From BESA Perspectives Papers on Current Affairs, Perspectives 40, March 26, 2008, by David M. Weinberg, director of public affairs at the BESA Center:
Executive Summary:
The newfangled "shelf agreement" concept which now serves as the basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is unworkable. The concept has no foundation in negotiation theory, especially in the history of Arab-Israeli negotiations. It incautiously assumes best case scenarios regarding the Palestinians which have no basis in reality; when in fact a durable "final status" agreement must anticipate all worst case scenarios. Furthermore, the historical record shows that even if Israel and the PA were to agree on a grand "endgame agreement," the Palestinians would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions as the price of implementation. Moreover, Israel inevitably would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on the needed governmental and security reforms even as the PA unilaterally proclaims statehood. Finally, the two-state paradigm on which the "shelf agreement" concept rests seems an anachronism in the wake of the Islamic takeover of Gaza. Thus, shelf agreement theory is strategically illogical and tactically ill-considered. A performance-based peace process remains the only sustainable model towards a durable final settlement.
The Shelf Agreement Concept
The new "shelf agreement" concept, advanced by US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert...is to negotiate an "agreement in principle" on an "endgame" solution with moderate Palestinians, but then place this agreement out of their reach – high up on a "shelf" where the Palestinians can see it, but not yet attain it. Only when the Palestinians have matured and fulfilled all their "implementation" obligations will the transcendent trophy come down off the shelf.
The negotiations are predicated upon the realization that Palestinian leaders currently are completely unable to deliver on any of their obligations under the "old" road map. Consequently, parties to the conflict are ignoring the messy here and now and instead turning their attentions to the political "horizon." In the context of shelf agreement theory, the parties seek to give the Palestinians a clear picture of the big prize awaiting them in the future (the "horizon")....
....All this makes for nice, but seriously flawed and completely untested, theory.
Erroneously Assuming Best Case Scenarios
To begin with, the shelf agreement negotiations assume best case scenarios regarding the intentions and capabilities of a future Palestinian state. .... Endgame talks ought to take into account all worst case scenarios....
.... how can Israel, for example, sign a sustainable endgame shelf agreement with workable border crossing arrangements if it does not know the character or capabilities of the future Palestinian entity....? ....To simply assume – as the current negotiations do – that the planned Palestinian state will have outstanding, professional, loyal and determined anti-terror fighting convictions, is to flirt with folly.
This is just one example. There are hundreds of similar matters that currently cannot be assessed, because Israel is negotiating against itself in a vacuum with a phantom Palestinian partner. Israel is seeking to will into existence a "moderate, stable, capable and democratic" Palestinian government – that does not yet have a foothold even in the in West Bank, not to mention Gaza.
Contrary to shelf agreement theory, it should be obvious that a final status agreement only can be negotiated the other way around: with a Palestinian partner that has proven its mettle over time. In the absence of this, it will be impossible to reach sustainable agreements even on "small ticket" technical matters – never mind the major issues.
Ignoring the Historical Record
Shelf agreement theory unhappily fails in a second critical area: it ignores the historical record. Experience attests that with the Palestinians, negotiations are never over.
Even if Israel and the PA were to grasp the fabled horizon, and royally set the grand "final status" agreement in a jeweled case high up on a shelf of honor – the Palestinians would not begin "implementation"; they would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions as the price of implementation.
For example, if Israel promises to forgo half of Jerusalem and dozens of Jewish towns in Judea and Samaria – it might still be expected to yield further concessions in order "to keep the process alive and the Palestinian moderates in power."
And thus, Washington and the world community will demand that Israel go beyond the "ultimate" sacrifices it already had made in order to secure the supposedly "final" shelf agreement.
In sum, there will be nothing "final" about an agreement with the Palestinians. They will "pocket" Israel's verbal and written concessions, then press for more as the price for "implementation" on their part, or as the price of "buying in" other Palestinian factions.....
A Disincentive for Implementation
...a shelf agreement would prove a disincentive to Palestinian implementation. The dynamic set in place by a shelf agreement would lead the Palestinians to "grab" statehood unilaterally and Israel would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on their implementation.
...How many times have "moderate" Palestinian governments promised to collect weapons, disband militias, arrest terrorists, reform government and educate for peace – yet failed to do so. Years later, Palestinian leaders make the same promises again in exchange for more Israeli concessions.....
....Only strong leaders, such as Begin and Sadat or Rabin and Hussein, can make the reciprocal concessions needed to reach a genuine peace agreement; and then successfully implement them. Abbas has no ability to withstand Hamas accusations of "treason" should he concede to Israel on anything significant....
The Gaza Conundrum
...Gaza has become a mini-Palestinian state unto its own, and it answers to no other Palestinian "Authority." ...the Hamas-Israel conflict inevitably will yet involve a significant military confrontation, a reality that will make Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement in the West Bank tenuous at best....
...Israelis have little incentive to offer "endgame" maximal concessions to a Palestinian Authority that does not control Gaza and cannot guarantee quiet on that front too.
Conclusion
...Contrary to the hopes of its inventors, a shelf agreement could be a disincentive to peace.
Of course, the maintenance of some sort of "peace process," no matter how flimsy, is beneficial to everybody in the Middle East.....
...However, Palestinian-Israeli relations have suffered enough from all kinds of failed experiments in negotiations. A performance-based peace process remains the only proven and sustainable model towards a durable final settlement. There is little choice but to tough it out the old-fashioned way: building confidence between the parties by measured, verifiable and concrete steps along a road map towards stability.
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