'Israeli drone strike' kills 5 terrorists in Egypt

..

An air strike has reportedly killed several Egyptian militants in Sinai. Source: AAP

   
SEVERAL Egyptian [terrorists] have been killed in an air strike in Sinai as they prepared to launch a rocket into Israel, security sources and witnesses say.

The origin of the strike was not immediately clear.
Some sources spoke of an Israeli air strike conducted from Israeli air space and others credited the Egyptian military.
Two senior Egyptian security officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said an Israeli drone strike inside Egypt killed five suspected Islamic [terrorists] and destroyed a rocket launcher on Friday.
The officials said the Israeli attack was in co-operation with Egyptian authorities.
The Egyptian officials said that the drone had been flying over the site of the attack since Friday morning...
State media said at least five members of a [terrorist] cell led by local Islamist [terrorists] were killed in the raid.
Earlier, Egypt's army said two explosions were heard at around 4:15pm in the al-Ojra area, three kilometres from the border with Israel...
Israel's military on Thursday ordered the cancellation of all flights in and out of the Red Sea resort of Eilat, which borders Egypt, due to what is said was a security threat.
Last month, Israel deployed a battery of its Iron Dome missile defence system near Eilat, which has been a target of attacks in the past...

Who disspossessed whom???

From JPost, Thursday Aug 08, 2013, by Lyn Julius:

 

Cairo's Tahrir Square is once more in the news: revolution and counter-revolution, protest and put-down.  But some issues never capture the headlines: for instance, did you know that at least 13 villas and public buildings around [Tahrir] square  (including the present Swiss, German, Canadian, Russian, US, Korean, Bahraini and Algerian embassies) were once the residences of wealthy Jews - properties seized by the Egyptian state?

 

 

The Jewish settlement of Ofra (Wikipedia)

 

Together with humbler properties owned by Egypt's 80,000-strong Jewish community - itself now on the verge of extinction - these grand residences stand as silent witnesses to mass dispossession. The Jewish owners never received compensation and were summarily expelled in the 1950s.

 

A feature about the Tahrir Square embassies appeared in the Hebrew press on the day that, in order to force Israel to make concessions for peace, the EU announced it was banning co-operation with Israeli institutions that operate beyond the 'pre-1967 borders' – the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The EU regards these territories as ‘Arab land’. 

 

With its anti-settlement policy, the EU is sending a clear signal that it is acceptable for the Arab states, goaded by the Palestinian leadership, to 'ethnically cleanse' the Jewish population of the so-called Palestinian territories,  the Middle East and North Africa, but that Jews living a few meters beyond the 1948 armistice lines are obstacles to peace. 

 

The idea that the territories beyond the Green Line should be Jew-free received a ringing endorsement from Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas just as US secretary of state John Kerry sat Israelis and Palestinians down to peace talks in Washington DC. Not a single Israeli would be allowed in a Palestinian state, Abbas announced.

 

Like the Palestinians, the EU assumes that the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are ‘Arab land.’   But nothing is ever that simple in the Middle East. Land ownership is a tangled web, although that's a point not often made by the Israeli government. 

 

The Golan Heights are almost universally considered 'Syrian' territory and yet the Jewish National Fund lays claim to 73,974 dunams in southern Syria. The earliest purchase was made in the 1880s. 

 

Similarly, land ownership in Jerusalem and the 'West Bank' is far more complex than the EU thinks. The 'Jewish settlements' north of Jerusalem, Atarot and Neve Yaakov, were evacuated in 1948. Mount Scopus - technically in 'Arab' East Jerusalem - remained a Jewish enclave in Jordanian-controlled territory. 

 

It is also little known that hundreds of thousands of Arab squatters in 'Arab East Jerusalem' live on land still owned by the Jewish National Fund. The JNF purchased hundreds of individual parcels of land in and around Jerusalem during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s. In 1948, on one of these parcels the UN built the Kalandia refugee camp. The Deheishe  refugee camp south of Bethlehem was also built on JNF land.

 

In the 1920s and 30s Iraqi and Iranian Jews queued up to buy parcels of JNF land; after the 1948 war, they  were cut off from their purchases when these came under Jordanian rule, as Gil Zohar explained in his 2007 Jerusalem Post piece.  In total 145,976 dunams (I dunam = 1,000 sq. m) of Jewish land is said to have come under Jordanian control. (Jewish property claims against Arab countries by Michael Fischbach, p 85).

 

In Abu Dis, the site of the putative Palestinian parliament, some 598 dunams of land are actually Jewish-owned as even Palestinian organisations acknowledge. 

During the 1920s and 30s the ‘Agudat HaDayarim’ Jewish Cooperative Society was established in Jerusalem in order to create Jewish neighbourhoods outside  the Old City. The Society had over 210 members, from all walks of life and ethnic backgrounds - including Persian, Iraqi and Yemenite Jews.  In 1928 the Aguda purchased 598 dunams of land on the city outskirts in Abu Dis  in order to build a ‘Garden Community’ (homes with agricultural plots). Although it acquired a legal title to the area, the Arab revolts of 1929 and 1936-9 prevented the Aguda from establishing the new community.  The War of Independence resulted in the Jewish-owned lands in Abu Dis coming under the control of the Jordanian Custodian of Enemy Property. 

Another 16,684.421 dunams of Jewish land in the rural West Bank - including the Gush Etzion settlements, land between Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm, and in Bethlehem and Hebron - were seized by the Jordanians after 1948. 

 

Even before 1948, riots and massacres caused Jews of the centuries-old Yishuv to evacuate their homes in Hebron and parts of Jerusalem.

 

Before it fell to the Arab Legion in 1948, Jerusalem had a Jewish majority. The first refugees from eastern Jerusalem were Jews from the Shimon Hatzaddik quarter - the site of the tomb of Simon the High Priest. The Old City of Jerusalem became 'judenrein' as thousands of Jews were expelled, leaving their property behind. The Old City was ransacked and some 58 synagogues were destroyed during the 19-year Jordanian occupation. Jews were banned from their holiest places.

