From GLORIA (IDC, Herzliya, by Cameron S. Brown (A version of this article was published in Hebrew in Ha'aretz on September 10, 2006) [emphasis added]...
Even before the fighting ended, many in Israel and abroad were convinced that the strategic position of Hizballah and its sponsors in Tehran and Damascus will improve following the war.
Going even further, the well-known columnist Charles Krauthammer claimed that Israel's failure to flatten Hizballah decisively could lead to a reduction in Israel's value in the eyes of American policymakers.
A deeper examination, however, makes it clear that the opposite is true: After investing billions of dollars in the organization over the past two decades, Hizballah has lost its strategic value for Iran. Moreover, Iran will now have to multiply its investment 10-20 times in order simply to hold onto the support of Lebanon's Shi'a.
The key to understanding the new strategic environment is to realize that Hizballah is no longer able to play the crucial role Iran had hoped should the United States or Israel strike Iran's nuclear program. As a senior Iranian source told the Arabic daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat last April, one key element in Iran's attempt to deter such a strike was the threat of thousands of rockets falling on northern Israel in retaliation. Yet, if such an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities takes place in the next year, Hizballah will find its hands tied. As recent reports inside Lebanon have made clear, if Lebanon is dragged into another war with Israel anytime soon, such a development would be extremely unpopular inside Lebanon, and could drastically undermine Hizballah's shaky position there. Hizballah's opponents would use the opportunity to press their claim that Hizballah is simply an Iranian proxy--a claim Hasan Nasrallah tried strenuously to deny in his speeches during the war.
If Hizballah cannot be part of Iran's response--or even pester Israel along the border for fear that it could lead to renewed war--then Iran has invested billions of dollars on an organization that can no longer provide it with material benefits. This is especially important now because, while until today Iran could support Hizballah for a mere $100-200 million per year, it will now have to sink billions of dollars over the next few years on reconstruction efforts. (And these billions do not even include the investment in rearming Hizballah.) Yet if Iran should fail to rebuild people's homes, even Lebanon's Shi'a population will become resentful for having been abandoned by its patron.
Even if willing to concede that Iran has lost the material benefits of its ally, many would argue that Iran's "soft power" in Lebanon and the broader Arab world has been bolstered following Hizballah's supposed victory in this recent war. Yet, here again, a deeper examination leads us to see that the opposite may be the case.
First, it is important to remember that even if Hizballah were to single-handedly destroy the State of Israel, neither it nor Iran will ever gain significant influence in non-Shi'a sectors of Lebanon. On the one hand, this is because no Christian or Druze wants to live in the mullah-run theocracy Hizballah advocates. On the other hand, even those few Sunnis in Lebanon who do dream of an Islamist-run government would never agree to have a Shi'a leader rule such a regime, as Sunni tolerance for "heretical" Shi'ism is minimal even in the best of times.
Indeed, this is exactly what happened after Israel's pullout from South Lebanon. Despite the willingness of many in Lebanon to wave Hizballah's flag immediately after, almost no one outside of the Shi'a community voted for the party in any of the national or local elections held since. This wariness is even more acutely felt regarding Iran. With Lebanese nationalists still battling the remnants of Syrian influence, few in Lebanon want to see Iran take Syria's place. The Lebanese are sick and tired of being other people's satellite.
Second, looking at the region as a whole, despite the temporary boost in popularity for Iran and Syria amongst the masses, this war actually convinced many of the Sunni regimes that they must act to balance Iran. For the first time since 1988, an anti-Iranian alliance emerged, led by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Having become convinced of Iran's threatening nature, it is entirely possible these countries will start lobbying side-by-side with the United States for the imposition of sanctions on Iran if it does not give up its nuclear weapons program.
Even if Hizballah performed impressively against Israel, given these changes in the strategic environment, it is hard to see what Iran actually gained from this war.
Cameron S. Brown is the Deputy Director of the GLORIA Center, a research center at the Interdisciplinary Center University in Herzliya, Israel.
No comments:
Post a Comment