The declared US
objective is to punish Assad for the use of chemical weapons and to deter him
from further use of these weapons. Undeclared but no less important American
goals would be to
- damage the Syrian president’s sense of security;
- bring about an end to the slaughter, including the “conventional” slaughter; and
- bring about an end to the civil war.
In order to promote
these goals, President Obama should restore the deterrent power of the United
States. The President, who announced a red line that if crossed would generate
a response, has avoided acting until now. American restraint has strengthened
Assad’s sense of security and encouraged him to expand the scope of his
operations against the rebels and his attacks against innocent civilians. This
restraint has also strengthened the assessment in Moscow that supporting Assad
demonstrates to the world Russia's loyalty to its allies and its principles, in
contrast to the United States, which allegedly abandons its allies and
hesitates to stand up for its principles.
A very important
American interest is to weaken the radical axis – Iran, Syria, and Hizbollah –
which negates American values and interests. The American aversion to an
operation encouraged Hizbollah to intervene in Syria, and this intervention
succeeded in changing the momentum in the Syrian civil war in Assad’s favor.
Western vacillation has strengthened both Russia, which continues to support
the Assad regime, and the jihadi organizations, which have grown stronger while
the United States has failed to act. The organizations that have remained the
weakest are actually the pro-Western secular organizations, which are vital to
Syria's ability to establish a liberal, democratic regime the day after Assad
falls. It is an American interest to attempt to change the momentum in favor of
these organizations.
Weakening the
Tehran-Damascus-Beirut axis and the jihadi organizations would also reduce the
fear of undermining stability along Syria’s borders with Turkey, Jordan, and
Israel, all US allies in the region. Indeed, the continued current trend toward
instability could lead to an expansion of the cycle of violence in other states
in the region.
Tension sometimes
exists between a state's moral obligation and its interests, but for the United
States there is no such tension regarding Syria. From a moral perspective, the
fact that Assad’s army’s carried out a large scale attack with chemical weapons
clearly cannot be ignored. This is not an isolated case, but merely
continuation of a policy that does not shy away from slaughtering civilians
through the massive use of inaccurate and destructive weapons, including
chemical weapons. This policy has cost the lives of over 100,000 people thus
far and has turned millions of Syrian citizens into refugees. American
vacillation in response to the massacres has only increased Assad's brazenness.
Rebel organizations have also become more daring as Assad has expanded his acts
of slaughter.
At this time, there
is no military option that could immediately stop the slaughter in Syria, force
Assad to leave, and ensure a moderate, democratic regime. Therefore, all the
existing options, including continuation of American restraint, are less than
optimal, if not poor. Yet given the understanding that a lack of action is a
very bad strategy – it is not moral and it harms American interests – what
constitutes the best of the bad strategies?
...there
are six strategies other than an all-out attack a la Iraq in 2003. General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discussed these options
in a letter to Congressman Eliot Engel on August 19, 2013, two days before
the chemical attack in Damascus...
... What follows is a brief analysis of each of the options.
... What follows is a brief analysis of each of the options.
1. “What was, is what
will be,”
i.e.., increased training and armaments for the rebels. This involves training
for rebel forces outside of Syria, aid in establishing an effective chain of
command, and transferring a significant amount of weaponry while incurring the
risk that the advanced weaponry reaches terrorist organizations in Syria.
President Obama has already declared that the United States will arm the
rebels. While the United States has not yet fully implemented this policy, even
full implementation will not at this stage be a convincing sign of change in
American policy and the determination of the United States to change the
balance of power in Syria. Although this strategy could have been appropriate
until several weeks ago, it does not provide an appropriate response at this
point, specifically, after the latest chemical attack.
2. A pinpoint “punitive”
attack.
The attack would be limited in scope, localized, and of short duration,
targeting the units that took part in the recent chemical attack, military
targets, or regime assets. This option would constitute a change in US policy
and strengthen American credibility, but its chances of restoring US deterrent
power are slim. This localized retribution would not change the reality in
Syria in a significant way. It has the ability to prevent large scale use of
chemical weapons, such as what took place on August 21, 2013, but it is
doubtful that if would have an impact on Assad’s considerations regarding the
continued massacre of his people.
