the grave were covered by plaster and that a mosque is planned to be built on top of the tomb. He told me that he found the changes at the tomb disturbing and warned me that I'd better act quickly, before any irreversible damage will be inflicted...Then I saw the report from the Ur news agency, mentioning the decision of the Antiquities and Heritage Authority to build a mosque and to erase the Hebrew inscriptions and ornaments..." [Prof. Shmuel Moreh of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem] said.
...[Mr. Shelomo Alfassa, US director of Justice for Jews from Arab Countries] believes that Iraq's Antiquities and Heritage Authority "has been pressured by Islamists to historically cleanse all evidence of a Jewish connection to Iraq - a land where Jews had lived for over a thousand years before the advent of Islam."
According to the Baghdad-born Moreh, many of the Muslims who visit the tomb today are unaware Ezekiel was a Jew.
Iraq, the biblical Aram Naharaim, is rich in Jewish religious sites. Not only Ezekiel is buried there, but also Ezra, Daniel, Nehemiah, Nahum and Jonah. (Another tomb attributed to Ezekiel is located in Dezful, in southwestern Iran.)
...the future of Jewish sacred sites looks grim in the intolerant current climate of post-Saddam Iraq, where only eight Jews are left, the Christian minority is severely persecuted by the fundamentalists and ancient Shi'ite mosques are blown up.
"Let's hope that the Jewish sites will be spared, but someone must intervene before it's too late," Moreh warned.
Wednesday, December 23, 2009
Syria is the lynchpin
From The Middle East Forum, December 2009, by Michael Rubin (brief excerpt only - follow the link to the full paper):
[After the] 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel ...United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 restored calm, but only a tenuous one. While the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) returned to Lebanon, it failed to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah with an arsenal even more advanced than before the 2006 conflict. The Lebanese and Israeli border may be calm today, but the potential for regional conflict has only grown. If a new conflict erupts, it likely will be deadlier and harder to contain to Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah now possesses missiles capable of striking not only Haifa, but also Tel Aviv.
The Obama administration, meanwhile, has reached out diplomatically to both Syria and Iran in the belief that a less confrontational approach to conflict resolution might lead the two states to reconsider their rejectionist behavior. It has not worked. While Tehran and Damascus may welcome the incentives inherent in U.S. engagement, both states continue to use proxies to pursue radical aims and undercut stability. Iran may be Hezbollah's chief patron, but Syria is the lynchpin that makes Iranian support for foreign fighters possible. While Israel may be the immediate target of the Iran-Syria nexus, the partnership threatens broader U.S. interests...
...Syria's continued support for terrorists and other foreign fighters undermines any diplomatic gains the United States achieves. Because of Syria, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. Meanwhile, the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards] has more political power now than at any previous point in its history. As such, statements by its commander that "in the near future, we will witness the destruction of Israel, the aggressor, this cancerous microbe Israel, at the able hands of the soldiers of the community of Hezbollah," should raise concerns in Washington and European capitals about the possibility of a regional conflagration.
Recent reports that Iran transshipped gas masks and chemical weapons through Syria to Hezbollah should only heighten concern as the Islamic Republic increases its defiance in international discussions about its nuclear activities. Across the U.S. political spectrum, analysts agree that, should Israel, the United States, or any other power strike at Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would respond, at least in part, by activating its proxy terrorist networks.
Palestinian groups in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and foreign fighters in Iraq all have Syrian support in common.
Not only Hezbollah's rhetoric but also its track record suggest a willingness to attack Western targets, should war against Iran erupt.
Given both the circumstances and the stakes, it is ironic that U.S. officials continue to accept the fiction of Syrian sincerity. As difficult as stopping terrorist supplies may be, the likelihood that proxy groups will voluntarily forfeit their capability is low, and the cost of allowing terrorists to use such arms is high.
[After the] 2006 war between Lebanon and Israel ...United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1701 restored calm, but only a tenuous one. While the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) returned to Lebanon, it failed to prevent the resupply of Hezbollah with an arsenal even more advanced than before the 2006 conflict. The Lebanese and Israeli border may be calm today, but the potential for regional conflict has only grown. If a new conflict erupts, it likely will be deadlier and harder to contain to Israel and Lebanon. Hezbollah now possesses missiles capable of striking not only Haifa, but also Tel Aviv.
The Obama administration, meanwhile, has reached out diplomatically to both Syria and Iran in the belief that a less confrontational approach to conflict resolution might lead the two states to reconsider their rejectionist behavior. It has not worked. While Tehran and Damascus may welcome the incentives inherent in U.S. engagement, both states continue to use proxies to pursue radical aims and undercut stability. Iran may be Hezbollah's chief patron, but Syria is the lynchpin that makes Iranian support for foreign fighters possible. While Israel may be the immediate target of the Iran-Syria nexus, the partnership threatens broader U.S. interests...
...Syria's continued support for terrorists and other foreign fighters undermines any diplomatic gains the United States achieves. Because of Syria, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 has failed to prevent Hezbollah's rearmament. Meanwhile, the [Iranian Revolutionary Guards] has more political power now than at any previous point in its history. As such, statements by its commander that "in the near future, we will witness the destruction of Israel, the aggressor, this cancerous microbe Israel, at the able hands of the soldiers of the community of Hezbollah," should raise concerns in Washington and European capitals about the possibility of a regional conflagration.
Recent reports that Iran transshipped gas masks and chemical weapons through Syria to Hezbollah should only heighten concern as the Islamic Republic increases its defiance in international discussions about its nuclear activities. Across the U.S. political spectrum, analysts agree that, should Israel, the United States, or any other power strike at Iran's nuclear facilities, the Islamic Republic would respond, at least in part, by activating its proxy terrorist networks.
Palestinian groups in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and foreign fighters in Iraq all have Syrian support in common.
Not only Hezbollah's rhetoric but also its track record suggest a willingness to attack Western targets, should war against Iran erupt.
Given both the circumstances and the stakes, it is ironic that U.S. officials continue to accept the fiction of Syrian sincerity. As difficult as stopping terrorist supplies may be, the likelihood that proxy groups will voluntarily forfeit their capability is low, and the cost of allowing terrorists to use such arms is high.
Monday, August 31, 2009
Syria "on the nose"
From THE JERUSALEM POST Aug. 31, 2009, by Herb Keinon:
...Iraq and Syria are entangled in a diplomatic dispute over demands that Damascus extradite two suspects wanted in recent suicide attacks on government ministries in Baghdad that killed about 100 people. The tension led both countries to recall their ambassadors.
The dispute was further compounded on Sunday, when Iraqi authorities broadcast a confession from a man who said he received terrorist training in neighboring Syria.
The Iraqi government has blamed an alliance of al-Qaida in Iraq and Saddam Hussein loyalists it says are based in Syria for the Aug. 19 bombings and demanded that Damascus hand over the two suspected plotters, raising tensions between the two countries.
...In a bid to ease diplomatic tensions between the two neighbors, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu planned to meet leaders in Iraq and Syria later Monday.
...the US believes some of those responsible for the wave of attacks, as well as some of the explosives that were used to carry them out, came across the border from Syria ...
...The deadly attacks have also severely strained Syrian-Iraqi relations, with Iraq charging that Syria is sheltering suspects connected to some of the bombings. Iraq demanded Damascus hand over the suspects, Damascus demanded proof that they were involved, and the two countries recently recalled their respective ambassadors over the issue.
With all this in the background, Syria - according to Israeli sources - has made it clear in recent weeks that it was no longer interested in Turkish mediation in indirect talks with Jerusalem, but now only wanted US mediation.
According to assessments in Jerusalem, however, the US was far less likely now to accommodate this Syrian request until it did more to stop the infiltrations into Iraq...
...Iraq and Syria are entangled in a diplomatic dispute over demands that Damascus extradite two suspects wanted in recent suicide attacks on government ministries in Baghdad that killed about 100 people. The tension led both countries to recall their ambassadors.
The dispute was further compounded on Sunday, when Iraqi authorities broadcast a confession from a man who said he received terrorist training in neighboring Syria.
The Iraqi government has blamed an alliance of al-Qaida in Iraq and Saddam Hussein loyalists it says are based in Syria for the Aug. 19 bombings and demanded that Damascus hand over the two suspected plotters, raising tensions between the two countries.
...In a bid to ease diplomatic tensions between the two neighbors, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu planned to meet leaders in Iraq and Syria later Monday.
...the US believes some of those responsible for the wave of attacks, as well as some of the explosives that were used to carry them out, came across the border from Syria ...
...The deadly attacks have also severely strained Syrian-Iraqi relations, with Iraq charging that Syria is sheltering suspects connected to some of the bombings. Iraq demanded Damascus hand over the suspects, Damascus demanded proof that they were involved, and the two countries recently recalled their respective ambassadors over the issue.
With all this in the background, Syria - according to Israeli sources - has made it clear in recent weeks that it was no longer interested in Turkish mediation in indirect talks with Jerusalem, but now only wanted US mediation.
According to assessments in Jerusalem, however, the US was far less likely now to accommodate this Syrian request until it did more to stop the infiltrations into Iraq...
Wednesday, February 04, 2009
Iraqi woman had 80 women raped then recruited as suicide bombers
From The Australian, February 04, 2009, by Agence France-Presse correspondents in Baghdad:
A WOMAN suspected of recruiting more than 80 female suicide bombers has confessed to organising their rapes so she could later convince them that martyrdom was the only way to escape the shame.
Samira Jassam, 51, was arrested by Iraqi police and confessed to recruiting the women and orchestrating dozens of attacks.
In a video confession, she explained how she had mentally prepared the women for martyrdom operations, passed them on to terrorists who provided explosives, and then took the bombers to their targets.
"We arrested Samira Jassim, known as 'Um al-Mumenin', the mother of the believers, who was responsible for recruiting 80 women'', Major General Qassim Atta said.
"She confessed her responsibility for these actions, and she confirmed that 28 attempts had been made in one of the terrorists' strongholds,'' he said.
... Women are often allowed through military checkpoints without being searched, making it easier for them to hide explosives under their traditional robes.
A WOMAN suspected of recruiting more than 80 female suicide bombers has confessed to organising their rapes so she could later convince them that martyrdom was the only way to escape the shame.
Samira Jassam, 51, was arrested by Iraqi police and confessed to recruiting the women and orchestrating dozens of attacks.
In a video confession, she explained how she had mentally prepared the women for martyrdom operations, passed them on to terrorists who provided explosives, and then took the bombers to their targets.
"We arrested Samira Jassim, known as 'Um al-Mumenin', the mother of the believers, who was responsible for recruiting 80 women'', Major General Qassim Atta said.
