- Israel is not better off strategically than it was at the beginning of the war; this in itself is a Hizballah victory. Israel must prepare to win the next round decisively.
- The IDF knew that Hizballah could not be defeated without a major ground operation: its plan did not fail - it was never implemented. The failure was primarily of leadership: only go to war with clear objectives and the determination to prevail.
- The IDF ostensibly applied the initially brilliant U.S. strategy in Iraq - an aerial blitz against military targets and civil infrastructure, to crush the Iraqi system, followed by a decisive ground offensive. In reality, Israel did not launch the follow-on ground operation and, except for transportation, did not target Lebanon's infrastructure either.
- Israel must adopt and aggressively implement a realistic deterrent posture, with clear "red lines." Hizballah attacks, even attempts to redeploy, should cause an immediate and overwhelming response. Israel, not Hizballah, must have escalation dominance.
- Lebanese and international forces will do little to ensure security and will end up as a cover for ongoing Hizballah operations, hampering Israel's freedom of movement. Hizballah will neither disarm nor redeploy from the south. Another round is likely.
- The West Bank consolidation is now virtually dead and with it any prospects for the "peace process." Only a serious, dramatic Arab initiative can save it. Once again, the Palestinians and their radical allies have been their own worst enemy.
- Iran remains the primary issue - imagine this war just a few years from now: a nuclear umbrella for Hizballah, threats to Israel's existence, an international crisis. The good news: Iran exposed its Hizballah deterrent prematurely; Israel learned it can survive Hizballah rocket attacks, an important lesson if Iran is attacked in the future; the world was given a "wake-up call."
- A revitalized U.S.-Israel strategic dialogue is more vital than ever.
... Israel is not better off strategically than it was at the beginning of the war. ...Israel must face up to reality, draw the appropriate conclusions, make the best of a bad situation, and now seek to turn adversity into long-term advantage. This analysis looks at how the current situation evolved, and possible future steps.
The IDF's Plan Was Never Implemented
... The IDF's plan did not fail - it was never implemented. ...Ostensibly, the IDF followed an approach similar to the brilliant U.S. military strategy of the early days of the 2003 Iraq War - a massive aerial blitz against both military targets and the civil infrastructure... immediately followed by a rapid ground offensive to deliver the decisive blow. In fact, Israel not only failed to launch the follow-on ground operation, but did not truly apply the aerial blitz model either. With the exception of a handful of targets, mostly in the opening days of the war, the only "civil infrastructure" Israel targeted was the transportation system. The power (electrical, gas, gasoline), communications, media, and governmental system were all left untouched. ...
Secure Enough to be Risk-Adverse
Over the years, Israel has become secure enough to become risk-adverse... In the past, when Israel's strategic circumstances were even more constrained, every possible setback was considered an unacceptable loss in a zero sum game and Israel was willing to pay almost any price to prevail. This is no longer the case, and the government's careful and mature approach was justified, but was taken too far, leading to indecision and even paralysis.
Forgetting the "Powell Doctrine"
Israel's primary mistake was the failure to learn the lessons of the "Powell Doctrine," formulated by former U.S. Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell, who identified three essential preconditions for entering a war: establishing clear, attainable objectives, with a defined exit strategy; applying overwhelming force in the pursuit thereof; and ensuring public support. Of these, Israel had only public support, with the government failing to heed the clear lessons of Vietnam, Lebanon 1982, and Iraq today - either play to win or not at all......
Imagine if Iran Had Nukes ...
No Unilateral West Bank Withdrawal
.... it is abundantly clear that the IDF will have to remain deployed in the West Bank for years, for defensive purposes, even if the settlements are dismantled. The Palestinians, with Hizballah's gracious help, will have succeeded once again in being their own worst enemy.
Radicals Ascendant in the Middle East
.... Following the U.S. failure in Iraq and Israel's in Lebanon....[has led to] to a greatly reemboldened radical camp. Iran, Syria, Hizballah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, the insurgents in Iraq and others, will all become even more convinced of their ability to stand up to both the "Great" and "Little Satan," and to promote WMD capabilities and terror in the pursuit of their extremist ideologies. The radicals' and fundamentalists' power will increase, as will the threat to the stability of moderate Arab regimes. With the death of the peace process and hopes for regional reform, the "bad, old" Middle East will truly be back, whose internal dysfunctions will pose an even greater threat to international security.
The Road Forward.... Escalation Dominance
....Israel must now adopt a realistic deterrent posture, with clear "red lines," and aggressively implement it in practice, at the risk of renewed hostilities. Hizballah attempts to redeploy in the security zone, not to mention actual attacks, should result in immediate and overwhelming Israeli responses and a willingness to further escalate, as needed. Israel, not Hizballah, must dominate the escalation cycle.
Lebanon's civil infrastructure should no longer be out of bounds. Israel should create a new strategic equation: If Hizballah persists in targeting Israel's civilian population, Israel will respond, not by hitting Lebanese civilians, but by gradually attacking the civil infrastructure - power plants, communications, and media.
The criterion for renewed and expanded military action has to be efficacy, not artificial territorial delineations, such as the Litani River. This may require a far broader operation, with all of the attendant consequences.
A Robust International Force?
... there should be few illusions regarding the actual efficacy of this force. No international force will even attempt to do what Israel has tried to do: confront Hizballah, put an end to its cross border operations, and prevent rockets from being fired overhead, as well as implement UN resolutions calling for its disarmament. The Shiite-dominated Lebanese army will, in all likelihood, do little, if anything, to ensure security in the south and, together, the two forces will probably end up serving as a cover for ongoing Hizballah operations, merely hampering Israel's future freedom of operation. Moreover, Hizballah will do everything in its power to erode the morale and efficacy of these forces; indeed, it has already begun doing so, even prior to their actual deployment....
A Revitalized U.S.-Israeli Strategic Dialogue
The U.S. and Israel maintain intensive, ongoing consultations at all levels and on virtually all issues. Talks, however, are often more in the form of an exchange of information....It is time for a far broader and more in-depth policy exchange at both senior political and bureaucratic levels. Existing strategic fora, such as the JPMG (Joint Politico-Military Group), must be given new life, infused with a truly substantive policy approach, and conducted at more senior levels.
It is more urgent than ever that the two sides agree, or at least fully explore, the strategic options open to them on Iran. On this issue, neither side can afford the failed assessments, expectations, and outcome of the war in Lebanon.
Greater joint attention, including funding, will have to be devoted to the development of weapons systems and tactics for dealing with the new form of asymmetric warfare posed by Hizballah in Lebanon and the insurgents in Iraq.....
.... An effective U.S. attempt to promote such an idea is now essential.
[Summary and exerpts only; follow the link for the full article.]
Dr. Chuck Freilich, formerly Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser, is now a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government.
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