[This article was published by GLORIA in the current June edition of their Journal MERIA, but is particularly relevant in the increasing US political environment leading up to mid-term elections.]
Iraq is most likely to see a protracted internal war and economic difficulties for years to come. A mildly optimistic scenario is possible but so are some outcomes that would be destabilizing for the region, unpleasant for Iraq, and detrimental for U.S. interests.
Iraq's difficulties are disappointing to the Iraqi people, who so hoped that the American invasion would at least mean a return to peace after 23 years of war and near-war. The violent insurgency now raging is not likely to end any time soon; neither the government nor the insurgents are strong enough to win a decisive victory. Instead, the war is likely to continue for some years, and--especially if the forces behind the current government prevail--the fighting is likely to phase down rather than to end abruptly.
The interesting question to ask is what will be the situation five to ten years from now, for that is a time frame long enough that one or the other side could have become strong enough to prevail. It is possible that by then, modest democratic forces will have prevailed. Yet the most likely future is that Iraq will remain a weak and fragile society challenged by an insurgency. However, it is also possible that an Islamist state will emerge. Also, there is always the outside chance Iraq will split apart.
[The article then describes several scenarios in some detail:
- A MODERATELY DEMOCRATIC REGIME
- THE STATUS QUO: A WEAK AND FRAGILE STATE CHALLENGED BY INSURGENCY
- ISLAMIST TAKEOVER (Insurgent Victory or [more likely] Islamist Takeover of the New Government Institutions)
- A DIVIDED IRAQ (several alternative scenarios) ]
IRAQ'S NEW PROBLEMS--AND ITS OLD ONES
In our concern about the instability from a weak central government in Iraq, we would do well to bear in mind that the alternative of a strong central government has been the main problem in modern Iraqi history....The oil income allows a ruler to create a powerful state bureaucracy--including security services that repress the people and an army that threatens regional stability.....
When Iraq is so weak and divided, it may seem perverse to worry about the old problem of too powerful a central state, but consider the implications of a successful suppression of the current insurgency. Such success will come only if the United States trains and equips an Iraqi military that is incomparably stronger than that of other Arab states or Iran--a military hardened by battle, well versed in American military ethos..... No wonder some of Iraq's neighbors would not mind if Iraq's central government were threatened by separatist forces that kept Iraq preoccupied.
The challenge is to find a way for Iraq to function well with a weak central government, presumably through a federal system with powerful regional and local governments. It would be a grave error to embrace some new savior on horseback who promises to bring stability by restoring all power to Baghdad. That might solve our current concerns, but at the expense of bringing a worse future for Iraqis, who would be the first victims of totalitarian tendencies, and for the region, which would suffer from the overweening ambitions of any Iraqi strongman.
CONCLUSION
The prospects for Iraq are not particularly attractive. The most likely attainable outcomes would still leave a weak and divided society, not just a fragile government. ...... there is little prospect that for many, many decades to come Iraq will be able to recover the same position relative to its neighbors that it had when Saddam came to power. His rule effectively ruined Iraq's chances for regional leadership for a century.
That is the best case. Much worse cases are quite possible. Most troubling for the international community is the situation in which Iraq becomes once again a source of regional instability, this time due to unrest, terrorism, and communitarian violence spilling over from Iraq onto its neighbors. It is striking how little Iraq's neighbors are doing to counter such a threat. Indeed, Syria and most especially Iran are feeding the flames that may one day engulf them.
The difficult situation in Iraq was almost certainly made worse by errors in the U.S.-led occupation. That said, the fundamental cause of the problems is the social destruction during Saddam's days, which drove Iraqis to seek security in elemental communal structures of sect and ethnic group. Saddam hollowed the government and the other social institutions of the Iraqi middle class. He empowered radicals of many sorts, including in his last decade intolerant Islamists. No matter how his rule ended, Iraq would have been a mess afterwards.
[For a wealth of analysis from the IDC in Herziliya go to MERIA HOMEPAGE. For the current issue contents with links to all articles and back issues follow this link. For back issues go to MERIA Journal Previous Issues]
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