 

There is a respectable body of  opinion which argues that most Israeli settlements are legal. Even if Israel were to agree that the Jewish settlements stigmatized by the EU are illegal under international law, the proportion of land 'built on Arab land' in the West Bank represents a tiny fraction of the Jewish-owned land abandoned or seized as a matter of deliberate policy in Arab countries.

  

 The issue of Jewish settlements has to be seen in the context of the mass exchange of land and population between Jews and Arabs  across the entire region.

 

The status quo represents an exchange far more favourable to Arabs than to Jews. According to economist Sidney Zabludoff, the Jewish refugees – 75 percent of whom resettled in Israel - lost assets worth twice as much as those abandoned by Palestinian refugees.

 

On the macro-level, the World Organization of Jews from Arab Countries estimates that Jews living in Arab countries owned some 100,000 sq km of deeded property, equivalent to four or five times the size of Israel  itself. 

 

Many cities in the 'Arab' Middle East and North Africa had large Jewish populations. Baghdad was a quarter Jewish. Within a generation, the Jewish population of the Arab world will have been ‘cleansed’ out of existence.

 

Evidently, private ownership of property does not equate to sovereignty. But many people – the EU included - assume that areas inhabited in Jerusalem and the ‘West Bank’ by a majority of Arabs - regardless of whether they established that majority at the expense of Jews - should naturally come under Arab sovereignty. Organisations like J-Street and Yachad are willing to fight for Arab squatters’ rights; you would be hard-pressed to find any human rights group or NGO prepared to campaign for Jewish property rights.

 

The suggestion is never considered that the attacking parties in the 1967 war - Syria and Jordan - should be made to forfeit territory as the price for their aggression. No Arab state has been held to account for ‘ethnically cleansing’ their innocent Jewish citizens whom they branded, from1948 onwards, as ‘members of the minority of Palestine’. Instead, the Arab states have pocketed the spoils. It goes without saying that no Arab government has paid out any compensation for lost Jewish property.

 

Israel is expected to make all the concessions.

 

 East  Jerusalem was annexed to Israel; some Jews have recovered their properties, and settlements predating 1948 have been re-established since the ‘West Bank’ came under Israeli control. But those Jews who purchased parcels of land in East Jerusalem and its periphery have not been allowed to recover lands purchased from the JNF.

 

The reason is that these come under the jurisdiction of the 'Jordanian Custodian for Enemy Property' .

 

The irony is that the Sephardi and Mizrahi Jews among them are screwed twice over: by the Arab states, who forced them to become refugees and dispossessed them of their original dwellings in Arab countries - be these mansions in Tahrir Square or rather more modest abodes ; and by Israel, which, in compliance with international law, will not, as a general rule, allow Jewish-owned lands beyond the Green Line  to revert to their original owners until a final peace settlement is signed.

 

In all the discussion of ‘Jewish settlements’ the international community has a decontextualised and distorted idea of just who has dispossessed whom - and the Israeli government is not exactly helping to enlighten them.

Religion and Rule in Saudi Arabia

From Future Directions International, Wednesday, 07 August 2013, by Gustavo Mendiolaza, Research Analyst,  Indian Ocean Research Programme:

 

The recent sentencing of a Saudi blogger, Raif Badawi, has once again sparked concerns about human rights in Saudi Arabia. On a political level, it has highlighted the shifting attitudes of young people in Saudi Arabia in questioning religion and theocracy.

Background
On 29 July, a sentence of 600 lashes and seven years imprisonment was given to Raif Badawi, on charges of insulting Islam through electronic channels. The lashes will be administered over a period of weeks or months. In a country that still practices amputation, stoning, beheading, eye-gouging and various other methods of punishment, the recent sentence against Badawi is still seen as excessive. Nevertheless, as the members of the Saudi royal family grow older, with few clear plans for succession, these sentences are a principal tool used to limit dissenting civic opinion.
Comment
The House of Saud, and King Abdullah in particular, face two pertinent problems that need to be addressed. The first is the succession process for the throne, as the agnatic seniority system has created a pool of potential candidates, but few are less than 70 years of age and many closer to 80. The second issue is the young people in the population, who have, in recent years, due in large part to globalisation, begun to question the legitimacy of the monarchical system. Though Saudi Arabia successfully navigated the Arab Spring that washed over the region in 2010-11, its government and societal structures mirror many of those in the countries that were affected.
Consequently, the combination of these two factors has produced significant internal problems for Riyadh. One of the principal critiques made by Badawi in his blog commented on the role of religion in Saudi Arabia and was highly critical of senior Saudi Islamic figures. That role has remained a key issue in recent years, as the young people become increasingly exposed to Western culture, through both foreign workers and the media. The end result is that the young people, those most affected by societal inequality, have questioned the legitimacy of the Islamic system enforced in Saudi Arabia.
For King Abdullah, addressing these matters has been no easy task. The Saudi legal system and its government are based on a strict application of Islamic Law. Questioning the legitimacy of the system, as Badawi has done, is likely to increase in the years to come, as the heavy-handed approach by the government loses touch with the changing population dynamic. Until now, Riyadh has been able to keep a lid on the boiling pot, through large government revenues that have provided education and work placements for many thousands of Saudi nationals. Oil revenues are expected to decline over the next decade, due to diminishing exports. This raises the question of how the al Saud house will maintain stability in the future.
A fortunate aspect for King Abdullah is that Arab monarchies seem to be significantly harder to overthrow than military despots. Therefore, we do not expect to see a level of revolution in Saudi Arabia comparable to that in Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Egypt. In the years to come, however, there will be more calls by the youth of Saudi Arabia questioning the legitimacy of the state and its Islamic doctrine. The direction that King Abdullah and his successors take in the matter will very much dictate whether Saudi Arabia can compete with the more dynamic states on its periphery, such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar and, in the long run, perhaps Egypt.
Raif Badawi is representative of a growing segment of Saudi society that seeks change to the existing order. His sentence of seven years imprisonment and 600 lashes highlights the seriousness with which Saudi Arabia, throughout its government, demands stability. With King Abdullah having celebrated his eighty-ninth birthday on 1 August, change may happen sooner rather than later. Addressing these concerns should be a priority for the King, before the haphazard succession process occurs.

