The next war

From Ynet, by Ron Ben-Yishai, 15/2/08:

Decision on major Gaza incursion already taken; preparations underway

...The political leadership has already decided to embark on a wide-scale military operation in the Gaza Strip. However, preparations have not yet been completed, which is why the operation is delayed. A limited group of ministers who are party to the decision, just like the IDF and Shin Bet, require more time in order to create the conditions that would ensure that the operation's objectives are achieved within a reasonable period of time. Good preparation, they believe, will minimize casualties among our forces, shorten the duration of the rocket counterattack to be delivered by Hamas at the start of the operation, and prevent undesirable developments on other fronts....

..... A significant part of the Second Lebanon War's failures stemmed from a negligent and unrealistic definition of the objectives of the military move, which started as an aerial operation and ended as war. This time around, the targets have already been defined, and they are clear. Some of them are tactical:
1. The facilitation of operational and intelligence-gathering freedom of action for the IDF and Shin Bet all across the Strip, as quickly as possible. This is a crucial basic condition for achieving the other objections.
2. A drastic reduction of rocket and mortar fire as quickly as possible.
3. Destruction of most military infrastructure, arms arsenal, and means of production. We are not only talking about Hamas infrastructure, but rather, also that of the other organizations and crime families.
4. Blocking the Philadelphi Route in a manner which would curb, by at least 60%, smuggling into and out of the Strip.
5. Avoiding, as much as is possible, harming Palestinian civilians who are not involved in the fighting, and the prevention of a humanitarian crisis.

The strategic objectives are as follows:
1. Removing Hamas from power and establishing a stable Palestinian regime in the Gaza Strip, with international monitoring and assistance.
2. Demilitarizing the Strip for an extended period of time in terms of rockets and the infrastructure to produce such weapons.
3. Effective Israeli security and monitoring for years to come of crossings into the Strip, including Philadelphi (either independently or through an agreement with the Palestinians, the Egyptians, and international monitoring parties.)

In order to achieve this ambitious list of objectives, or at least most of it, Israel must secure the "operational environment." Simply put, Israel must create, in advance, international understanding and backing for the Gaza campaign and elicit the willingness (of NATO or other international parties) to by party to the agreement to follow in its wake, which would enable the IDF to exit Gaza. This matter is an important component in the preparations ahead of the campaign. Another important condition for success is to prevent escalation on other fronts during the fighting.

Hizbullah and its patron, Iran, may attempt to open a second front in the north, in order to mitigate the pressure on Hamas. Both of them, as well as Syria, must be made to understand in advance, in an unequivocal manner, that any intervention on their part may cost them dearly. The IDF must also prepare for a terror wave in the West Bank; meanwhile, the police must prepare for possible riots among Israel's Arabs.

In addition, we must prepare for the possibility of Hamas attempting to organize mass marches of civilians towards Israel's borders and within the Strip.

Heavy barrages in first 2 weeks
In order to address all of the above, large forces (including reservists and police) must be prepared in advance, in a manner that would enable them to quickly join the fighting or prevent massive riots. Plenty of diverse equipment should also be prepared in order to handle riots.

Once the military operation starts, this equipment must already be waiting at regional warehouses near possible trouble spots, or even in the possession of the forces. The home front must be prepared as well. Western Negev residents will surely have to sustain heavy Qassam and mortar barrages in the first week or two (in a good case scenario.) But they are not the only ones who must be ready – residents on the Lebanese border and even south of it must be ready for rocket barrages...

....Operation Defensive Shield was followed by other operations and two years passed before the number of attacks was drastically reduced. In Gaza, should all go well, it would take much less time. Yet we must not expect instant results. To that end, the Israeli public and politicians must show all the restraint and patience they are able to draw on. The public must also internalize the realization that a Gaza campaign would exact a human toll and an economic price.

We can draw encouragement from the fact that the preparations undertaken these days by the IDF and Shin Bet, and also on the diplomatic front, are being undertaken thoroughly and secretly.....

...It has already been proven that the more thorough the preparation process, the more successful and smooth the operation tends to be. Let's hope that this rule will also apply to the upcoming major Gaza campaign.