Thursday, August 24, 2006

Iran

From a 52-page report entitled IRAN, ITS NEIGHBOURS AND THE REGIONAL CRISES, sdited by Robert Lowe and Claire Spencer, has just been released by the Middle East Programme at Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs)....

Executive Summary
The Middle East is bedevilled by crises. The war between Hizbullah and Israel, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the instability in Iraq and the dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme create a climate of deep unease. Iran is involved in all these crises, to a greater or lesser degree, and its regional role is significant and growing. In applying pressure on Iran to cease support for Hizbullah, to refrain from hostility towards Israel, to resist meddling in Iraq and to abandon any thoughts of nuclear military capability, the United States hopes for the cooperation of Iran’s regional neighbours. However, Iran has successfully cultivated relations with its neighbours, even those Arab and Sunni states which fear its influence, and is in a position of considerable strength.

Iran is simply too important – for political, economic, cultural, religious and military reasons – to be treated lightly by any state in the Middle East or indeed Asia. The wars and continued weaknesses in Afghanistan and Iraq have further strengthened Iran, their most powerful immediate neighbour, which maintains significant involvement in its ‘near-abroad’. The US-driven agenda for confronting Iran is severely compromised by the confident ease with which Iran sits in its region.

Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology has recently dominated its relations with the Western powers, but not those with its regional neighbours. Understanding the dynamics of Iran’s relations with its neighbours helps explain why Iran feels able to resist Western pressure. While the US and Europeans slowly grind the nuclear issue through the mills of the IAEA and UN Security Council, Iran continues to prevaricate, feeling confident of victory as conditions turn ever more in its favour.

Iran’s domestic power structure is complex and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is only one of a number of players. His dramatic millenarian rhetoric attracts headlines, but the broader governing polity does share his robust conviction that Iran is the linchpin of a wide region and can maintain firm
independent positions.

Iran views Iraq as its own backyard and has now superseded the US as the most influential power there; this affords it a key role in Iraq’s future. Iran is also a prominent presence in its other war-torn neighbour with close social ties, Afghanistan. The Sunni Arab states of Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf are wary of Iran yet feel compelled by its strength to maintain largely cordial relations while Iran embarrasses their Western-leaning governments through its stance against the US.

Syria and Iran enjoy an especially close relationship, as most clearly seen in their alliance against the US and Israel, and support for Hizbullah. Iran’s relationship with Lebanon is long and intricate and the conflict between Israel and Hizbullah in July-August 2006 may be partly seen in the context of the broader struggle between Iran and the US/Israel. Israel certainly views Iran as its greatest threat and the tension between the two has increased.

The relationship between Iran and Turkey pivots between friendship and rivalry but Turkey favours good relations and the avoidance of further regional instability. Russia is a significant economic partner to Iran, is heavily involved in its nuclear programme, and tends to take the role of mediator at the international level.

The recent rapprochement between Iran and Pakistan remains ambiguous while Iran and India have notably improved ties, mostly on the basis of Indian energy needs. Energy security and economic ties also dominate Iran’s relations with China and Japan.

Introduction
There is little doubt that Iran has been the chief beneficiary of the war on terror in the Middle East. The United States, with Coalition support, has eliminated two of Iran’s regional rival governments – the Taliban in Afghanistan in November 2001 and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in April 2003 – but has failed to replace either with coherent and stable political structures. The outbreak of conflict on two fronts in June–July 2006 between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza, and Israel and Hizbullah in Lebanon has added to the regional dimensions of this instability.

Consequently, Iran has moved to fill the regional void with an apparent ease that has disturbed both regional players and the United States and its European allies. Iran is one of the most significant and powerful states in the region and its influence spreads well beyond its critical location at the nexus of the Middle East, Turkey, the Caucasus, Central Asia and South Asia. It is often viewed from a distant Western perspective or as the large and awkward non-Arab country dominating the eastern end of the Middle East. This report places Iran at the centre of its true neighbourhood and analyses its relations with key Asian and Eurasian states as well as with the Middle East. The strength of these relationships is a major factor in Iran’s self-confidence and regional power.....

An article in The Australian, 25/8/06, by Bronwen Maddox (of The Times) analyses the Chatham House report....

[The]... report from Chatham House...argues that the strength and complexity of Iran's links with Russia and its neighbours underpins its new confidence.

The report's most striking observation grabbed headlines yesterday, because of the embarrassment it implies for Britain's Tony Blair and US President George W.Bush.
Iran, it says, has been the "main beneficiary" of the Iraq war. But that is mainly because there is little competition for that title.

Iran has benefited, the authors say, because the US removed Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan, both hostile to Iran, and nothing much has filled the gap. Iran is now more influential in Iraq than the US.

The authors warn the US off conflict with Iran, lest it force the coalition to quit Iraq abruptly. They say the US's predicament in Iraq is why Iran seems so sure-footed in spinning out the nuclear saga to its advantage.

On the surface, Iran's response this week to an offer in June by the US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China for talks on Tehran's nuclear program was uncompromising. It gave no hint that it would suspend uranium enrichment, as the US and Britain insist. But it wrapped up its response in a bundle of counter-demands that have stalled the response.....it is playing hardball, ahead of the UN deadline of August 31 for it to stop the controversial work.

The ...report ......makes clear how Iran's confidence is rooted in its role as a regional power, and how hard it works at maintaining relations with other countries.

Russia and China are allies of expediency, the authors say. They are shrewd about Iran's complex relations with Turkey, and argue that "should Turkey's accession prospects (to the EU) be derailed, then Turkey is likely to pursue far more independent and nationalistic policies, including with regard to Iran".

The report is too dismissive of US and British accusations Iran is stirring the conflict in Iraq. It avoids judgment on whether Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons. It appears sympathetic to Iran but not to Ahmadinejad, in the way writers who call themselves "pro-American" take pains to say they are not pro-Bush.

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