"She confessed her responsibility for these actions, and she confirmed that 28 attempts had been made in one of the terrorists' strongholds,'' he said.
... Women are often allowed through military checkpoints without being searched, making it easier for them to hide explosives under their traditional robes.
Thursday, December 11, 2008
What do the present financial crisis and U.S. Middle East policy have in common?
From The Adelson Institute for Strategic Studies, The Shalem Center, 27/11/08, by Martin Kramer:
Behind the financial crisis was a well-practiced mechanism for concealing risk. The risk was there, and it was constantly growing, but it could be disguised, repackaged and renamed, so that in the end it seemed to have disappeared. Much of the debate about foreign policy in the United States is conducted in the same manner: policymakers and pundits, to get what they want, conceal the risks.
In the case of the Middle East, they concealed the risks of bringing Yasser Arafat in from the cold; they concealed the risks of neglecting the growth of Al Qaeda; and they concealed the risks involved in occupying Iraq. It isn't that the risks weren't known×’€”to someone. The intelligence was always there. But if you were clever enough, and determined enough, you could find a way to conceal them.
But concealed risk doesn't go away. It accumulates away from sight, until the moment when it surges back to the surface. It did that after Camp David in 2000, when the "peace process" collapsed in blood; it did that on 9/11, when hijackers shattered the skies over New York in Washington; and it happened in Iraq, when an insurgency kicked us back. This tendency to downplay risk may be an American trait: we have seen it in U.S. markets, and now we see it in U.S. election-year politics. In Middle East policy, its outcome has been a string of very unpleasant surprises.
A case in point is radical Islam. One would think that after the Iranian revolution, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the terrorism of Hezbollah, the Rushdie affair, the suicide attacks of Hamas and Al Qaeda, the Danish cartoons, and a host of other "surprises," that we would not be inclined to ignore the risks posed by radical Islam. And yet there are batteries of interpreters, analysts and pundits whose principal project is to obscure if not conceal the risks. Here are some of the most widespread variations on the theme:
Worried about Ahmadinejad? Pay him no mind. He doesn't really call the shots in Iran, he's just a figurehead. And anyway, he didn't really say what he's purported to have said, about wiping Israel off the map. What the Iranians really want is to sit down with us and cut a deal. They have a few grievances, some of them are even legitimate, so let's hear them out and invite them to the table, without preconditions. Iran isn't all that dangerous; it's just a small country; and even their own people are tired of the revolution. So pay no attention to Ahmadinejad, and pay no attention to the old slogans of "death to America," because that's not the real Iran.
Worried about the Palestinian Hamas? You've got it wrong. They merely represent another face of Palestinian nationalism. They aren't really Islamists at all: Hamas is basically a protest movement against corruption. Given the right incentives, they can be drawn into the peace process. Sure, they say they will never recognize Israel, but that is what the PLO once said, and didn't they change their tune? Anyway, Hamas controls Gaza, so there can't be a real peace process×’€”a settlement of the big issues like Jerusalem, refugees, borders×’€”without bringing them into the tent. So let's sit down and talk to them, figure out what their grievances are×’€”no doubt, some of them are legitimate too. And let's get the process back on track.
Troubled by Hezbollah? Don't believe everything they say. They only pretend to be faithful to Iran's ayatollahs, and all their talk about "onwards to Jerusalem" is rhetoric for domestic consumption. What they really want is to earn the Shiites their rightful place in Lebanon, and improve the lot of their aggrieved sect. Engage them, dangle some carrots, give them a place at the table, and see how quickly they transform themselves from an armed militia into a peaceable political party.
And so on. There is a large industry out there, which has as its sole purpose the systematic downplaying of the risks posed by radical Islam. And in the best American tradition, these risks are repackaged as opportunities, under a new name. It could just as easily be called appeasement, but the public associates appeasement with high risk. So let's rename it engagement, which sounds low-risk--- after all, there's no harm in talking, right? And once the risk has been minimized, the possible pay-off is then inflated: if we engage with the Islamists, we will reap the reward in the form of a less tumultuous Middle East. Nuclear plans might be shelved, terror might wane, and peace might prevail.
The engagement package rests upon a key assumption: that these "radical" states, groups, and individuals are motivated by grievances. If only we were able to address or ameliorate those grievances, we could effectively domesticate just about every form of Islamism. Another assumption is that these grievances are finite--- that is, by ameliorating them, they will be diminished.
It is precisely here that advocates of "engagement" are concealing the risk. They do so in two ways. First, they distract us from the deep-down dimension of Islamism--- from the overarching narrative that drives all forms of Islamism. The narrative goes like this: the enemies of Islam--- America, Europe, the Christians, the Jews, Israel--- enjoy much more power than the believing Muslims do. But if we Muslim return to the faith, we can restore to ourselves the vast power we exercised in past, when Islam dominated the world as the West dominates it today. The Islamists believe that through faith--- exemplified by self-sacrifice and self-martyrdom--- they can put history in reverse.
Once this is understood, the second concealment of risk comes into focus. We are told that the demands of Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran are finite. If we give them a concession here, or a foothold there, we will have somehow diminished their demand for more concessions and footholds. But if their purpose is the reversal of history, then our gestures of accommodation, far from enticing them to give up their grand vision, only persuade them to press on. They understand our desire to engage them as a sign of weakness--- an attempt to appease them--- which is itself an enticement for them to push harder against us and our allies. And since they believe in their narrative of an empowered Islam with the fervency of religious conviction, no amount of insistence by us that we will go only so far and no further will stop them.
Our inability to estimate this risk derives in part from our unwillingness to give credence to religious conviction in politics. We are keen to recast Islamists in secular terms--- to see them as political parties, or reform movements, or interest groups. But what if Islamists are none of these things? What if they see themselves as soldiers of God, working his will in the world? How do you deal with someone who believes that a paradise awaits every jihadist "martyr," and that the existence of this paradise is as real and certain to him as the existence of a Sheraton Hotel in Chicago? Or that at any moment, the mahdi, the awaited one, could make a reappearance and usher in the end of days? How do we calculate that risk?
So what are the real risks posed by Islamic extremism? If I were preparing a prospectus for a potential investor in "engagement," or a warning label on possible side effects of "engagement," they would include these warnings:
With regards to Iran. The downside risk is that Iran will prolong "engagement" in such a way as to buy time for its nuclear program--- perhaps just the amount of time it needs to complete it. At the same time, it will use the fact of "engagement" with the United States to chisel away at the weak coalition of Arab states that the United States has cobbled together to contain Iran. If "engagement" is unconditionally offered, Iran will continue its subversive activities in Iraq and Lebanon until it receives some other massive concession. Indeed, it may even accelerate these activities, so as to demand a higher price for their cessation. If the United States stands its ground and "engagement" fails, many in the Middle East will automatically blame the United States, but by then, military options will be even less appealing than they are today.
In regards to Hamas. The downside risk is that "engagement"... will be the nail in the coffin of Mahmoud Abbas, and of any directly negotiated understandings between Israel and the Palestinians. It is true that Israelis and Palestinians aren't capable today of reaching a final status agreement. But the present situation in the West Bank allows for a degree of stability and cooperation. This is because Israel stands as the guarantor against Hamas subversion of the West Bank. "Engagement" with Hamas would weaken that guarantee, signal to Palestinians once again that terrorism pays, and validate and legitimate the anti-Semitic, racist rhetoric that emanates daily from the leaders and preachers of Hamas. It might do all this without bringing Israeli-Palestinian peace even one inch closer.
In regards to Hezbollah. The downside risk is that "engagement" will effectively concede control of Lebanon to an armed militia that constitutes a state within a state. It will undermine America's pretension to champion civil society and pluralism in the most diverse Arab state. It will constitute the final rout of the beleaguered democracy forces within Lebanon, which have been consistently pro-American. It will compound the unfortunate effects of the 2006 summer war, by seeming to acknowledge Hezbollah as the victor. And it might do all this without bringing about the disarming of a single Hezbollah terrorist, or the removal of a single Iranian-supplied missile from Lebanon.
...In the Middle East, the idea that "there's no harm in talking" is entirely incomprehensible. It matters whom you talk to, because you legitimize your interlocutors. Hence the Arab refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Remember the scene that unfolded this past summer, when Bashar Asad scrupulously avoided contact with Ehud Olmert on the same reviewing stand at a Mediterranean summit. An Arab head of state will never directly engage Israel before extracting every concession. Only an American would think of doing this at the outset, and in return for nothing: "unconditional talks" is a purely American concept, incomprehensible in the Middle East. There is harm in talking, if your talking legitimates your enemies, and persuades them and those on the sidelines that you have done so from weakness. For only the weak talk "unconditionally," which is tantamount to accepting the enemy's conditions. It is widely regarded as the prelude to unconditional surrender.
The United States cannot afford to roll the dice again in the Middle East, in the pious hope of winning it all. Chances are slim to nil that the United States is going to talk the Iranians, Hamas or Hezbollah out of their grand plan. Should that surprise us? We "engaged" before, with Yasser Arafat, and we know how that ended. We downplayed radical rhetoric before, with Osama bin Laden, and we know how that ended. We assumed we could talk people out of their passions in Iraq, and we know how that ended.
It is time to question risk-defying policies in the Middle East. The slogans of peace and democracy misled us. Let's not let the new slogan of engagement do the same. The United States is going to have to show the resolve and grit to wear and grind down adversaries, with soft power, hard power and will power. Paradoxically, that is the least risky path--- because if America persists, it will prevail.
Behind the financial crisis was a well-practiced mechanism for concealing risk. The risk was there, and it was constantly growing, but it could be disguised, repackaged and renamed, so that in the end it seemed to have disappeared. Much of the debate about foreign policy in the United States is conducted in the same manner: policymakers and pundits, to get what they want, conceal the risks.
In the case of the Middle East, they concealed the risks of bringing Yasser Arafat in from the cold; they concealed the risks of neglecting the growth of Al Qaeda; and they concealed the risks involved in occupying Iraq. It isn't that the risks weren't known×’€”to someone. The intelligence was always there. But if you were clever enough, and determined enough, you could find a way to conceal them.
But concealed risk doesn't go away. It accumulates away from sight, until the moment when it surges back to the surface. It did that after Camp David in 2000, when the "peace process" collapsed in blood; it did that on 9/11, when hijackers shattered the skies over New York in Washington; and it happened in Iraq, when an insurgency kicked us back. This tendency to downplay risk may be an American trait: we have seen it in U.S. markets, and now we see it in U.S. election-year politics. In Middle East policy, its outcome has been a string of very unpleasant surprises.