HAMAS IN CRISIS: ISOLATION AND INTERNAL STRIFE

From an ANALYSIS OF NEAR EASTPOLICY FROM THE SCHOLARS AND ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, PolicyWatch 2111, July 30, 2013, by Ehud Yaari*:

A serial loss of regional allies, serious financial difficulties, internal squabbling, and inability to build up its military capabilities have all weakened Hamas, leaving it vulnerable to potential unrest in Gaza.

As Hamas voices raise predictable objections to the just-announced resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks, the group is in the throes of one of its most testing crises ever. Over the past year, all of its major pillars of support have eroded to one degree or another, while internally, the movement is split by acute policy differences. Concerned that their grip on power in Gaza may be at risk in the foreseeable future, many in the group's top echelon are pushing for immediate measures to mobilize local public opinion as a means of confronting potential challenges, and to repair fraying relations with Iran and other allies.

REVERSAL IN EGYPT
The latest and most painful loss for Hamas came next door in Egypt, where President Muhammad Morsi was ousted and the group's parent movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, was defeated in the struggle for power. Hamas viewed the Brotherhood's rise in Egypt as a great asset, enjoying close relations with its leaders in Cairo and forging a de facto alliance with the group.

For example, top Brotherhood figure Khairat al-Shater -- a millionaire now imprisoned by the military -- made significant financial donations to the Gaza government, while Morsi allowed Hamas to open offices in Cairo and permitted several of its leaders (e.g., Mousa Abu Marzouk) to establish residency there. Egypt also opened its Rafah border terminal in a much more generous manner than ever before. More broadly, Hamas saw the Brotherhood-led Egypt as a guarantor of its hold on Gaza, a deterrent against Israel, an ally against the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and a potential new sponsor in its bid to join the regional rise of political Islam.

Egypt's June 30 revolution brought a quick reversal, however. The new authorities in Cairo now treat Hamas as a hostile adversary, accusing it of undermining Egypt's stability and fomenting rapid security deterioration in the Sinai Peninsula. The Egyptian military has practically sealed the border with Gaza, limiting the Rafah crossing to intermittent, minimal capacity and effectively closing the hundreds of smuggling tunnels through which Hamas acquired many of Gaza's necessary goods (e.g., cars, cement, fuel). And for the first time since Hamas took control of the strip, Egyptian helicopters are gathering intelligence over Gaza's southern sector after receiving a quiet nod from Israel.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian media has adopted a fiery anti-Hamas tone, even spreading stories about the group collaborating with the Brotherhood to attack soldiers in the Sinai. For its part, Hamas claims that PA president Mahmoud Abbas ordered his intelligence officials to smear the group by providing Egypt with false documents. To prove its case, Hamas presented purportedly intercepted memos from the PA's Preventive Security service. Such tensions may grow if Morsi is belatedly indicted for arranging the 2011 Wadi Natrun prison break, in which armed Hamas operatives allegedly raided the facility and helped him and other detainees escape, killing several Egyptian security personnel in the process.

OTHER REGIONAL RIFTS
The loss of Egypt followed other important setbacks for the group, largely caused by the position it has taken on Syria's civil war. By siding with the uprising against the Assad regime, Hamas was forced to evacuate its large headquarters in Damascus, and Syria severed all ties with the group.

Next came a rift with Hezbollah, after Hamas leaders joined the wave of Sunni criticism over the Shiite militia's intervention in Syria this spring. Some Hamas commanders in charge of military cooperation between the two organizations were ordered to leave Hezbollah's stronghold in Beirut, and all bilateral military arrangements -- including weapons supplies, training, intelligence exchange, and so forth -- are currently suspended. Thus far, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has rejected all Hamas requests to meet with him about the impasse, though some delegates have been permitted to speak with his lieutenants at the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

Even more devastating for Hamas is its strained relationship with Tehran, which for years served as the group's primary financial sponsor and main provider of long-range missiles (including advanced training by the regime's elite Qods Force personnel in Iran and Syria). Furious with Hamas's decision to join the anti-Shiite rhetoric of Muslim Brotherhood spiritual guide Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Tehran has substantially reduced its monthly subsidy to the Gaza government. And even if the Egyptian military had not clamped down on the border tunnels, weapons smuggling into Gaza would still have stopped because of Iran's determination to punish Hamas. In any case, no new supplies are reaching Hamas's military wing (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) for the time being.

Other providers of assistance to Hamas are beginning to close their pocketbooks as well. Two key donors -- Turkey and Qatar -- have failed to comply fully with their past pledges. Ankara has switched its attention to the Syrian crisis, while Qatar has just undergone a leadership change, spurring Doha to reassess its role as the Brotherhood's banker and reduce its contributions to Hamas. Similarly, private donors from other Persian Gulf states -- especially the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait -- are now under pressure to stop funding Hamas as their governments wage a wider campaign to curb the Brotherhood's influence.

INTERNAL DIVISIONS
The serial loss of allies and aid has produced a severe split within the Hamas leadership. Khaled Mashal, who was chosen to continue as head of the Executive Committee (formerly the Political Bureau) in April, insists that Hamas had to adjust itself to the policies of the Brotherhood's "International Organization," the movement's worldwide top body. Yet other leaders disagree, causing Mashal to lose most of his authority.

For example, in contrast to Mashal's Egypt focus, Gaza prime minister Ismail Haniyeh has emphasized the need to defend Hamas control over the strip. Although he accepted the position of deputy Executive Committee chief after failing to win the top Hamas post in April, he no longer heeds orders from Mashal.

Other leaders have urged speedy reconciliation with Iran, emphasizing that Hamas cannot afford to divorce itself from the "resistance axis". The most adamant proponent of this view is Imad al-Alami, the group's former permanent envoy in Tehran and head of the "Intifada Committee," now returned from Damascus to Gaza. He is supported by military figures such as Muhammad Deif and Marwan Issa, and by politicians such as Mahmoud al-Zahar. In contrast, Mashal received heavy criticism for attending a much-publicized May sermon in Qatar in which Qaradawi railed against Iran and its partners. His response was that he did not have prior knowledge of what Qaradawi would say.