4. Demilitarized zones near the border with
Turkey and Jordan and humanitarian corridors. The goal here is to create a
haven for the civilian population and reduce the scope of the slaughter in
Syria, with the possibility of creating humanitarian aid corridors for people
already wounded. Like the previous alternative, this requires ongoing
maintenance and requires the entry of ground forces. If this option is chosen,
the forces maintaining the demilitarized zones and humanitarian corridors would
not be American. Turkish soldiers would maintain the corridors near the border
with Turkey and Jordanian soldiers would maintain the areas near the border
with Jordan. Cooperation with moderate organizations associated with the rebels
can also help maintain the areas within Syria.
5. A prolonged aerial attack against critical regime assets that allow Assad to conduct the fighting against the rebels, such as headquarters and weapons bases. In this type of large scale attack, it would be possible to attack ground, air, and naval forces as well as advanced weaponry. This is an option that would impact on the balance of power between Assad and the rebels and convey a message of American resolve that could undermine the regime's sense of security. This option, which involves direct American involvement in the Syrian civil war and places Assad in a new and difficult position, involves a relatively high risk of sucking the United States into the civil war.
6. Gaining control and destroying chemical weapons in Syria. This is the most direct option against the threat that Assad will use chemical weapons again or that the rebels will resort to this tactic. However, seizing and destroying the stores of chemical weapons in Syria’s possession is an operation requiring the use of special forces in Syria for a prolonged period until all of the chemical material has been destroyed. In this scenario, there is a risk that a small quantity of chemical weapons would reach hostile elements. Therefore, before this option is used, there should be an examination of how possible it is to reduce the use of chemical weapons by strengthening US deterrent power through one of the other options, and it should be made clear that the United States is determined to act in the event of further use of chemical weapons.
Policy
Recommendations
An analysis of the
relevant options available to President Obama indicates the need for a strategy
combining the third, fourth, and fifth alternatives toward direct, gradual US
intervention. This strategy, beyond punishing Assad, would change the rules of the
game in Syria and deter the regime from further use of chemical
weapons.
A strategy of combined, gradual intervention would include an attack on selected strategic targets as punishment for the chemical attack in the Damascus suburbs and declaration of a no-fly zone. In a second step, the United States could also declare demilitarized zones and humanitarian corridors and attack a number of regime assets if Assad escalates his response.
A strategy of combined, gradual intervention would include an attack on selected strategic targets as punishment for the chemical attack in the Damascus suburbs and declaration of a no-fly zone. In a second step, the United States could also declare demilitarized zones and humanitarian corridors and attack a number of regime assets if Assad escalates his response.
The
Obama administration has designed a national security policy that initiates
intervention only when the supreme national interest is at risk and there is as
broad legitimacy as possible. It appears that Washington's assessment is that
Assad’s recent actions threaten the supreme American interest. The
administration should promote a joint military action in the broadest possible
framework in the Security Council. If vetoed by Russia, the United States
should involve its own allies in the region – Turkey, which has already
announced its support for a US action, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and Israel,
with the possibility of also involving Egypt in order to improve relations
between the states.
American planning should also include a diplomatic response to Russian opposition and readiness to deter Iran and Hizbollah from expanding the battlefield.
Such a US military action would not resolve the Syrian conflict, but it is the least problematic of the bad options.
Together with an initiative for a political settlement, it could very likely promote the strategic goals of replacing the Assad regime, inflicting defeat on the radical camp, restoring American deterrence and credibility toward Iran, and strengthening US alliances in the Middle East.
American planning should also include a diplomatic response to Russian opposition and readiness to deter Iran and Hizbollah from expanding the battlefield.
Such a US military action would not resolve the Syrian conflict, but it is the least problematic of the bad options.
Together with an initiative for a political settlement, it could very likely promote the strategic goals of replacing the Assad regime, inflicting defeat on the radical camp, restoring American deterrence and credibility toward Iran, and strengthening US alliances in the Middle East.
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