A case in point is radical Islam. One would think that after the Iranian revolution, the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the terrorism of Hezbollah, the Rushdie affair, the suicide attacks of Hamas and Al Qaeda, the Danish cartoons, and a host of other "surprises," that we would not be inclined to ignore the risks posed by radical Islam. And yet there are batteries of interpreters, analysts and pundits whose principal project is to obscure if not conceal the risks. Here are some of the most widespread variations on the theme:
Worried about Ahmadinejad? Pay him no mind. He doesn't really call the shots in Iran, he's just a figurehead. And anyway, he didn't really say what he's purported to have said, about wiping Israel off the map. What the Iranians really want is to sit down with us and cut a deal. They have a few grievances, some of them are even legitimate, so let's hear them out and invite them to the table, without preconditions. Iran isn't all that dangerous; it's just a small country; and even their own people are tired of the revolution. So pay no attention to Ahmadinejad, and pay no attention to the old slogans of "death to America," because that's not the real Iran.
Worried about the Palestinian Hamas? You've got it wrong. They merely represent another face of Palestinian nationalism. They aren't really Islamists at all: Hamas is basically a protest movement against corruption. Given the right incentives, they can be drawn into the peace process. Sure, they say they will never recognize Israel, but that is what the PLO once said, and didn't they change their tune? Anyway, Hamas controls Gaza, so there can't be a real peace process×’€”a settlement of the big issues like Jerusalem, refugees, borders×’€”without bringing them into the tent. So let's sit down and talk to them, figure out what their grievances are×’€”no doubt, some of them are legitimate too. And let's get the process back on track.
Troubled by Hezbollah? Don't believe everything they say. They only pretend to be faithful to Iran's ayatollahs, and all their talk about "onwards to Jerusalem" is rhetoric for domestic consumption. What they really want is to earn the Shiites their rightful place in Lebanon, and improve the lot of their aggrieved sect. Engage them, dangle some carrots, give them a place at the table, and see how quickly they transform themselves from an armed militia into a peaceable political party.
And so on. There is a large industry out there, which has as its sole purpose the systematic downplaying of the risks posed by radical Islam. And in the best American tradition, these risks are repackaged as opportunities, under a new name. It could just as easily be called appeasement, but the public associates appeasement with high risk. So let's rename it engagement, which sounds low-risk--- after all, there's no harm in talking, right? And once the risk has been minimized, the possible pay-off is then inflated: if we engage with the Islamists, we will reap the reward in the form of a less tumultuous Middle East. Nuclear plans might be shelved, terror might wane, and peace might prevail.
The engagement package rests upon a key assumption: that these "radical" states, groups, and individuals are motivated by grievances. If only we were able to address or ameliorate those grievances, we could effectively domesticate just about every form of Islamism. Another assumption is that these grievances are finite--- that is, by ameliorating them, they will be diminished.
It is precisely here that advocates of "engagement" are concealing the risk. They do so in two ways. First, they distract us from the deep-down dimension of Islamism--- from the overarching narrative that drives all forms of Islamism. The narrative goes like this: the enemies of Islam--- America, Europe, the Christians, the Jews, Israel--- enjoy much more power than the believing Muslims do. But if we Muslim return to the faith, we can restore to ourselves the vast power we exercised in past, when Islam dominated the world as the West dominates it today. The Islamists believe that through faith--- exemplified by self-sacrifice and self-martyrdom--- they can put history in reverse.
Once this is understood, the second concealment of risk comes into focus. We are told that the demands of Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran are finite. If we give them a concession here, or a foothold there, we will have somehow diminished their demand for more concessions and footholds. But if their purpose is the reversal of history, then our gestures of accommodation, far from enticing them to give up their grand vision, only persuade them to press on. They understand our desire to engage them as a sign of weakness--- an attempt to appease them--- which is itself an enticement for them to push harder against us and our allies. And since they believe in their narrative of an empowered Islam with the fervency of religious conviction, no amount of insistence by us that we will go only so far and no further will stop them.
Our inability to estimate this risk derives in part from our unwillingness to give credence to religious conviction in politics. We are keen to recast Islamists in secular terms--- to see them as political parties, or reform movements, or interest groups. But what if Islamists are none of these things? What if they see themselves as soldiers of God, working his will in the world? How do you deal with someone who believes that a paradise awaits every jihadist "martyr," and that the existence of this paradise is as real and certain to him as the existence of a Sheraton Hotel in Chicago? Or that at any moment, the mahdi, the awaited one, could make a reappearance and usher in the end of days? How do we calculate that risk?
So what are the real risks posed by Islamic extremism? If I were preparing a prospectus for a potential investor in "engagement," or a warning label on possible side effects of "engagement," they would include these warnings:
With regards to Iran. The downside risk is that Iran will prolong "engagement" in such a way as to buy time for its nuclear program--- perhaps just the amount of time it needs to complete it. At the same time, it will use the fact of "engagement" with the United States to chisel away at the weak coalition of Arab states that the United States has cobbled together to contain Iran. If "engagement" is unconditionally offered, Iran will continue its subversive activities in Iraq and Lebanon until it receives some other massive concession. Indeed, it may even accelerate these activities, so as to demand a higher price for their cessation. If the United States stands its ground and "engagement" fails, many in the Middle East will automatically blame the United States, but by then, military options will be even less appealing than they are today.
In regards to Hamas. The downside risk is that "engagement"... will be the nail in the coffin of Mahmoud Abbas, and of any directly negotiated understandings between Israel and the Palestinians. It is true that Israelis and Palestinians aren't capable today of reaching a final status agreement. But the present situation in the West Bank allows for a degree of stability and cooperation. This is because Israel stands as the guarantor against Hamas subversion of the West Bank. "Engagement" with Hamas would weaken that guarantee, signal to Palestinians once again that terrorism pays, and validate and legitimate the anti-Semitic, racist rhetoric that emanates daily from the leaders and preachers of Hamas. It might do all this without bringing Israeli-Palestinian peace even one inch closer.
In regards to Hezbollah. The downside risk is that "engagement" will effectively concede control of Lebanon to an armed militia that constitutes a state within a state. It will undermine America's pretension to champion civil society and pluralism in the most diverse Arab state. It will constitute the final rout of the beleaguered democracy forces within Lebanon, which have been consistently pro-American. It will compound the unfortunate effects of the 2006 summer war, by seeming to acknowledge Hezbollah as the victor. And it might do all this without bringing about the disarming of a single Hezbollah terrorist, or the removal of a single Iranian-supplied missile from Lebanon.
...In the Middle East, the idea that "there's no harm in talking" is entirely incomprehensible. It matters whom you talk to, because you legitimize your interlocutors. Hence the Arab refusal to normalize relations with Israel. Remember the scene that unfolded this past summer, when Bashar Asad scrupulously avoided contact with Ehud Olmert on the same reviewing stand at a Mediterranean summit. An Arab head of state will never directly engage Israel before extracting every concession. Only an American would think of doing this at the outset, and in return for nothing: "unconditional talks" is a purely American concept, incomprehensible in the Middle East. There is harm in talking, if your talking legitimates your enemies, and persuades them and those on the sidelines that you have done so from weakness. For only the weak talk "unconditionally," which is tantamount to accepting the enemy's conditions. It is widely regarded as the prelude to unconditional surrender.
The United States cannot afford to roll the dice again in the Middle East, in the pious hope of winning it all. Chances are slim to nil that the United States is going to talk the Iranians, Hamas or Hezbollah out of their grand plan. Should that surprise us? We "engaged" before, with Yasser Arafat, and we know how that ended. We downplayed radical rhetoric before, with Osama bin Laden, and we know how that ended. We assumed we could talk people out of their passions in Iraq, and we know how that ended.
It is time to question risk-defying policies in the Middle East. The slogans of peace and democracy misled us. Let's not let the new slogan of engagement do the same. The United States is going to have to show the resolve and grit to wear and grind down adversaries, with soft power, hard power and will power. Paradoxically, that is the least risky path--- because if America persists, it will prevail.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Milestone in Baghdad
From the Washington Post, by Charles Krauthammer, Friday, December 05, 2008:
The barbarism in Mumbai and the economic crisis at home have largely overshadowed an otherwise singular event: the ratification of military and strategic cooperation agreements between Iraq and the United States.
They must not pass unnoted.
They were certainly noted by Iran, which fought fiercely to undermine the agreements. Tehran understood how a formal U.S.-Iraqi alliance endorsed by a broad Iraqi consensus expressed in a freely elected parliament changes the strategic balance in the region.
For the United States, this represents the single most important geopolitical advance in the region since Henry Kissinger turned Egypt from a Soviet client into an American ally. If we don't blow it with too hasty a withdrawal from Iraq, we will have turned a chronically destabilizing enemy state at the epicenter of the Arab Middle East into an ally.
...The only significant opposition bloc was the Sadrists, a mere 30 seats out of 275. The ostensibly pro-Iranian religious Shiite parties resisted Tehran's pressure and championed the agreement. As did the Kurds. The Sunnis put up the greatest fight. But their concern was that America would be withdrawing too soon, leaving them subject to overbearing and perhaps even vengeful Shiite dominance.
The Sunnis, who only a few years ago had boycotted provincial elections, bargained with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, trying to exploit his personal stake in agreements he himself had negotiated. They did not achieve their maximum objectives. But they did get formal legislative commitments for future consideration of their grievances, from amnesty to further relaxation of the de-Baathification laws.
That any of this democratic give-and-take should be happening in a peaceful parliament just two years after Iraq's descent into sectarian hell is in itself astonishing.
Nor is the setting of a withdrawal date terribly troubling. The deadline is almost entirely symbolic. U.S. troops must be out by Dec. 31, 2011 -- the weekend before the Iowa caucuses, which, because God is merciful, will arrive again only in the very fullness of time. Moreover, that date is not just distant but flexible. By treaty, it can be amended. If conditions on the ground warrant, it will be.
True, the war is not over. As Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly insists, our (belated) successes in Iraq are still fragile. There has already been an uptick in terror bombings, which will undoubtedly continue as what's left of al-Qaeda, the Sadrist militias and the Iranian-controlled "special groups" try to disrupt January's provincial elections.
The more long-term danger is that Iraq's reborn central government becomes too strong and, by military or parliamentary coup, the current democratic arrangements are dismantled by a renewed dictatorship that abrogates the alliance with the United States.
Such disasters are possible. But if our drawdown is conducted with the same acumen as was the surge, not probable. A self-sustaining, democratic and pro-American Iraq is within our reach. It would have two hugely important effects in the region.