In recent weeks, Hamas has sent delegations to Beirut and Tehran in order to reach new understandings with Iran and Hezbollah. Although both parties replied that they will keep their doors open to Hamas, they also noted that they cannot normalize relations until the group modifies its position on Syria's war and Iranian/Hezbollah involvement there.

Internally, recent Hamas leadership meetings in Doha and Istanbul have failed to produce compromise between rival factions. The discussions have also shown that power is quickly shifting from veteran leaders to the   Hamas members released from Israeli jails last year in exchange for hostage Gilad Shalit. Yahia al-Sanwar is becoming the ultimate arbiter in the group's internal affairs, while Saleh al-Aruri, based in Turkey, has taken sole control of the movement's activities in the West Bank. (Although the Turks are allowing Aruri and his staff to pursue the rebuilding of Hamas infrastructure in the West Bank, there is no evidence that they are turning a blind eye to terrorist operations planned from Turkish soil.)

CONCLUSION
Hamas's current weakness -- amply demonstrated by its serious financial difficulties, internal squabbling, growing isolation, and inability to implement a military buildup program -- means that the group's leadership could face growing challenges in Gaza as economic conditions worsen. For the first time in years, opportunities might present themselves to encourage Gazans to publicly protest Hamas's authoritarian regime and harsh Islamist measures. Local resentment toward the group has been building for a long time, leading the government to expand its internal security apparatus.

Although encouraging active popular opposition to Hamas would not be easy, it is not in the realm of fantasy. For example, it could be one of the topics discussed in upcoming Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. One important  question is the shape and scope of the PA's financial aid to Gaza -- namely, whether it helps Hamas maintain its $890 million annual budget, or whether it can be restructured to assist anti-Hamas forces in the strip, who are now deprived of any meaningful aid.

*Ehud Yaari is a Lafer International fellow with The Washington Institute and a Middle East commentator for Israel's Channel Two television.

Racism complaint filed against Australian Academic

Israeli civil rights group filed a class action racism complaint against Australian Associate Professor Jake Lynch, over Israel boycott activities, including Sydney University academic boycott.

July 31, 2013: Israeli civil rights group, Shurat HaDin, has filed a class action complaint under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 with the Australian Human Rights Commission over a Associate Professor Jake Lynch's participation and public support of  boycotts of Israel including an academic boycott of  Israeli universities.  
Recently, faculty and students at Sydney University called for the severing of links with Israeli institutions, actions that would be deemed racist and in violation of Australian Federal anti-discrimination laws.
The complaint filed by Shurat HaDin's Australian solicitor Alexander Hamilton is the first time that a Racial Discrimination Act action has been launched in Australia against those promoting boycotts, sanctions and divestment (BDS) against the Jewish State. It is the first time that Australia's anti-racism laws have been utilized against those seeking to harm Israeli academics or businesses because of their national origin.    
In its letter sent to the Australian commission, Shurat HaDin pointed out that the Federal Racial Discrimination Act of 1975 made it unlawful for anyone "to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion…or preference based on race…or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose…of nullifying or impairing…fundamental freedom in the…economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life."
The Shurat HaDin complaint also noted that any boycott of Israeli “settlement products,” such as SodaStream and Ahava, harms Palestinian economic interests due to the fact the factories employ many Palestinian workers and provide an important source of income for local families and villages.
This past semester, the university's student body endorsed Associate Professor Jake Lynch's academic boycott of Israel. Lynch had publicly announced his refusal to work with Dan Avnon, an Israeli professor from the prestigious Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which promotes Israeli-Arab coexistence, and also called for a boycott of Technion University in Haifa.
Last month, Lynch refused to heed the Tel Aviv-based rights group's warning that he must cease participation in unlawful, and racist, boycott activity. Although widely condemned by mainstream politicians and community figures, Lynch has also been publically supported by notorious Holocaust denier Fredrick Toben.

The European Union's Working Definition of Antisemitism includes the following:
"...Examples of the ways in which antisemitism manifests itself with regard to the State of Israel taking into account the overall context could include:
·           Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.
·           Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.
·           Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.
·           Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.
·           Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel...." 
An EU conference on antisemitism also inspired famous Soviet dissident and then-Israeli-Government Minister, Natan Sharansky to devise his "3D Test" to distinguish antisemitism from legitimate criticism of Israel. The BDS movement fails that test on all three counts.

Furthermore, the BDS movement has been recognized as anti-Semitic by leading authorities such as the Anti-Defamation League in the United States, and in a report recently released by the Simon Wiesenthal Center.

According to solicitor Andrew Hamilton:
"The BDS movement is racist by its own definition because it seeks to discriminate and impose adverse preference based on Israeli national origin and Jewish racial and ethnic origin of people and organisations. It does nothing to help Palestinians and indeed harms them. It is merely an excuse for the vilest public anti-semitic campaign the western world has seen since the Holocaust."
According to Shurat Hadin director Nitsana Darshan-Leitner:
"Lynch and his ilk seek to boycott Israeli and Jewish national products, whether its goods, services, performers or professors. By singling out Israel and no other country the BDS extremists expose the anti-Semitism that motivates them. We are hopeful that this historic proceeding against the BDS movement will serve as a model for battling it in other jurisdictions worldwide."

Wishing thinking ...for an Iranian moderate

From Israel Hayom, 25 July 2013, by Clifford D. May*:
                                                                               

...A letter sent last week by 131 members of the U.S. House of Representatives urging President Barack Obama to "pursue the potential opportunity presented by Iran's recent presidential election." What "potential opportunity" is that?

Hasan Rouhani, the new president-elect, they say, "campaigned on the promise to 'pursue a policy of reconciliation and peace' and has since promised 'constructive interaction with the outside world.'"

Should we not expect American politicians (of all people!) to demonstrate a little skepticism when it comes to "promises" made by an Iranian politician?

...how much research is required to figure out that Rouhani has said nothing even to suggest that he opposes Iran's support for terrorism abroad (including past attempts to blow up airplanes and restaurants in the U.S.), gross violations of human rights domestically, threats of genocide against Israelis and, of course, illegal nuclear weapons program?

