Is a Sustainable Cease-Fire in Lebanon Realistic? If Not, What is the Alternative?

From the JCPA Institute for Contemporary Affairs, founded jointly with the Wechsler Family Foundation, JERUSALEM ISSUE BRIEF, Vol. 6, No. 5, 30 July 2006, by Gerald M. Steinberg* [introduction only, follow this link to the full article] ...

• As intense discussions continue on the terms of a "sustainable cease-fire" and a "robust international force" that would end the latest war in Lebanon and prevent renewed conflict, many of the elements suggested appear highly unrealistic.
• All of the elements envisioned in such a framework are highly problematic, to understate the case. Without realistic mechanisms for long-term implementation, a temporary cease-fire would quickly be exploited by Hizballah, Syria, and Iran in preparation for the next round of attacks against Israel.
• As a result, in parallel to the formal negotiations, the Israeli government should explore a regime based on clearly defined "red lines" which Israel will enforce unilaterally until Lebanese and international mechanisms are shown to be reliable.
• These measures include Israeli military action to destroy weapons shipments to Hizballah, prevent the return of terrorists to the border area, and halt the construction by Hizballah of military fortifications.
• The main Hizballah leaders, including Hassan Nasrallah, should be isolated in a manner similar to Israel's policy with respect to PLO leader Yassir Arafat until his death.
  

The Issues Involved in Preventing Renewed Conflict
While there is a great deal of talk about a "sustainable cease-fire" that would end the latest war in Lebanon and prevent renewed conflict, the complexities of implementation are formidable. The parameters include:

• Strengthening the Lebanese state and weakening the role of Hizballah as an independent armed force.
• Blocking the ability of Hizballah to import and deploy missiles and other weapons from Syria and Iran, and construct protected concrete bunkers and fortifications.
• Limiting the status and operational capabilities of the Hizballah leadership, particularly Hassan Nasrallah.
• Formulating the parameters, mission statement, and terms of engagement for a "robust international force."
• Evaluating the composition and credibility of this force to implement the terms of any agreement.
• Setting the terms and conditions for the release of kidnapped Israeli soldiers.
• Evaluating the impact of any territorial dimensions (such as the claim to the "Shabaa farms").

All of the elements envisioned in such a framework are highly problematic, to understate the case. Without realistic mechanisms for long-term implementation, a temporary cease-fire would quickly be exploited by Hizballah, Syria, and Iran in preparation for the next round of attacks against Israel. This analysis examines the details and likely limitations of the formal proposals under discussion, and explores the parameters of an alternative approach based on unilateral Israeli policies.....

[The above is an introduction only. Follow this link to the full article]

* Gerald M. Steinberg, a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is a Professor of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University where he directs the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation. He is also the editor of NGO Monitor.