First, it would constitute a major defeat for Tehran, the putative winner of the Iraq war, according to the smart set. Iran's client, Moqtada al-Sadr, still hiding in Iran, was visibly marginalized in parliament -- after being militarily humiliated in Basra and Baghdad by the new Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the major religious Shiite parties were the ones that negotiated, promoted and assured passage of the strategic alliance with the United States, against the most determined Iranian opposition.
Second is the regional effect of the new political entity on display in Baghdad -- a flawed yet functioning democratic polity with unprecedented free speech, free elections and freely competing parliamentary factions. For this to happen in the most important Arab country besides Egypt can, over time (over generational time, the time scale of the war on terror), alter the evolution of Arab society. It constitutes our best hope for the kind of fundamental political-cultural change in the Arab sphere that alone will bring about the defeat of Islamic extremism. After all, newly sovereign Iraq is today more engaged in the fight against Arab radicalism than any country on earth, save the United States -- with which, mirabile dictu,it has now thrown in its lot.
The barbarism in Mumbai and the economic crisis at home have largely overshadowed an otherwise singular event: the ratification of military and strategic cooperation agreements between Iraq and the United States.
They must not pass unnoted.
They were certainly noted by Iran, which fought fiercely to undermine the agreements. Tehran understood how a formal U.S.-Iraqi alliance endorsed by a broad Iraqi consensus expressed in a freely elected parliament changes the strategic balance in the region.
For the United States, this represents the single most important geopolitical advance in the region since Henry Kissinger turned Egypt from a Soviet client into an American ally. If we don't blow it with too hasty a withdrawal from Iraq, we will have turned a chronically destabilizing enemy state at the epicenter of the Arab Middle East into an ally.
...The only significant opposition bloc was the Sadrists, a mere 30 seats out of 275. The ostensibly pro-Iranian religious Shiite parties resisted Tehran's pressure and championed the agreement. As did the Kurds. The Sunnis put up the greatest fight. But their concern was that America would be withdrawing too soon, leaving them subject to overbearing and perhaps even vengeful Shiite dominance.
The Sunnis, who only a few years ago had boycotted provincial elections, bargained with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, trying to exploit his personal stake in agreements he himself had negotiated. They did not achieve their maximum objectives. But they did get formal legislative commitments for future consideration of their grievances, from amnesty to further relaxation of the de-Baathification laws.
That any of this democratic give-and-take should be happening in a peaceful parliament just two years after Iraq's descent into sectarian hell is in itself astonishing.
Nor is the setting of a withdrawal date terribly troubling. The deadline is almost entirely symbolic. U.S. troops must be out by Dec. 31, 2011 -- the weekend before the Iowa caucuses, which, because God is merciful, will arrive again only in the very fullness of time. Moreover, that date is not just distant but flexible. By treaty, it can be amended. If conditions on the ground warrant, it will be.
True, the war is not over. As Gen. David Petraeus repeatedly insists, our (belated) successes in Iraq are still fragile. There has already been an uptick in terror bombings, which will undoubtedly continue as what's left of al-Qaeda, the Sadrist militias and the Iranian-controlled "special groups" try to disrupt January's provincial elections.
The more long-term danger is that Iraq's reborn central government becomes too strong and, by military or parliamentary coup, the current democratic arrangements are dismantled by a renewed dictatorship that abrogates the alliance with the United States.
Such disasters are possible. But if our drawdown is conducted with the same acumen as was the surge, not probable. A self-sustaining, democratic and pro-American Iraq is within our reach. It would have two hugely important effects in the region.
First, it would constitute a major defeat for Tehran, the putative winner of the Iraq war, according to the smart set. Iran's client, Moqtada al-Sadr, still hiding in Iran, was visibly marginalized in parliament -- after being militarily humiliated in Basra and Baghdad by the new Iraqi security forces. Moreover, the major religious Shiite parties were the ones that negotiated, promoted and assured passage of the strategic alliance with the United States, against the most determined Iranian opposition.
Second is the regional effect of the new political entity on display in Baghdad -- a flawed yet functioning democratic polity with unprecedented free speech, free elections and freely competing parliamentary factions. For this to happen in the most important Arab country besides Egypt can, over time (over generational time, the time scale of the war on terror), alter the evolution of Arab society. It constitutes our best hope for the kind of fundamental political-cultural change in the Arab sphere that alone will bring about the defeat of Islamic extremism. After all, newly sovereign Iraq is today more engaged in the fight against Arab radicalism than any country on earth, save the United States -- with which, mirabile dictu,it has now thrown in its lot.
Monday, November 10, 2008
President Obama and the Middle East Challenge
Follow the link to a brief, but comprehensive analysis in the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives Papers No. 50, November 6, 2008 by Jonathan Rynhold, senior lecturer of political studies at Bar-Ilan University and a senior research associate at BESA. Brief excerpts:
Executive Summary
Barack Obama's general outlook on foreign policy is the opposite of George W. Bush's approach. He has enunciated a clear program for Middle East policy based on multilateralism and negotiations to deal with Iran, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In reality he will have to make tough choices about what to prioritize and do when other countries reject the US approach. The most important challenge he faces concerns Iran, rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict.
[The body of the paper includes brief, one paragraph statements on general Foreign Policy, Iraq, the War on terror, Iran, The Arab-Israeli Arena, Foreign Policy Appointments...Implications for Israel, etc]
.... Conclusion
Aside from his policy preferences, Obama's foreign policy will be dependent on his managerial and decision-making abilities. He is smart and has run a superb campaign, but he lacks experience. The real tests are yet to come, and given the volatility of the Middle East, they will come thick and fast. In such situations, ideologues can fall back on a set of assertions that provide a clear guide for resolving ambiguity; pragmatists have to be more analytical and pay attention to shifting realities.
The central challenge for Obama in the Middle East is neither democratization nor securing a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (though those are worthy long term objectives), but rather the maintenance of a stable pro-American balance of power in the region. First and foremost that means dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue.
Executive Summary
Barack Obama's general outlook on foreign policy is the opposite of George W. Bush's approach. He has enunciated a clear program for Middle East policy based on multilateralism and negotiations to deal with Iran, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict. In reality he will have to make tough choices about what to prioritize and do when other countries reject the US approach. The most important challenge he faces concerns Iran, rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict.
[The body of the paper includes brief, one paragraph statements on general Foreign Policy, Iraq, the War on terror, Iran, The Arab-Israeli Arena, Foreign Policy Appointments...Implications for Israel, etc]
.... Conclusion
Aside from his policy preferences, Obama's foreign policy will be dependent on his managerial and decision-making abilities. He is smart and has run a superb campaign, but he lacks experience. The real tests are yet to come, and given the volatility of the Middle East, they will come thick and fast. In such situations, ideologues can fall back on a set of assertions that provide a clear guide for resolving ambiguity; pragmatists have to be more analytical and pay attention to shifting realities.
The central challenge for Obama in the Middle East is neither democratization nor securing a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict (though those are worthy long term objectives), but rather the maintenance of a stable pro-American balance of power in the region. First and foremost that means dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue.
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
Syria raid killed terrorist leader
From the Miami Herald, Mon, Oct. 27, 2008, by JONATHAN S. LANDAY AND NANCY A. YOUSSEF:
A CIA-led raid on a compound in eastern Syria killed an al-Qaida in Iraq commander who oversaw the smuggling into Iraq of foreign fighters whose attacks claimed thousands of Iraqi and American lives, three U.S. officials said Monday.
The body of Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih, an Iraqi national who used the nom de guerre Abu Ghadiya, was flown out of Syria on a U.S. helicopter at the end of the operation Sunday by CIA paramilitary officers and special forces, one U.S. official said.
"It was a successful operation," a second U.S. official told McClatchy Newspapers. "The bottom line: This was a significant blow to the foreign fighter pipeline between Syria and Iraq."
...The three U.S. officials, who all spoke on the condition of anonymity because the operation was classified, declined to reveal other details of the raid. A CIA spokesman declined to comment.
..."He is the guy who produced the most prolific of the foreign fighters networks," said the first U.S. official, adding that the extremists he smuggled into Iraq were responsible for attacks that "killed thousands of Iraqis and our own U.S. forces."
On Feb. 28, the Treasury Department announced a freeze on any U.S. assets belonging to al-Mazidih and three of his associates, charging that they were smuggling "money, weapons, terrorists, and other resources through Syria to al Qaida in Iraq, including to (al-Qaida) commanders."
..."Badran obtained false passports for foreign terrorists, provided passports, weapons, guides, safe houses, and allowances to foreign terrorists in Syria and those preparing to cross the border into Iraq," it said. "As of the spring of 2007, Badran facilitated the movement of AQI operatives into Iraq via the Syrian border. Badran also directed another Syria-based AQI facilitator to provide safe haven and supplies to foreign fighters," the Treasury said. "This AQI facilitator, working directly for Badran, facilitated the movement of foreign fighters primarily from Gulf countries, through Syria into Iraq."
The Bush administration, which for years has expressed frustration over what it charges have been Syria's lackluster efforts to stop foreign Islamic fighters from crossing into Iraq, refused to publicly acknowledge the operation.
...Pentagon officials were tight-lipped about the operation. But they were quick to defend the decision to cross the border, with one saying that if nations that sponsor terrorist networks won't go after them, "we will."
...The Iraqi government defended the raid. Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said that Syria had refused to hand over foreign fighters who'd taken refuge there after killing 13 Iraqi border guards....
A CIA-led raid on a compound in eastern Syria killed an al-Qaida in Iraq commander who oversaw the smuggling into Iraq of foreign fighters whose attacks claimed thousands of Iraqi and American lives, three U.S. officials said Monday.
The body of Badran Turki Hishan al-Mazidih, an Iraqi national who used the nom de guerre Abu Ghadiya, was flown out of Syria on a U.S. helicopter at the end of the operation Sunday by CIA paramilitary officers and special forces, one U.S. official said.
"It was a successful operation," a second U.S. official told McClatchy Newspapers. "The bottom line: This was a significant blow to the foreign fighter pipeline between Syria and Iraq."
...The three U.S. officials, who all spoke on the condition of anonymity because the operation was classified, declined to reveal other details of the raid. A CIA spokesman declined to comment.
..."He is the guy who produced the most prolific of the foreign fighters networks," said the first U.S. official, adding that the extremists he smuggled into Iraq were responsible for attacks that "killed thousands of Iraqis and our own U.S. forces."