There is a lot we don't know about Rouhani but this much ought to be obvious: He is a political clergyman, a loyal acolyte of Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader and self-proclaimed "shadow of God upon Earth." Were that not so, Khamenei would not permit Rouhani to become Iran's president. Remember: There were 686 registered candidates for the last election. Only eight were allowed to run. Loyalty to the supreme leader and adherence to his ideology/theology were required. Khamenei also made clear to the lucky finalists that under no circumstances are they to "make concessions to the enemies."

There are ways in which Rouhani is different from your run-of-the-mill Iranian jihandist/apparatchik: He speaks our language. He studied in Scotland. He certainly has insights into the peculiar psychology of the Westerner which may explain why, when he served as Iran's lead nuclear negotiator a decade ago, he consistently ate the lunch of those on the other side of the table.

Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, has taken the trouble to read what Rouhani has written over the years. He tells me that Rouhani has candidly stressed that "one of the goals of his nuclear diplomacy was to create a wedge" between the United States and its European allies so that Iran could import nuclear technology without incurring Western penalties. By contrast, the antagonistic approach of Rouhani's predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, raised Western hackles and brought painful sanctions upon Iran.

...Rouhani's "moderation" has been stylistic, not substantive. The evidence indicates that to him "constructive interaction" means persuading the enemy to let down his guard.

Which is essentially what the congressmen propose -- right after telling the president that Rouhai has "publicly expressed the view that obtaining a nuclear weapon would run counter to Iran's strategic interests."

No, actually Rouhani has expressed the view that Iran's strategic interests are best served not by obtaining "a" nuclear weapon but by developing an industrial-size nuclear capability to manufacture dozens of them. Achieving that requires spinning centrifuges and stocking up on enriched uranium until there is enough for "undetectable breakout" -- the ability to make weapons-grade uranium (or sufficiently reprocessed plutonium) so quickly that neither U.N. inspectors nor foreign intelligence agencies are aware it's happening.

This approach is not new. Alfoneh tells me it was spelled out by Abdollah Ramenzanzadeh, a spokesman for Muhammad Khatami, Iran's president from 1997-2005. Defending Khatami's record on the nuclear portfolio in 2008, Ramenzanzadeh said: "We had one overt policy, which was one of negotiation and confidence building, and a covert policy, which was continuation of the activities…" meaning advancing toward a nuclear weapons capability.

Ramezanzadeh concluded: "Today, in the field of confidence building, Japan is the most advanced country in the world, but Japan can produce a nuclear bomb in less than a week…" Exactly: The minute politicians give the command.

The congressmen advise the White House that "it would be a mistake not to test whether Dr. Rouhani's election represents a real opportunity for progress toward a verifiable, enforceable agreement on Iran's nuclear program that ensures the country does not acquire a nuclear weapon." Quite right but, perversely, no test of Rouhani is then proposed. What they recommend instead is more like a test of the United States. Washington, they say, must be "careful not to preempt this potential opportunity by engaging in actions that delegitimize the newly elected president and weaken his standing relative to hardliners within the regime…"

How in Heaven's name would it "delegitimize" Rouhani if American negotiators were to make clear that he'll be judged by his actions, not his rhetoric, and that the offers we've put on the table -- most recently during negotiations in Kazakhstan in the spring -- will remain on the table, but will be neither weakened nor sweetened in exchange for his smile?

Is it so difficult to comprehend that if we backpedal now, signaling our eagerness to appease, Rouhani will say to the hardliners: "You see how simple this can be? Do you finally understand why it is more effective to attract flies with baklava than with vinegar? And do you further grasp that, when you do it my way, the flies become calm and easier to swat at a time of our choosing?"

If last week's letter is bad advice, what should the congressmen be telling Obama instead? To stay on track -- as they should be, too. Of the 131 signers of the letter, 86 also are co-sponsors of legislation authored by Ed Royce and Eliot Engel, the top Republican and Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, establishing a de facto oil embargo against Iran as well as a significant reduction in non-humanitarian commercial trade.

The impact of sanctions is hard to gauge with precision because Tehran conceals basic economic facts. For example: If the current level of Iran's accessible foreign exchange reserves is north of $100 billion, the regime can soldier on for a long time. If, however, as some analysts believe, the Iranians have only between $20 billion and $30 billion in their coffers with a rapid rate of depletion, they could be facing imminent economic collapse.

Rouhani will have more influence on the supreme leader -- not less -- if he can warn that an oil embargo is coming and will hit Iran hard. After that, as economist Nouriel Roubini and Foundation for Defense of Democracies analyst John Hannah recently wrote, "Time is running out on peaceful options to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons."

Rouhani needs to be convinced that force is a credible option.

Remember that in 2004, he did persuade the supreme leader to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment in response to American soldiers pulling Saddam Hussein out of a spider hole in neighboring Iraq.

In the coming months (not years), American leaders will have to decide whether, on their watch, the world's leading sponsor of terrorism, a self-proclaimed revolutionary jihadist regime that calls America "Satan incarnate," will be permitted to acquire the nuclear weapons it needs to dominate the Middle East and reshape the world order.

How wonderful it would be if, within Iran's ruling elite, there were a moderate eager to avoid this confrontation and establish amicable relations. But that is not reality. If wishes were horses, 131 members of Congress would be galloping down Pennsylvania Avenue this week. It's their job to dismount, and plant their feet firmly on the ground.

*Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security.