On Feb. 28, the Treasury Department announced a freeze on any U.S. assets belonging to al-Mazidih and three of his associates, charging that they were smuggling "money, weapons, terrorists, and other resources through Syria to al Qaida in Iraq, including to (al-Qaida) commanders."
..."Badran obtained false passports for foreign terrorists, provided passports, weapons, guides, safe houses, and allowances to foreign terrorists in Syria and those preparing to cross the border into Iraq," it said. "As of the spring of 2007, Badran facilitated the movement of AQI operatives into Iraq via the Syrian border. Badran also directed another Syria-based AQI facilitator to provide safe haven and supplies to foreign fighters," the Treasury said. "This AQI facilitator, working directly for Badran, facilitated the movement of foreign fighters primarily from Gulf countries, through Syria into Iraq."
The Bush administration, which for years has expressed frustration over what it charges have been Syria's lackluster efforts to stop foreign Islamic fighters from crossing into Iraq, refused to publicly acknowledge the operation.
...Pentagon officials were tight-lipped about the operation. But they were quick to defend the decision to cross the border, with one saying that if nations that sponsor terrorist networks won't go after them, "we will."
...The Iraqi government defended the raid. Government spokesman Ali al-Dabbagh said that Syria had refused to hand over foreign fighters who'd taken refuge there after killing 13 Iraqi border guards....
Wednesday, August 13, 2008
Iraq is getting better
From The Australian, Christopher Hitchens, columnist for Vanity Fair and Slate Magazine August 13, 2008:
... consider last week's astonishing report about the Iraqi budget surplus ... Largely attributable to the bonanza in oil prices, to new discoveries of oil since the eviction of Saddam Hussein and to the increasing success of Iraqi exports via the pipelines to Turkey, this surplus could amount to as much as $79 billion by the end of this year.
...may we take a moment to apologise to Paul Wolfowitz? Of all the many slanders hurled at this advocate for Iraq's liberation and former deputy secretary of defence, probably none was more gleefully bandied about than his congressional testimony that Iraq's recovery from decades of war and fascism could be self-financing.
... what used to happen to Iraq's oil wealth...[it] was prostituted through a UN program and diverted to such noble causes as the subsidy of suicide bombers in Gaza and the financing of pro-Saddam and "anti-war" politicians in London, Paris and Moscow.
While this criminal enrichment of Iraqi and overseas elites was taking place, the population of the country was living on garbage and drinking tainted water as a result of the UN-mandated international sanctions.
I think we should be glad that the luridly sadistic and aggressive Saddam regime is no longer in power to be the beneficiary of the rise in oil prices and thus able to share its wealth with the terrorists, crooks and demagogues on its secret payroll.
I think we should also be glad that its private ownership of Iraq's armed forces, and its control over a party monopoly called the Baath, has been irrecoverably smashed.
Iraq's resources are no longer at the disposal of an aggressive, parasitic oligarchy. Its retrained and re-equipped army is being deployed, not in wars of invasion against its neighbours and genocide against its inhabitants, but in cleanup campaigns against al-Qa'ida and the Mahdi Army. An improvement. A distinct improvement.
It is in no spirit of revenge that I remind you that, as little as a year ago, the whole of smart liberal opinion believed that the dissolution of Baathism and militarism had been a mistake, that Iraq itself was a bottomless pit of wasted dollars and pointless casualties and that the only option was to withdraw as fast as possible and let the inevitable civil war burn itself out.
To the left of that liberal consensus, people of the calibre and quality of Michael Moore were describing the nihilist "insurgents" as the moral equivalent of the Minutemen, and to the right of the same consensus, people such as Pat Buchanan were hinting that we had been cheated into the whole enterprise by a certain minority whose collective name began with the letter J.
Had any of this sinister nonsense been heeded, it wouldn't even be Saddam's goons who were getting their hands on that fantastic wealth in such a strategic country. It would have been the gruesome militias who answer either to fanatical Wahhabism on one wing or to fanatical Shiaism on another, and who are the instruments of tyrannical forces in neighbouring countries. Hardly a prospect to be viewed with indifference. I still reel when I remember how many supposedly responsible people advocated surrendering Iraq without a fight.
... If there is any Iraqi nostalgia for the old party and the old army, it is remarkably well-concealed. Iraq no longer plays deceptive games with weapons of mass destruction or plays host to international terrorist groups.
It is no longer subject to sanctions that punish its people and enrich its rulers. Its religious and ethnic minorities -- together a majority -- are no longer treated like disposable trash.
Its most bitter internal argument is about the timing of the next provincial and national elections.
Surely it is those who opposed every step of this emancipation, rather than those who advocated it, who should be asked to explain and justify themselves.
... consider last week's astonishing report about the Iraqi budget surplus ... Largely attributable to the bonanza in oil prices, to new discoveries of oil since the eviction of Saddam Hussein and to the increasing success of Iraqi exports via the pipelines to Turkey, this surplus could amount to as much as $79 billion by the end of this year.
...may we take a moment to apologise to Paul Wolfowitz? Of all the many slanders hurled at this advocate for Iraq's liberation and former deputy secretary of defence, probably none was more gleefully bandied about than his congressional testimony that Iraq's recovery from decades of war and fascism could be self-financing.
... what used to happen to Iraq's oil wealth...[it] was prostituted through a UN program and diverted to such noble causes as the subsidy of suicide bombers in Gaza and the financing of pro-Saddam and "anti-war" politicians in London, Paris and Moscow.
While this criminal enrichment of Iraqi and overseas elites was taking place, the population of the country was living on garbage and drinking tainted water as a result of the UN-mandated international sanctions.
I think we should be glad that the luridly sadistic and aggressive Saddam regime is no longer in power to be the beneficiary of the rise in oil prices and thus able to share its wealth with the terrorists, crooks and demagogues on its secret payroll.
I think we should also be glad that its private ownership of Iraq's armed forces, and its control over a party monopoly called the Baath, has been irrecoverably smashed.
Iraq's resources are no longer at the disposal of an aggressive, parasitic oligarchy. Its retrained and re-equipped army is being deployed, not in wars of invasion against its neighbours and genocide against its inhabitants, but in cleanup campaigns against al-Qa'ida and the Mahdi Army. An improvement. A distinct improvement.
It is in no spirit of revenge that I remind you that, as little as a year ago, the whole of smart liberal opinion believed that the dissolution of Baathism and militarism had been a mistake, that Iraq itself was a bottomless pit of wasted dollars and pointless casualties and that the only option was to withdraw as fast as possible and let the inevitable civil war burn itself out.
To the left of that liberal consensus, people of the calibre and quality of Michael Moore were describing the nihilist "insurgents" as the moral equivalent of the Minutemen, and to the right of the same consensus, people such as Pat Buchanan were hinting that we had been cheated into the whole enterprise by a certain minority whose collective name began with the letter J.
Had any of this sinister nonsense been heeded, it wouldn't even be Saddam's goons who were getting their hands on that fantastic wealth in such a strategic country. It would have been the gruesome militias who answer either to fanatical Wahhabism on one wing or to fanatical Shiaism on another, and who are the instruments of tyrannical forces in neighbouring countries. Hardly a prospect to be viewed with indifference. I still reel when I remember how many supposedly responsible people advocated surrendering Iraq without a fight.
... If there is any Iraqi nostalgia for the old party and the old army, it is remarkably well-concealed. Iraq no longer plays deceptive games with weapons of mass destruction or plays host to international terrorist groups.
It is no longer subject to sanctions that punish its people and enrich its rulers. Its religious and ethnic minorities -- together a majority -- are no longer treated like disposable trash.
Its most bitter internal argument is about the timing of the next provincial and national elections.
Surely it is those who opposed every step of this emancipation, rather than those who advocated it, who should be asked to explain and justify themselves.
Tuesday, August 12, 2008
Will Russia Get Away With It?
If you read nothing else this week, read this important analysis from The New York Times, August 11, 2008, by WILLIAM KRISTOL, Op-Ed Columnist (Posted in full, with my own emphasis added - SL):
In August 1924, the small nation of Georgia, occupied by Soviet Russia since 1921, rose up against Soviet rule. On Sept. 16, 1924, The Times of London reported on an appeal by the president of the Georgian Republic to the League of Nations. While “sympathetic reference to his country’s efforts was made” in the Assembly, the Times said, “it is realized that the League is incapable of rendering material aid, and that the moral influence which may be a powerful force with civilized countries is unlikely to make any impression upon Soviet Russia.”
“Unlikely” was an understatement. Georgians did not enjoy freedom again until 1991. Today, the Vladimir Putins and Hu Jintaos and Mahmoud Ahmadinejads of the world — to say nothing of their junior counterparts in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and North Korea — are no more likely than were Soviet leaders in 1924 to be swayed by “moral influence.”
Dictators aren’t moved by the claims of justice unarmed; aggressors aren’t intimidated by diplomacy absent the credible threat of force; fanatics aren’t deterred by the disapproval of men of moderation or refinement.
... 2008 has been, in one respect, an auspicious year for freedom and democracy. In Iraq, we and our Iraqi allies are on the verge of a strategic victory over the jihadists in what they have called the central front of their struggle. This joint victory has the potential to weaken the jihadist impulse throughout the Middle East.
On the other hand, the ability of Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas to get away with murder (literally), and above all the ability of Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions effectively unchecked, are setbacks for hopes of peace and progress.
And there is no evidence that China’s hosting of the Olympics has led to moderation of its authoritarianism. Meanwhile, Russia has sent troops and tanks across an international border, and now seems to be widening its war against Georgia more than its original — and in any case illegitimate — casus belli would justify.
Will the United States put real pressure on Russia to stop? In a news analysis on Sunday, the New York Times reporter Helene Cooper accurately captured what I gather is the prevailing view in our State Department: “While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.”
But Georgia, a nation of about 4.6 million, has had the third-largest military presence — about 2,000 troops — fighting along with U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraq. For this reason alone, we owe Georgia a serious effort to defend its sovereignty. Surely we cannot simply stand by as an autocratic aggressor gobbles up part of — and perhaps destabilizes all of — a friendly democratic nation that we were sponsoring for NATO membership a few months ago.
For that matter, consider the implications of our turning away from Georgia for other aspiring pro-Western governments in the neighborhood, like Ukraine’s. Shouldn’t we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?
Incidentally, has Russia really been helping much on Iran? It has gone along with — while delaying — three United Nations Security Council resolutions that have imposed mild sanctions on Iran. But it has also supplied material for Iran’s nuclear program, and is now selling Iran antiaircraft systems to protect military and nuclear installations.
It’s striking that dictatorial and aggressive and fanatical regimes — whatever their differences — seem happy to work together to weaken the influence of the United States and its democratic allies.
When the “civilized world” expostulated with Russia about Georgia in 1924, the Soviet regime was still weak. In Germany, Hitler was in jail. Only 16 years later, Britain stood virtually alone against a Nazi-Soviet axis.
Is it not true today, as it was in the 1920s and ’30s, that delay and irresolution on the part of the democracies simply invite future threats and graver dangers?
In August 1924, the small nation of Georgia, occupied by Soviet Russia since 1921, rose up against Soviet rule. On Sept. 16, 1924, The Times of London reported on an appeal by the president of the Georgian Republic to the League of Nations. While “sympathetic reference to his country’s efforts was made” in the Assembly, the Times said, “it is realized that the League is incapable of rendering material aid, and that the moral influence which may be a powerful force with civilized countries is unlikely to make any impression upon Soviet Russia.”
“Unlikely” was an understatement. Georgians did not enjoy freedom again until 1991. Today, the Vladimir Putins and Hu Jintaos and Mahmoud Ahmadinejads of the world — to say nothing of their junior counterparts in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe, Burma and North Korea — are no more likely than were Soviet leaders in 1924 to be swayed by “moral influence.”
Dictators aren’t moved by the claims of justice unarmed; aggressors aren’t intimidated by diplomacy absent the credible threat of force; fanatics aren’t deterred by the disapproval of men of moderation or refinement.
... 2008 has been, in one respect, an auspicious year for freedom and democracy. In Iraq, we and our Iraqi allies are on the verge of a strategic victory over the jihadists in what they have called the central front of their struggle. This joint victory has the potential to weaken the jihadist impulse throughout the Middle East.
On the other hand, the ability of Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas to get away with murder (literally), and above all the ability of Iran to pursue its nuclear ambitions effectively unchecked, are setbacks for hopes of peace and progress.
And there is no evidence that China’s hosting of the Olympics has led to moderation of its authoritarianism. Meanwhile, Russia has sent troops and tanks across an international border, and now seems to be widening its war against Georgia more than its original — and in any case illegitimate — casus belli would justify.
Will the United States put real pressure on Russia to stop? In a news analysis on Sunday, the New York Times reporter Helene Cooper accurately captured what I gather is the prevailing view in our State Department: “While America considers Georgia its strongest ally in the bloc of former Soviet countries, Washington needs Russia too much on big issues like Iran to risk it all to defend Georgia.”
But Georgia, a nation of about 4.6 million, has had the third-largest military presence — about 2,000 troops — fighting along with U.S. soldiers and marines in Iraq. For this reason alone, we owe Georgia a serious effort to defend its sovereignty. Surely we cannot simply stand by as an autocratic aggressor gobbles up part of — and perhaps destabilizes all of — a friendly democratic nation that we were sponsoring for NATO membership a few months ago.
For that matter, consider the implications of our turning away from Georgia for other aspiring pro-Western governments in the neighborhood, like Ukraine’s. Shouldn’t we therefore now insist that normal relations with Russia are impossible as long as the aggression continues, strongly reiterate our commitment to the territorial integrity of Georgia and Ukraine, and offer emergency military aid to Georgia?
Incidentally, has Russia really been helping much on Iran? It has gone along with — while delaying — three United Nations Security Council resolutions that have imposed mild sanctions on Iran. But it has also supplied material for Iran’s nuclear program, and is now selling Iran antiaircraft systems to protect military and nuclear installations.
It’s striking that dictatorial and aggressive and fanatical regimes — whatever their differences — seem happy to work together to weaken the influence of the United States and its democratic allies.
- So Russia helps Iran.
- Iran and North Korea help Syria.
- Russia and China block Security Council sanctions against Zimbabwe.
- China props up the regimes in Burma and North Korea.
When the “civilized world” expostulated with Russia about Georgia in 1924, the Soviet regime was still weak. In Germany, Hitler was in jail. Only 16 years later, Britain stood virtually alone against a Nazi-Soviet axis.
Is it not true today, as it was in the 1920s and ’30s, that delay and irresolution on the part of the democracies simply invite future threats and graver dangers?
Friday, May 23, 2008
Hope for Iraq
From a BESA Perspectives No. 43, May 21, 2008 by Max Singer* (brief excerpt only - follow the link for the full article):
Executive Summary
Opponents of the war in Iraq have long warned that the removal of Saddam Hussein would have two extremely negative consequences: that Iraqi Shiites would impose a radical religious regime on the country, and that Iran would effectively come to control the country. However, a dispassionate examination of the facts on the ground reveals that neither of these horrors has come to be. While the struggle is not yet over and these dangers exist, the likelihood of Iraq becoming radically religious or Iranian-dominated seems considerably lower than it did in 2003.
Background
From the beginning, the Bush Administration knew that the war in Iraq would be difficult, and the decision to launch the war was not easily taken. Administration officials were forced to choose between the risks of removing Saddam Hussein and the risks of leaving him in power.
Many experts warned that the Shia majority rule that would inevitably follow ...suppression of Kurds and Sunnis, and a new ally for international Shia power. ....
Basis for Fear
There are both real and exaggerated fears of Iranian domination of a Shia-led Iraqi government. Iraqi leaders such as Talabani, Chalabi, al Sadr, Maliki, and Hakim often meet with high-level Iranian leaders in Iran, and have generally refused to denounce Iran ...
...Iran's population is more than double that of Iraq, and it is led by an authoritarian government with a powerful, well-financed force of foreign agents, many of them operating inside Iraq. ....
Understanding Iranian Influence on Iraqi Leaders
On the other hand, one can dismiss many of these warning indicators. It is true that in effect many Iraqi players have kept a foot in both the Iraqi and Iranian camps ...
...Now, five years after the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein, after the creation of an Iraqi constitution and two elected Iraqi governments, and after the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, it is becoming increasingly clear that most of these leaders remain primarily loyal to Iraq. ...
.... A large number of Iraqi leaders will probably maintain significant relationships with the Iranian regime. A few will be almost completely compliant with the Iranians. Others will pay only perfunctory attention to Iranian attempts at influence. Most will be scattered along the spectrum of degree of Iranian influence.
Iranian Agents in Iraq
The Iranians have another source of power in Iraq. In addition to well-funded political agents, they support hundreds of armed agents, many in criminal gangs, especially in southern Iraq. ...
.... The gangs recently received a heavy blow in Basra and the south where the British had allowed them almost free rein, and they are not dominating the political scene in Baghdad.....
Iraqi Power
Thus far, the fears of Iranian domination are not materializing. In fact, it can reasonably be argued that the opposite is true: we are beginning to see signs of Iraqi Shiite independence and even blowback against the Iranians.
Led by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraqi Shiism (which theologically is traditional Shiism) is beginning to be considered as an alternative source of religious authority in Iran. A Shiite Iraq is beginning to look more like a rival to Iran than like an addition to Iranian Shia power.
Ayatollah Sistani was not willing to see Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his brief trip to Iraq in March 2008, and Iraqi demonstrations against Ahmadinejad kept him away from the Shiite holy city of Najaf.
While the fears of Iranian domination of Iraq are so far unrealized, the story is not yet over. In Iraq, as in most of the world, political leaders support those who they perceive will be the winner. Iran’s failure to dominate Iraq results from the expectation that Iraq will continue to be independent and protected by the US. If that expectation changes, and the common view becomes that Iran will be the dominant voice in the region, many Iraqis will pay more attention to Iranian suggestions.
This could result in an intensified struggle in Iraq and perhaps a drastic change in the current situation.
The other serious danger is deadlock in the Iraqi government, rendering it unable to carry out essential actions. The Iraqis – like the US when it first achieved independence – avoided the need to compromise by agreeing to act by consensus. This assured all parties that their interests would not be trampled on. However, a system in which nothing happens unless everyone agrees is vulnerable to deadlock. While this is still a danger, the confidence and respect that Maliki has gained by his initiative and success in Basra makes it more likely that Iraqi politicians will allow him enough freedom of action to limit harm from deadlock.
*Dr. Max Singer is Senior Fellow at both the Hudson Institute and at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He is also Research Director of the Institute for Zionist Strategies.
Executive Summary
Opponents of the war in Iraq have long warned that the removal of Saddam Hussein would have two extremely negative consequences: that Iraqi Shiites would impose a radical religious regime on the country, and that Iran would effectively come to control the country. However, a dispassionate examination of the facts on the ground reveals that neither of these horrors has come to be. While the struggle is not yet over and these dangers exist, the likelihood of Iraq becoming radically religious or Iranian-dominated seems considerably lower than it did in 2003.
Background
From the beginning, the Bush Administration knew that the war in Iraq would be difficult, and the decision to launch the war was not easily taken. Administration officials were forced to choose between the risks of removing Saddam Hussein and the risks of leaving him in power.
Many experts warned that the Shia majority rule that would inevitably follow ...suppression of Kurds and Sunnis, and a new ally for international Shia power. ....
Basis for Fear
There are both real and exaggerated fears of Iranian domination of a Shia-led Iraqi government. Iraqi leaders such as Talabani, Chalabi, al Sadr, Maliki, and Hakim often meet with high-level Iranian leaders in Iran, and have generally refused to denounce Iran ...
...Iran's population is more than double that of Iraq, and it is led by an authoritarian government with a powerful, well-financed force of foreign agents, many of them operating inside Iraq. ....
Understanding Iranian Influence on Iraqi Leaders
On the other hand, one can dismiss many of these warning indicators. It is true that in effect many Iraqi players have kept a foot in both the Iraqi and Iranian camps ...
...Now, five years after the liberation of Iraq from Saddam Hussein, after the creation of an Iraqi constitution and two elected Iraqi governments, and after the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq, it is becoming increasingly clear that most of these leaders remain primarily loyal to Iraq. ...
.... A large number of Iraqi leaders will probably maintain significant relationships with the Iranian regime. A few will be almost completely compliant with the Iranians. Others will pay only perfunctory attention to Iranian attempts at influence. Most will be scattered along the spectrum of degree of Iranian influence.
Iranian Agents in Iraq
The Iranians have another source of power in Iraq. In addition to well-funded political agents, they support hundreds of armed agents, many in criminal gangs, especially in southern Iraq. ...
.... The gangs recently received a heavy blow in Basra and the south where the British had allowed them almost free rein, and they are not dominating the political scene in Baghdad.....
Iraqi Power
Thus far, the fears of Iranian domination are not materializing. In fact, it can reasonably be argued that the opposite is true: we are beginning to see signs of Iraqi Shiite independence and even blowback against the Iranians.