Release of prisoners sends the wrong message

From Ynet News, 29 July 2013, by Yoaz Hendel:

Of the 1,005 Palestinian prisoners who were released as part of the Shalit deal, 44 have already been arrested for involvement in terror. The prisoners are cultural heroes on the Palestinian street.
...Whenever a new round of talks with Israel begins, the Palestinians ask for the release of prisoners as an entrée and, if possible, for dessert as well.
As far as [the Palestinians] are concerned, the release of prisoners has been the only achievement of the peace negotiations since the Oslo days.
...From Israel's perspective, the message is problematic.
A justice system that regularly acts in contradiction to its own rulings is hard to explain. Prisoners who were sentenced to lengthy prison terms are released following diplomatic decisions. Someone has to be wrong here – the judges who send the Palestinians to such long periods in prison or the system that releases them before they have completed their terms. The list of prisoners who are slated to be released next as a gesture to the Palestinian Authority includes some who had been sentenced to multiple life terms. 
The Americans pressured Israel to release the prisoners. Washington calls it a "tolerable price" - prisoners in exchange for renewed peace negotiations. Netanyahu, for his part, asked once again that the US release Jonathan Pollard, but he was denied. The "tolerable price" demanded of Israel is not applied to the Pollard case. 
Those who will not be released from prison will wait for the next opportunity; for the next Gilad Shalit.
The release of prisoners creates motivation.
Despite the revolving door in Israel, the government still lacks a clear policy regarding who is released, who isn't, and when. The result is that the government is not in charge of the prisoners issue; it is being controlled according to the developments.
One example is the Shamgar Commission, which was established to examine ways to deal with cases of kidnappings of Israelis, civilians or soldiers. Following the release of terrorists as part of the Shalit deal, the government pledged to adopt the commission's recommendations in order to stop the mass release of Palestinian prisoners. But nothing ever materialized.
The same stagnation can be seen with regards to the to prisoners' comfortable conditions behind bars: Academic studies, satellite TV and family visits.
Nothing has changed. The judges judge, the prisoners walk, and the politicians do not make decisions- with or without a referendum.

"Palestine must be Judenrein"

From Reuters, 29 July 2013, by Noah Browning:

(Reuters) - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas laid out his vision on Monday for the final status of Israeli-Palestinian relations ahead of peace talks due to resume in Washington for the first time in nearly three years.
Abbas said that no Israeli settlers or border forces could remain in a future Palestinian state and that Palestinians deem illegal all Jewish settlement building within the land occupied in the 1967 Middle East war.
The forceful statements appeared to challenge mediator U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's hopes that the terms of the talks, scheduled to begin Monday night over dinner, be kept secret.

"In a final resolution, we would not see the presence of a single Israeli - civilian or soldier - on our lands,"  Abbas said ...

..."We've already made all the necessary concessions,"  he said.

"East Jerusalem is the capital of the state of Palestine ... if there were and must be some kind of small exchange (of land) equal in size and value, we are ready to discuss this - no more, no less," he said.

TERMS OF REFERENCE
Before agreeing to return to talks last week, Palestinian officials were adamant that negotiations should have three main prerequisites: the release of veteran Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, a full settlement freeze and an acknowledgment of the 1967 lines as the basis for future borders.
Israel has publicly granted only one of those demands when its Cabinet on Sunday voted by a slim margin to approve the phased release of 104 Arab prisoners.
...Asked if the Americans may try to get Israel to agree to a de facto settlement freeze, the president made a broad smile and declined to answer: "I don't know... Israel has not yet agreed to a state on the 1967 lines, but it will go to the talks on that basis."

Last hurrah for a fake "peace"?

From The New York Times, 29 July 2013, by Michael R. Gordon  and Isabel Kershner*:

WASHINGTON — For all of the intricacies of issues like the shape of future borders, security arrangements and the status of Jerusalem, the Middle East peace talks that resumed Monday night are dominated by two simple questions: If it took Secretary of State John Kerry countless phone calls and six trips to the Middle East just to get Israeli and Palestinian officials to the negotiating table, how will it be possible to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement? And what will happen if his herculean negotiating efforts fall short?
...In making the revival of the Middle East talks his top priority, Mr. Kerry is not only challenging the status quo in the region but also taking on the conventional wisdom in much of the American foreign policy establishment...      

Some experts argue that it may be risky even to try.

“The existence of talks can have a calming effect while they continue...But I see no realistic possibility that a final status agreement can be reached now,” Mr. Abrams said.

“I just hope there are two State Department teams: one to work on the talks, and the other to start planning for what to do when they fail...."  

 

...While the talks are initially expected to focus on procedural issues, like the location, schedule and format of negotiating sessions, they are already beginning to take on a last-ditch quality.       

One area Mr. Kerry and his critics appear to agree on is that having made Middle East peacemaking his top priority, the secretary of state has raised the stakes so much that if this effort collapses, it will be a long time before anybody tries again.

...Hussein Agha, a senior associate member of St. Antony’s College at Oxford University, said ... “If it is not done now, it will not be done for a long, long time.”

*Michael R. Gordon reported from Washington, and Isabel Kershner from Jerusalem.

Kumbaya: all aboard the "peace train"...

From the Wall Street Journal Editorial, 29 July 2013:

Gathering at John Kerry's home in Washington, Israeli and Palestinian officials on Monday relaunched peace negotiations.
Syria is burning, Egypt is in turmoil and Jordan's king is under siege, but the Secretary of State will try to push this stone up the hill one more time.An independent Palestine must not pose a threat to Israel's security and survival, and that means that a defensible border won't match Israel's pre-1967 frontier.
The biggest obstacle as ever will be the inability of the Palestinian leadership to compromise.
Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian Authority for nearly a decade, inspires little confidence as a negotiating partner. His chief accomplishment has been to lose control of Gaza to Hamas, the terrorist group that denies Israel's right to exist.
The U.S. role should be as an honest broker, not as a backstage arm-twister of Netanyahu.
Peace isn't possible if Palestinians aren't ready to make it on terms Israelis can live with.

Major Palestinian party rejects Mideast peace talks

 From Ynet News, 29 July 2013, by AFP:

A major faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization rejected new peace talks with Israel just hours before their scheduled resumption in Washington on Monday after a three-year break.

The leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine said that talks' resumption was a unilateral move by Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas which did not have the backing of the PLO as a whole.

"The PFLP is against a return to negotiations," said one of the party's leaders, Khaleda Jarar. "It is an individual move," she said, in allusion to Abbas. ..."We went to the UN precisely to take our case out of US hands."

...Washington was to host preliminary talks later on Monday between Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erakat and his Israeli counterpart, Justice Minister Tzipi Livni .