Led by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraqi Shiism (which theologically is traditional Shiism) is beginning to be considered as an alternative source of religious authority in Iran. A Shiite Iraq is beginning to look more like a rival to Iran than like an addition to Iranian Shia power.
Ayatollah Sistani was not willing to see Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during his brief trip to Iraq in March 2008, and Iraqi demonstrations against Ahmadinejad kept him away from the Shiite holy city of Najaf.
While the fears of Iranian domination of Iraq are so far unrealized, the story is not yet over. In Iraq, as in most of the world, political leaders support those who they perceive will be the winner. Iran’s failure to dominate Iraq results from the expectation that Iraq will continue to be independent and protected by the US. If that expectation changes, and the common view becomes that Iran will be the dominant voice in the region, many Iraqis will pay more attention to Iranian suggestions.
This could result in an intensified struggle in Iraq and perhaps a drastic change in the current situation.
The other serious danger is deadlock in the Iraqi government, rendering it unable to carry out essential actions. The Iraqis – like the US when it first achieved independence – avoided the need to compromise by agreeing to act by consensus. This assured all parties that their interests would not be trampled on. However, a system in which nothing happens unless everyone agrees is vulnerable to deadlock. While this is still a danger, the confidence and respect that Maliki has gained by his initiative and success in Basra makes it more likely that Iraqi politicians will allow him enough freedom of action to limit harm from deadlock.
*Dr. Max Singer is Senior Fellow at both the Hudson Institute and at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He is also Research Director of the Institute for Zionist Strategies.
Saturday, April 12, 2008
Bush warns Iran
From The Wekend Australian, April 12, 2008, by Greg Sheridan, Foreign editor:
EVERY day it becomes clearer that one of the fundamental conflicts of Iraq, and of the broader Middle East, is between the US and Iran.
Now a new missile site has been discovered at which Iran is building ballistic missiles that could hit Europe. Soon enough, Iran will have nuclear weapons to put on those missiles.
This week, General David Petraeus, the commander of US troops in Iraq, and Ryan Crocker, Washington's ambassador in Baghdad, fingered Iran as supplying weapons, training, money and fighters to keep the conflict in Iraq boiling. Petraeus said that Iran's interference was the single biggest threat to the emergence of a democratic, viable Iraq.
Now US President George W.Bush has gone further. He has said that Iraq is the centre for two of the biggest threats the US will face this century - al-Qa'ida and Iran.
Bush warned Iran starkly. In an important speech, he said to Tehran that it had the choice of living with Iraq in peace, or it could keep funding and training militant groups that terrorise Iraqi people and destabilise the nation. If Iran makes the wrong choice, Bush said, then "America will act to protect our interests, and our troops, and our Iraqi partners".
Anybody who discounts a threat by Bush to use force is a fool. The Iranians should realise that there is still a serious threat of a US military strike on Iranian nuclear and missile facilities before the end of the Bush administration. Bush has shown he will use the power of his office to the full and will not be deterred from actions he believes are strategically necessary.
Almost no one in the US power structure supported the troop surge in Iraq - not Defence Secretary Robert Gates nor Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice nor the joint chiefs of staff.
Bush and Cheney supported it. And carried it out. And it worked.
The decline in violence in Iraq in recent months has had three causes - the surge, the so-called Sunni awakening in which Sunni groups, sometimes funded by the US, have turned against al-Qa'ida, and the ceasefire observed by Moqtada al-Sadr's militia.
It is that ceasefire which has partly broken down in recent weeks, and there is no doubt that the Iranians are fishing in troubled waters among the Shia militias.
Of course, whether Bush strikes Iran or not, the next US president will face the same fundamental clash of interests between the US and Iran. This conflict has a long way to go.
EVERY day it becomes clearer that one of the fundamental conflicts of Iraq, and of the broader Middle East, is between the US and Iran.
Now a new missile site has been discovered at which Iran is building ballistic missiles that could hit Europe. Soon enough, Iran will have nuclear weapons to put on those missiles.
This week, General David Petraeus, the commander of US troops in Iraq, and Ryan Crocker, Washington's ambassador in Baghdad, fingered Iran as supplying weapons, training, money and fighters to keep the conflict in Iraq boiling. Petraeus said that Iran's interference was the single biggest threat to the emergence of a democratic, viable Iraq.
Now US President George W.Bush has gone further. He has said that Iraq is the centre for two of the biggest threats the US will face this century - al-Qa'ida and Iran.
Bush warned Iran starkly. In an important speech, he said to Tehran that it had the choice of living with Iraq in peace, or it could keep funding and training militant groups that terrorise Iraqi people and destabilise the nation. If Iran makes the wrong choice, Bush said, then "America will act to protect our interests, and our troops, and our Iraqi partners".
Anybody who discounts a threat by Bush to use force is a fool. The Iranians should realise that there is still a serious threat of a US military strike on Iranian nuclear and missile facilities before the end of the Bush administration. Bush has shown he will use the power of his office to the full and will not be deterred from actions he believes are strategically necessary.
Almost no one in the US power structure supported the troop surge in Iraq - not Defence Secretary Robert Gates nor Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice nor the joint chiefs of staff.
Bush and Cheney supported it. And carried it out. And it worked.
The decline in violence in Iraq in recent months has had three causes - the surge, the so-called Sunni awakening in which Sunni groups, sometimes funded by the US, have turned against al-Qa'ida, and the ceasefire observed by Moqtada al-Sadr's militia.
It is that ceasefire which has partly broken down in recent weeks, and there is no doubt that the Iranians are fishing in troubled waters among the Shia militias.
Of course, whether Bush strikes Iran or not, the next US president will face the same fundamental clash of interests between the US and Iran. This conflict has a long way to go.
Thursday, February 28, 2008
This is no time for a celebrity in the Oval Office
From The Australian, by Greg Sheridan, Foreign Editor February 28, 2008:
....In terms of who would be best for Australia, there is a respectable case to be made for each remaining US presidential candidate: Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain.
The case for Obama rests on the fact that .... His is a candidacy of celebrity and identity.... and for a time the world probably would fall in love with president Obama.
At a deeper level, Obama's soaring rhetoric seems to serve no purpose beyond itself.....
... Obama does have a record and it places him generally on the Left of the Democratic Party, although he has often used centrist and sometimes even hawkish rhetoric. But his closest advisers all come from the Left of the party.
This is bad for Australia in four ways.
It has led Obama into protectionism, he campaigns against Clinton because her husband passed the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Second, the Left of the Democratic Party has no interest in Asia and can barely find it on a map.
Most important, Obama steadily increases the stridency of his opposition to US troops in Iraq.
Members of the Bush administration are worried that the Democratic primary has gone on so long. This has resulted in both Obama and Clinton appealing only to the Democratic base on the Left, and not yet tracking back to the centre.
Iraq has faded as an issue because the US strategy there is now working. There is a real chance the US could prevail in Iraq. ....But Obama, playing not least for the Hollywood Bush haters, has left little room to manoeuvre as president on Iraq. A sudden US withdrawal from Iraq could be catastrophic for the Middle East, and for US standing generally. Obama is all over the place on foreign policy. He has threatened to bomb Pakistan to kill terrorists (imagine if Bush or McCain had said such a thing) but also to journey to Tehran to fix a grand bargain with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His rhetoric on foreign policy, apart from Iraq, is scattered, which is a sure sign that he's never given the matter any serious thought.
Finally, the Left of the Democratic Party cares least for the military and for alliances. But the chief way Washington conceives of Australia is as an ally, and the chief US thinkers about us are the military.
The case for Clinton is a more modest version of Obama. ..... The world would be much less hostile to her than it is to Bush. Moreover, while she has tracked Obama on protectionism, she has not gone as far.... Similarly, though promising to withdraw from Iraq, she has left herself much more wriggle room. She is surrounded by the hawks and centrists of the Democratic Party: old friends of Australia of great competence such as Kurt Campbell and Martin Indyk. She has no natural affinity with Asia and little knowledge of it, but some of her closest advisers do.
In my view the best candidate from Australia's point of view is McCain. Like his close friend former deputy secretary of state Rich Armitage, McCain has a national security outlook which elevates allies to a central position. He knows Asia very intimately. Like almost all US Vietnam veterans he has close Australian friends and has visited Australia on numerous occasions. He has spoken to the Australian American Leadership Dialogue.
Because he has been such a fierce critic of the way the Bush administration initially mismanaged Iraq, and the war on terror more generally, he can plausibly represent significant brand change from Bush, while still being from the same party. ..... One reason McCain would be good for Australia is that he would stay strong in Iraq. He would not let the Middle East spin out of control.
So why do I think an Obama ascendancy could cause war in the Middle East? It's a simple calculation. Despite the recently released US National Intelligence Estimate that Iran is not working on nuclear weaponisation, no one seriously doubts that Iran is moving towards nuclear weapons. The NIE confirms it is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and missile capabilities. Weaponisation is the easiest bit of the process.
Many Israeli leaders say that a nuclear armed Iran represents an existential threat to Israel. If they really believe this, they have no alternative but to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. If they believe McCain will win, they will have faith that the Americans, one way or another, will try to handle the Iranians. If they believe Obama will win, they not only believe he definitely won't handle Iran effectively, but he might even stop them from doing so....
....The odds are against a US strike on Iran under any circumstances, and I would say the odds are even against an Israeli strike. But either or both are much more likely if it looks like Obama will win.
....In terms of who would be best for Australia, there is a respectable case to be made for each remaining US presidential candidate: Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain.
The case for Obama rests on the fact that .... His is a candidacy of celebrity and identity.... and for a time the world probably would fall in love with president Obama.
At a deeper level, Obama's soaring rhetoric seems to serve no purpose beyond itself.....
... Obama does have a record and it places him generally on the Left of the Democratic Party, although he has often used centrist and sometimes even hawkish rhetoric. But his closest advisers all come from the Left of the party.
This is bad for Australia in four ways.
It has led Obama into protectionism, he campaigns against Clinton because her husband passed the North American Free Trade Agreement.
Second, the Left of the Democratic Party has no interest in Asia and can barely find it on a map.
Most important, Obama steadily increases the stridency of his opposition to US troops in Iraq.
Members of the Bush administration are worried that the Democratic primary has gone on so long. This has resulted in both Obama and Clinton appealing only to the Democratic base on the Left, and not yet tracking back to the centre.
Iraq has faded as an issue because the US strategy there is now working. There is a real chance the US could prevail in Iraq. ....But Obama, playing not least for the Hollywood Bush haters, has left little room to manoeuvre as president on Iraq. A sudden US withdrawal from Iraq could be catastrophic for the Middle East, and for US standing generally. Obama is all over the place on foreign policy. He has threatened to bomb Pakistan to kill terrorists (imagine if Bush or McCain had said such a thing) but also to journey to Tehran to fix a grand bargain with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. His rhetoric on foreign policy, apart from Iraq, is scattered, which is a sure sign that he's never given the matter any serious thought.