The last round of direct negotiations between the two sides broke down in September 2010 just weeks after they started.

US Secretary of State John Kerry visited the region six times in as many months to broker the resumption of negotiations.

Iran Enters the "Peace Process"

From the Gatestone Institute, 29 July 2013, by Khaled Abu Toameh:
 
Hamas is so desperate following the ouster of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi that it is now seeking to mend fences with Iran.
The honeymoon between Hamas and Iran is about to resume...
Relations between Hamas and Iran became strained after the Palestinian Islamist movement decided to support the rebels fighting against Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime.
Both Syria and Iran have since been boycotting Hamas, which until recently enjoyed political, financial and military aid from the two countries.
For some time, Hamas did not appear to be very worried about the loss of its allies in Tehran and Damascus.
Hamas leaders believed that the support of Qatar and Egypt's ruling Muslim Brotherhood was enough to keep it in power in the Gaza Strip.
But now that Hamas has lost the backing of the largest Arab country, Egypt, its leaders realize that they can not depend only on Qatar's support.
...Beleaguered Hamas officials revealed this week that they have contacted the Iranians with the hope of patching up differences between the two sides.

Iran's then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad warmly greets Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal at a Sept 13, 2009 meeting. (Source: Fars News Agency)

Ahmed Yusef, a senior Hamas official, was quoted as saying that his movement recently held two meetings with Iranian government officials in an attempt to achieve reconciliation between the two parties.
"Iran and Hamas have a common interest and we are keen on not losing anyone," Yusef said in an interview with Asia News...
Hamas's apparent rapprochement with Iran is paving the way for Iran to play a major role in the Palestinian arena.
This does not bode well for the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, especially on the eve of the resumption of the peace talks with Israel.
...Iran's support for Hamas means that the Islamist movement means renewed financial and military support. It also means that Iranian military experts could soon arrive in the Gaza Strip to train members of Hamas and other radical groups.
With the support of Iran, Hamas will step up its efforts to foil any attempt by the Palestinian Authority to regain control over the Gaza Strip. And with Iran's backing, Hamas and other Palestinian groups will do their utmost to foil any attempt to achieve peace between the Palestinians and Israel.
Some Palestinian Authority officials expressed fear that Hamas, on instructions from Tehran, would try to initiate a confrontation with Israel in an attempt to embarrass Abbas and thwart US Secretary of State John Kerry's effort to resume the peace negotiations.
Without dealing with the new Iranian threat, it is hard to see how the Palestinian Authority would be able to move forward with any peace process with Israel. The presence of the Iranians in the Gaza Strip will scare Abbas and his aides and make them think twice before reaching any deal with Israel.

Hamas patches up ties with Hezbollah, Iran

From Times of Israel, 28 July 2013, by Stuart Winer:

Two senior representatives of Gaza terror group meet with Shiite organization in Beirut

In an attempt to to return to the fold of Iranian patronage, the Gaza-based terror group Hamas has been holding meetings with representatives of its Lebanon-based, Tehran-sponsored counterpart Hezbollah.

According to a report from Asharq Al-Awsat, cited by Israel Radio on Sunday, two representatives from Hamas met with Hezbollah members at the Iranian embassy in Beirut  last month. The meeting, attended by Hamas senior official Moussa Abu Marzouk, focused on increasing Iranian support for Hamas.        

According to a Hamas source in Gaza, there have been other meetings, all of which stressed that Hamas is a strategic partner to Iran.

Relations between Hamas and Iran soured over Syria’s civil war. Whereas Tehran and Hezbollah back the Assad regime, in February 2012 Hamas’s Gaza leader Ismail Haniyeh openly called for support of the rebels, aligning himself with other Sunni groups that have struck out against the Alawite Assad and his Shiite backers.

As the civil war in Syria has deepened, most of the country’s half-million Palestinians have championed the rebels, while some groups — such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command — have been fighting on the government’s side.

Hamas politburo chief Khaled Mashaal has never publicly taken sides, but in early 2012 slipped out of Syria for Qatar, drawing an angry response from Damascus.

In June, Hamas scolded Hezbollah for fighting alongside the Syrian Army against the rebels and told the organization to go back to fighting Israel.

“We demand of Hezbollah to withdraw its forces from Syria and call on it to leave its weapons directed only at the Zionist enemy,” read a statement by Hamas, posted on the Facebook page of its deputy political leader Moussa Abu Marzouq. “The entry of [Hezbollah] forces to Syria has contributed to increasing the sectarian mobilization in the region.”

The crimes of the prisoners to be released for ‘peace talks’

From AIJAC, 30 July 2013, by Sharryn Mittelman:

A protest against the release of prisoners

Today, Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams met in Washington to talk for the first time in three years and have reportedly agreed to a nine-month timeline for final-status negotiations.
For peace talks to resume between Israel and the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority insisted on a number of preconditions, one of which was the release of Palestinian prisoners.
It is a sad reflection on the realities of the Middle East that for the Palestinian leadership ‘peace talks' could only resume with the injustice of freeing duly convicted murderers and kidnappers, many of whom will no doubt receive a hero's welcome when they return home.
The Israeli Cabinet approved the measure (13 to 7, with 2 abstentions) to release 104 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails prior to the 1993 Oslo Accords in phases over the nine-month planned period of negotiations.   Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an open letter to the Israeli public said it was "an incomparably difficult decision; it is painful for the bereaved families and it is painful for the entire nation and it is also very painful for me".  Hundreds of people gathered outside Netanyahu's Jerusalem residence to protest against the decision.
Israel's decision to release the prisoners is a good faith gesture that reflects the difficult price it is willing to pay for progress towards peace.  That price can be seen more clearly when you look at the list of horrific crimes committed by the prisoners who are likely to be released. The list of prisoners was published by the Palestinian Prisoners' Club (PPC) and reportedly leaked to Israeli websites by Israeli officials. Ben Hartman of the Jerusalem Post looked at the terrorist activities of some of these prisoners:

"Deep within the list are the names of two Gaza Strip natives, Yusef Said al-Al and Ayman Taleb Abu Sitteh, who late at night on December 31, 1993, broke into the Ramle house of David Bublil after he and an acquaintance, Haim Weitzman, had turned in for the night. They stabbed the two men to death as they slept and then mutilated their bodies, cutting off their ears as souvenirs.
That Ramle murder came a few years after 48-year-old Haim Taktuk disappeared without a trace in the central Israeli city. Five months later, investigators made their way to the Ramle home of Bashir Abdallah Khatib, where they found Taktuk's body buried inside the recently poured concrete floor of a storeroom.
Khatib, No. 23 on the PPC's list, is one of more than a dozen Israeli Arabs on the list, all of whom Israel expressed strong reluctance about releasing. These prisoners are typically seen as a greater security threat than their Palestinian counterparts, because their blue ID cards allow them the ability to travel freely across Israel.
Collectively, the small number of Israeli Arabs on the list are responsible for some of the most grisly crimes of the pre-Oslo years.
They include the four men from Wadi Ara - all members of the Islamic Movement - who took part in the infamous 'Night of Pitchforks.'
On the night of February 14, 1992, the four men infiltrated an IDF training base next to Kibbutz Galed and attacked a group of teenage Nahal recruits, hacking three of them to death with hatchets, knives and a pitchfork. The three men were sentenced to three life sentences each.
Othman Abdallah Bani Hasan and Haza'a Mohamed Sa'di, Nos. 9 and 10 on the list, have both been in Israeli prison since July 1985 for the murders of Afula school teachers Leah Elmakayis and Yosef Eliyahu, who were hiking in the North when they were ambushed and murdered.
Their bodies were found in a pasture in the Gilboa area.
The prisoners also include two West Bank men responsible for one of the most infamous attacks of the first intifada. Juma'ah Ibrahim Adam from Ramallah and Mahmoud Salem Kharbish from Jericho were arrested in October 1988 shortly after they threw a Molotov cocktail at an Egged bus north of Jericho, which burst into flames killing Rachel Weiss and three of her young children, including an infant boy. The bombing also took the life of soldier David Delarosa, who ran on board in a failed attempt to save the family.
In a similar incident, Mohamed Adal Daoud threw a firebomb at a car driven by Ophra Tal, killing her and her son Tal in December 1987.
The list also includes a number of men arrested for the murders of Israeli Arabs and Palestinians accused of being collaborators with Israel, including Yusef Abdel Hamid Irshaid, who killed five people suspected of collaborating as well as two men charged with the murder of Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) agent Haim Nahmani, found stabbed and beaten to death with a hammer in Rehavia in west Jerusalem in January 1993.
The list also includes men who murdered neighbors and co-workers, employers and acquaintances.
Nablus-native Sharif Hasan Abu Dhailah will be set for release, after he, in May 1992, stabbed to death Avraham Osher, his employer of 15 years at Moshav Bakat. Osher was found stabbed to death in the date field he managed at a nearby moshav. Abu Dahila also worked at the date field, and the two men were reportedly longtime friends, with both visiting each other's families on a number of occasions.
Najeh Mohamed Muqbel of Hebron will be released after a little over two decades for the 1990 murder of attorney Ya'acov Shalom, the owner of the cafe where Muqbel worked as a cook.
Some of those on the list were terrorists who took part in more elaborate attacks.
Muayad Salim Hijja of Nablus has been in prison since May 1992, after he swam from the port of Aqaba in Jordan to the beach in Eilat, where he made his way to the Institute for Marine Sciences and shot to death the institute's guard, Yosef Shirazi, who was unarmed and 62 at the time of his death.
The list also includes Mahmoud Musa Issa, the head of the Hamas cell that kidnapped Border Police officer Nissim Toledano from his hometown of Lod in December 1992, and dumped his stabbed, beaten body in a field in the West Bank two days later, after a failed attempt to use him as a bargaining chip to secure the release of then Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
In another kidnapping in August 1990, Mohamed Yusef Shamasneh and Abdel Jawad Yusef Shamasneh of east Jerusalem forced teenagers Lior Tubul and Ronen Karmani into a truck near the Ramot junction and took them to a dry creek bed near Beit Hanina, where after a short struggle they stabbed both of them to death. Those two are toward the end of the list, Nos. 90 and 91, respectively."

EU's partisan meddling in Israel

From Daily Alert, 26 July 2013:

New EU Restrictions on Israel Are about Foreign Policy, Not Law - Eugene Kontorovich*
The European Commission has published administrative guidelines that severely restrict its dealings with any Israeli company, municipality or NGO based in, or even involved in, activities east of the 1949 Armistice line, including most of Jerusalem. European officials claim international law and a concern for Palestinian self-determination demand such action. The rules also bar funding of any organization connected to the Golan Heights, which has nothing to do with "settlements" in the West Bank.
    The Europeans regard Israel as an occupier in the West Bank, despite the illegitimacy of the previous Jordanian presence there. They also see Jewish communities there as violating the Geneva Conventions prohibition on the "occupying power...transferring its civilian population," despite the fact that Jews living in the West Bank were not "transferred" by Israel in any meaning of the word; they just moved themselves.
    Article 15 of the EU guidelines exempts groups that "promot[e] the Middle East peace process in line with EU policy." The exemption reveals the true purpose of the rules: to promote European foreign policy, not to vindicate international law. Indeed, the essence of the rule of law is about applying general rules to similar cases, regardless of one's sympathies. The application of unique rules to the Jewish state is the opposite of lawful.  
*The writer is a professor at Northwestern University School of Law, specializing in international law. (Times of Israel)


The EU Tightens Economic Restrictions on Israel - Daniel Hannan
In its latest guidelines, the EU in effect restricts its economic dealings with Israel to the pre-1967 border. It's a bizarre decision, even by Brussels standards. By blundering in, the EU risks repeating the mistake it made in Cyprus and disincentivizing serious bilateral talks. No one seriously expects that a deal can be reached on the basis of an unaltered 1967 line (or rather, unaltered 1949 line). By putting that idea back on the table, the EU is making compromise more difficult. 
This isn't really about peace, though. It's about the EU's natural inclination to one side of the dispute. 
(Telegraph-UK)