Finally, the Left of the Democratic Party cares least for the military and for alliances. But the chief way Washington conceives of Australia is as an ally, and the chief US thinkers about us are the military.
The case for Clinton is a more modest version of Obama. ..... The world would be much less hostile to her than it is to Bush. Moreover, while she has tracked Obama on protectionism, she has not gone as far.... Similarly, though promising to withdraw from Iraq, she has left herself much more wriggle room. She is surrounded by the hawks and centrists of the Democratic Party: old friends of Australia of great competence such as Kurt Campbell and Martin Indyk. She has no natural affinity with Asia and little knowledge of it, but some of her closest advisers do.
In my view the best candidate from Australia's point of view is McCain. Like his close friend former deputy secretary of state Rich Armitage, McCain has a national security outlook which elevates allies to a central position. He knows Asia very intimately. Like almost all US Vietnam veterans he has close Australian friends and has visited Australia on numerous occasions. He has spoken to the Australian American Leadership Dialogue.
Because he has been such a fierce critic of the way the Bush administration initially mismanaged Iraq, and the war on terror more generally, he can plausibly represent significant brand change from Bush, while still being from the same party. ..... One reason McCain would be good for Australia is that he would stay strong in Iraq. He would not let the Middle East spin out of control.
So why do I think an Obama ascendancy could cause war in the Middle East? It's a simple calculation. Despite the recently released US National Intelligence Estimate that Iran is not working on nuclear weaponisation, no one seriously doubts that Iran is moving towards nuclear weapons. The NIE confirms it is continuing to pursue uranium enrichment and missile capabilities. Weaponisation is the easiest bit of the process.
Many Israeli leaders say that a nuclear armed Iran represents an existential threat to Israel. If they really believe this, they have no alternative but to strike Iran's nuclear facilities. If they believe McCain will win, they will have faith that the Americans, one way or another, will try to handle the Iranians. If they believe Obama will win, they not only believe he definitely won't handle Iran effectively, but he might even stop them from doing so....
....The odds are against a US strike on Iran under any circumstances, and I would say the odds are even against an Israeli strike. But either or both are much more likely if it looks like Obama will win.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
Fighting Fire with Fire
For a chilling, quick solution to Islamofacism follow the link to the MEMRI web site to see Sheik Ali Hatem Sleiman of the Al-Anbar Salvation Council pronounce: We Can Eradicate Al-Qaeda in Iraq within Two Months, but "Without Human Rights" ...
Sunday, February 10, 2008
al-Qaeda teaches Children to kidnap and kill
From The Times, February 7, 2008, by Martin Fletcher in Baghdad:
The boys look about 11 or 12, some even younger. .... The three-minute film shows the children — perhaps 20 in all — being taught to kidnap and assassinate at what appears to be an al-Qaeda training and indoctrination camp in the Iraqi countryside....
......Guided by adult trainers, they storm a house and capture the people sleeping on a floor inside. They brandish their weapons for the cameraman, recite Koranic verses and chant their support for al-Qaeda.
The US military released the chilling footage in Baghdad ....seized during a raid on December 4 on a suspected al-Qaeda base in Khan Bani Saad, north of Baghdad. Rear-Admiral Gregory Smith, a military spokesman, described it as a propaganda tool that would have been used to recruit more children.
....Admiral Smith and Major-General Mohammed al-Askari, an Iraqi army spokesman, said they were releasing the videos to highlight al-Qaeda’s growing use of woman and children and deepening depravity.
They were clearly seeking to build on the widespread disgust inspired by the terrorist group’s use of two mentally disabled women last Friday to attack two crowded pet markets in Baghdad, killing about 100 people. The explosives attached to the women were detonated remotely and they may not even have known what they were doing. They were also teenagers, the military said yesterday.
Admiral Smith produced figures to show al-Qaeda’s increasing use of women as suicide bombers in Iraq. He said that five had carried out suicide attacks before 2007 and ten since, with four of those this year alone.
He had no figures for child suicide bombers but at least two 15-year-old boys blew themselves up last month......
....“Al-Qaeda in Iraq wants to poison the next generation of Iraqis,” [Admiral Smith] said. “It is offering children as the new generation of mujahedeen . . . It’s a morally broke ideology that Iraqis have rejected and are fighting against to reclaim their homeland.”
General al-Askari said the growing use of women and children was a sign of desperation by al-Qaeda..... Al-Qaeda has been taken aback in the past few months, however, as thousands of ordinary Sunnis have turned on the terrorists and driven them out of large areas of western Iraq and Baghdad.....
Friday, December 28, 2007
What to watch in 2008
From GLORIA, by Barry Rubin*, December 23, 2007:
...2007 ...here are some of its significant trends which will continue to dominate the year to come.
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
This is the most important single Middle East event of 2007 because it is a clear, probably irreversible, shift in the balance of power. ...it is conceivable that Hamas will take over the West Bank within a few years and marginalize its rival. To Islamists, this is a great victory.
In fact, it is a disaster for Palestinians and Arabs.... A negotiated resolution of the Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and with it prospects for a Palestinian state, has been set back for decades.
...In years to come, struggles between Arab nationalists and Islamists, as well as between Sunnis and Shias, will dwarf the Arab-Israeli conflict. During 2008 we will have to assess whether the Palestinian Authority still ruling the West Bank can meet the Hamas challenge. (We already know it won't meet the diplomatic challenge but it will take all year for most Western politicians and much of the media to discover that.)
The military success of the U.S. surge in Iraq.
U.S. forces showed that pessimistic assessments were wrong and they were able to reduce the power of anti-government insurgents and lower the death toll in Iraq. However, this is a long way from winning the war.
During 2008 the two key questions will be whether U.S. troop withdrawals start in earnest and whether there is any political progress in bringing together Sunni and Shia communities in that country....
The Western failure to tighten sanctions substantially against Iran.
It was clear in 2007 that negotiations with Tehran would fail to deter Iran from its campaign to obtain nuclear weapons. Certainly, France, Britain and Germany were more willing to take--or at least to talk about taking--action but due to their own hesitations, plus resistance from Russia and China, very little happened.
The reaction to these events in Iran was mixed. On one hand, there was more worry about the pressures facing that country plus its own economic woes. On the other hand, the regime expressed more confidence that the West was chicken and that time and tide was on Iran's side.
In 2008 we will be able to see if Tehran's drive for nuclear weapons continues without serious hindrance. Equally, it will be possible to assess whether President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is being weakened by his factional opponents--especially in the March parliamentary elections--or tightening his hold on power and holding to his reckless course....
...Israel prospers.
Despite outdated talk of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's weakness, he used 2007 to rebuild his authority. Especially interesting, Israel's economic growth has been impressive; unemployment fallen to all-time lows. Revolutionary enthusiasm and paper victories still thrill the Arab world and Iran but material gains continue to be what is important.
The demoralization of Lebanon.
Worried that it is being abandoned by the West, forces supporting the moderate Lebanese government began to wonder if in fact Iran, Syria, and Hizballah would be able to reestablish their control over the country. A key element is the identity of the country's next president. In 2008, it will be important to watch how power shifts in Beirut and whether the investigation of Syrian involvement in terrorism against Lebanese opposition figures leads to an international tribunal.
France changes course.
President Francois Sarkozy has moved France away from the nationalistic effort to undercut the United States and appease radical regimes. Sarkozy, however, has played footsie with Syria and Libya. The question for 2008: Will he implement pledges to get tougher and will French institutions follow him in changing course?
*Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
...2007 ...here are some of its significant trends which will continue to dominate the year to come.
Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip.
This is the most important single Middle East event of 2007 because it is a clear, probably irreversible, shift in the balance of power. ...it is conceivable that Hamas will take over the West Bank within a few years and marginalize its rival. To Islamists, this is a great victory.
In fact, it is a disaster for Palestinians and Arabs.... A negotiated resolution of the Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and with it prospects for a Palestinian state, has been set back for decades.
...In years to come, struggles between Arab nationalists and Islamists, as well as between Sunnis and Shias, will dwarf the Arab-Israeli conflict. During 2008 we will have to assess whether the Palestinian Authority still ruling the West Bank can meet the Hamas challenge. (We already know it won't meet the diplomatic challenge but it will take all year for most Western politicians and much of the media to discover that.)
The military success of the U.S. surge in Iraq.
U.S. forces showed that pessimistic assessments were wrong and they were able to reduce the power of anti-government insurgents and lower the death toll in Iraq. However, this is a long way from winning the war.
During 2008 the two key questions will be whether U.S. troop withdrawals start in earnest and whether there is any political progress in bringing together Sunni and Shia communities in that country....
The Western failure to tighten sanctions substantially against Iran.
It was clear in 2007 that negotiations with Tehran would fail to deter Iran from its campaign to obtain nuclear weapons. Certainly, France, Britain and Germany were more willing to take--or at least to talk about taking--action but due to their own hesitations, plus resistance from Russia and China, very little happened.
The reaction to these events in Iran was mixed. On one hand, there was more worry about the pressures facing that country plus its own economic woes. On the other hand, the regime expressed more confidence that the West was chicken and that time and tide was on Iran's side.
In 2008 we will be able to see if Tehran's drive for nuclear weapons continues without serious hindrance. Equally, it will be possible to assess whether President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is being weakened by his factional opponents--especially in the March parliamentary elections--or tightening his hold on power and holding to his reckless course....
...Israel prospers.
Despite outdated talk of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's weakness, he used 2007 to rebuild his authority. Especially interesting, Israel's economic growth has been impressive; unemployment fallen to all-time lows. Revolutionary enthusiasm and paper victories still thrill the Arab world and Iran but material gains continue to be what is important.
The demoralization of Lebanon.
Worried that it is being abandoned by the West, forces supporting the moderate Lebanese government began to wonder if in fact Iran, Syria, and Hizballah would be able to reestablish their control over the country. A key element is the identity of the country's next president. In 2008, it will be important to watch how power shifts in Beirut and whether the investigation of Syrian involvement in terrorism against Lebanese opposition figures leads to an international tribunal.
France changes course.
President Francois Sarkozy has moved France away from the nationalistic effort to undercut the United States and appease radical regimes. Sarkozy, however, has played footsie with Syria and Libya. The question for 2008: Will he implement pledges to get tougher and will French institutions follow him in changing course?
*Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.
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